On the 16th the Battalion was moved to Mont Noir and Major Benké assumed command.[16] Working parties still continued to work in the Westoutre area, while parties of officers were detailed to make a thorough reconnaissance of the line just beyond Wulverghem and facing Messines Ridge, with a view of relieving the 6th Cheshire Regiment. However, this work was in vain, orders for the relief were cancelled, and we were ordered to move farther south and occupy the support area on the Neuve Eglise Sector, taking over from the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
[16] Lt.-Col. Gaze proceeding on leave.
On the 19th of September the Battalion marched from Mont Vidagne over the captured area as far as Bailleul, which town was now completely devastated, and then turning east arrived at Neuve Eglise about midnight. The relief was carried out successfully, although everyone was tired after their march of some ten or eleven miles.
CHAPTER XL
NEUVE EGLISE—MESSINES—HOUTHEM—WYTSCHAETE
In the Neuve Eglise area the Companies were spread over a considerable area, the whole of which was under the direct observation from the German lines on Messines Ridge. “A” Company was in immediate support to the London Scottish, who were in the line on Hill 63, north of Ploegsteert Wood, while the remaining three Companies were dotted along the defensive line of trenches just east of the village of Neuve Eglise. The Battalion was under orders to garrison this reserve line should the Bosche make an attack on our immediate front. Movement, of course, during daylight was restricted, and at the slightest sign of smoke the enemy would deluge the area with shells, and during one of these strafes “B” Company had to move its home further back, but not without suffering a few casualties. “A” and “C” Company were also unfortunate one night while furnishing working parties in the line, and several of their men were killed and wounded during an enemy bombardment of Hill 63. On the whole, however, a quiet time was spent in this area, and the Battalion was ordered up the line on the 26th of September. We relieved the 6/7th Inniskillings and took over the line in front of Messines town from the right of the main road from Wulverghem to Messines. Headquarters was situated near South Midland Farm, “A” Company were in the front line on the sector adjoining the road, and “C” Company on their right, having Stinking Farm as their right flank. “B” Company provided supports to both front Companies, while “D” Company were held in reserve behind South Midland Farm. The intention was that within a few days the Battalion, in conjunction with other units, should attack and capture Messines Ridge, so that the first days in the line were spent in reconnoitring our front, from which it was learnt that the enemy had a plentiful supply of machine guns. At night-time we were also busy in bringing up and distributing stores which are peculiar to an organised attack, such as red lights, Verey pistols and so forth. To recapture the ridge was less an operation by itself than an operation supplementary to a much larger attack further north.
The 2/16th Queen’s Westminsters were on our right and the 2/17th Londons on our left. The main road from Wulverghem to Messines formed the general line of the direction of our attack. On the Divisional front the first objectives were some enemy strong points close to our front line, and directly in front of our Battalion were three such strongholds, viz., Big Bull Cottage, Boyles Farm and Rome Alley. The attack was timed for dawn on the 28th, and at 5.30 a.m. our artillery opened up their bombardment on our front. It was not a creeping barrage, which had by that time become fairly perfect, but was rather a treatment of carefully-selected places and areas to cover the advance of our Companies on their allotted strong points to be attacked. Both our attacking Companies got well off the mark under this artillery preparation and possessed themselves of their objectives, the greatest resistance coming from Big Bull Cottage, where most of the occupants were killed, and before 7 a.m. the Battalion had claimed seventeen prisoners and nine machine guns. The Battalion on our left were also successful in capturing Mortar Farm and Ontario Farm. This clearing of the way for the advance to the Messines Ridge, though perhaps more an affair of fighting patrols than a staged attack, called for a good deal of initiative on the part of Company, Platoon and Subordinate Commanders in rushing and getting around machine guns when even the mere covering of the ground alone presented considerable difficulties. All the enemy strong points to be attacked had the armaments of machine guns, Captain Peatfield’s Company, “A,” our left attacking Company, accounting for six, Second-Lieutenant Pittam leading the platoon that captured them. Lance-Sergeant P. Mason, of “A” Company, mopped up a post of four with no little dash and skill, helped by the daring reconnaissances of the previous night, in which Private J. Volke had a notable share.
“C” Company (Captain F. H. Du Heaume) had also pushed forward and captured a network of trenches known as Rome Alley, driving off the garrison and killing a few of the enemy, while their patrols afterwards pushed towards Gabion Farm, which was strongly held by the enemy. Against this strong point “C” Company had to form a defensive flank, as the 2/16th Battalion had not advanced in the first stage of the day’s operations. No determined counter-attack was made on our front, although the enemy was active with his snipers and machine guns.
“B” Company moved forward during the attack from their position in support and occupied our original front line, while “D” Company was brought up to occupy the support line vacated by “B” Company.
The new front was then held pending the result of the greater attack taking place further north, while on our right the 2/16th Battalion (Queen’s Westminsters) assisted during the afternoon on the left flank of the attack of the 31st Division through Ploegsteert Wood, which met with considerable resistance, and the Westminsters suffered considerable casualties. The actual attack took place about 3 p.m. in the afternoon of the 28th, and turned out to be no easy task. The element of surprise which had assisted us was of course entirely lacking, and the progress of the troops on our right was attended with difficulties, and the Bosche made a determined stand, but under pressure gradually gave way.
By this time the success of the operations further north had begun to tell and, pressed on his right flank as well as in front, the enemy began to withdraw over the ridge in the late afternoon. His passage over the ridge, which of course was visible, was hastened by our artillery and machine-gun fire, which the sight of the enemy on the run in broad daylight naturally provoked. More than that, the Division could now, while still preserving the role of flanking the attack further north, push on to the ridge. Orders were accordingly issued for further patrols to advance over the ridge in the evening and secure a line east of Messines itself, curving back on the right to keep in touch with the troops there. This implied following the dip into the hollow of the Steenbecque River and its steepish rise to the top of the ridge, the whole way a pitted and torn desolation of the familiar type. Progress in the dark—it was pitch dark that night—was necessarily slow over such ground.