“B” Company led off, followed by “C” Company, two Lewis guns, two sections of bombers, Battalion H.Q. and “D” Company, and the remaining Lewis guns brought up the rear. “A” Company remained behind to bring up rations and water.
The advance was along a very shallow and narrow communication trench, and the scene of slaughter was approached through a barrage of tear gas. Owing to the movement of other bodies of troops progress was very slow, with the result that the Battalion endured some hours of tear gas, but the line moved slowly but surely towards the Cabaret Rouge on the Bethune-Arras Road, the site of a ruined estaminet where the Brigade Headquarters was now situated, just on the western side of the Zouave Valley.
In the words of the Regimental Diary:—
“The enemy was indulging in the most intense bombardment we had witnessed. He must have employed guns of every possible calibre. The air was just one solid mass of bursting shells.”
“We had little or no information as to what was happening, and as darkness had now gathered and we were in entirely strange trenches, there did not seem much chance of finding out.”
The leading Company (“B”), under Captain H. B. Farquhar, reached Brigade Headquarters at Cabaret Rouge at 10.15 p.m., and was ordered to report to the Commanding Officer of the Battalion holding the left of the 140th Brigade Front. After being loaded up with bombs and an extra 100 rounds of ammunition per man, they staggered forth through the barrage of the Zouave Valley, where the bombardment raged with its most intense fury, and arrived almost exhausted at the Battalion Headquarters of the left sub-sector of what was known as the Berthonval Sector shortly after 1.0 a.m., on May 22nd. The awful barrage of the valley had been negotiated almost without loss.
The Company Commander was told on arrival at Battalion Headquarters that the line of resistance and support line had been lost, and that his Company would deliver a counter attack at 2.0 a.m. It was then 1.30 a.m., and there was therefore no time to make any reconnaissance, nor was it possible to get any information at all as to the precise situation. Captain Farquhar was told that on his right the 6th and 7th Battalions would co-operate, on his left a company of the London Irish, and with him would be a party of bombers and details of the Post Office Rifles, but where any of these troops were to be found was not vouchsafed to him. He was told that one of his flanks would rest on Ersatz Trench, but as he had never heard of Ersatz Trench, nor was anyone there to show him where it was, he might just as well have been told to rest his flanks on the Unter den Linden. He was unable to find out whether there were any British troops between him and the Bosche, or how much of the line he was supposed to capture.
However, with these scant particulars, and with the information that the objective was about 600 yards up the side of the Ridge, Captain Farquhar was ordered to start his counter attack at 2.0 a.m.