These juries would prove the Magna Charta, the palladium, and true security of Indian liberty and property, against the despotism and extortion of their foreign government. And it evidently appears that the virtue of these juries, (as being, at one and the same time, truly effectual to the subject, and perfectly safe to the sovereign,) entirely depends upon the circumstance, of completely excluding the Company and her servants, from the smallest participation in the executive powers of government. But the efficacy of these juries, and of other inferior institutions made through the supreme controuling power, being once felt and known, would speedily induce the natives to purchase perpetual property in lands: seeing they would perceive themselves thoroughly secured in the produce of those lands. And this, being divulged abroad, would draw the inhabitants of the neighbouring countries to the standard of Britain; together with their wealth, and industry. By which means the British dominion in India, which, at present is, through oppression and consequent famine, in a great measure deserted and depopulated, would again be completely peopled and cultivated: arts, manufactures, and commerce would soon be restored to their former state; nay, they would be extended to a degree far superior: and these countries would, of course, be enabled to richly repay Britain for the blessings conferred by her, of perfect security in liberty and property; blessings, never before known in India.
And all this may be effected by means of that intermediate supreme controuling power: which would, not only create, but preserve, the full and vigorous efficacy of all these institutions, in the subordinate dominions. Whereas, if it was even possible, (though indeed it is morally impossible,) to institute, by any temporary means, all these powers, forms, rules, and regulations in those dominions, yet is it evidently certain that, so soon as these temporary means were withdrawn, the virtue and efficacy of all these institutions would immediately vanish, and be suppressed by the power of the executive government; which, from the nature of things, must unavoidably be, either despotic over the native subjects, or cannot exist at all.
But this same controuling power, as it would, on the one hand, by its fixed residence in the immediate neighbourhood, perpetually preserve the action and motion of all these institutions, like to a power ever present to wind up the springs of the machine; and, so, would check all the bad effects of that naturally necessary despotism in executive government: so would it, on the other hand, effectually support the power and authority of that executive government; and prevent its being encroached on, by an over exertion of the privileges conferred on the subject. For, on this side too, there is a danger; which will be readily comprehended, by those who consider the nature of government; and, at same time, the disposition of human nature. But all danger, of preponderating either scale, would be prevented, by the vicinity of the controuling power: which, holding the balance in its hands, and nicely diminishing from one, or adding to the other scale, would ever preserve a just equilibrium, betwixt the liberty of the subject, and the power of government.
Nor would the institution of new regulations be the only means, in the hands of the controuling power, of preventing the dangerous over exertion of privilege: it would likewise possess the instantaneous power of seizing, or otherwise of ordering to its own residence, all such persons as should prove over troublesome, or dangerous to the due authority of executive government. For, though it would be extremely absurd to trust a power of this nature, immediately in the hands of executive government; which would, infallibly, employ it to its own worst purposes: yet might such power be safely trusted to this controuling government; which could not have the same motives to abuse it.
Nevertheless, we do not mean that this, and all these other powers, should be unlimitedly confided to this controuling deputation: we still preserve a check over it, in the national government. And a most effectual check too; by means of the beforementioned copies of registers, immediately transmitted to Britain, from the subordinates; as likewise by its own minutes, accounts, and registers.
So that here would be a regular gradation of effectual political checks. The privilege of juries, and other institutions in the subordinate dominions, being preserved in vigorous action, by the influence of the intermediate controuling power, would prove an effectual check on the despotism or extortion of executive government; and would thus completely secure the liberty and property of the subject. And the same influence of the controuling power would sufficiently check the luxuriancy of privilege; and support the power of government; thus preserving an exact poise betwixt both. Whilst the sovereign, at a distance, could deliberately and effectually watch the hand that trimmed the scales.
And thus the institution of this intermediate controuling and impelling power, would completely remove every obstruction arising from the distance of situation: it would serve as an intermediate link of the political chain: or, as a bridge of communication, joining this dependent Indian dominion to the sovereign country. But, all obstruction arising from the distance of situation being thus removed, what difficulty can the national government of Britain find, in administring the political government of that Indian dominion? Upon this plan, that task appears to me more facil, less pregnant with difficulty, charge, or care, than it is to govern any one, the most pretty, of our foreign Colonies: nay it appears equally easy, as it is to govern the neighbouring Isle of Man: seeing that the opposition of the subjects, to the authority of government in this Indian dominion, though they be so infinitely more numerous, is not greater than is the opposition of the few subjects in Man. The only difficulty, that could exist to national government, was that of duly tempering, or abating, the power of the deputed executive government: and it appears, that this may be completely effected by means of this intermediate controuling power; which, in the hands of the sovereign, would act upon the government of this Indian dominion as the pegs or keys upon the strings of a musical instrument; of which one being gently strained, and another properly relaxed, would create, and perpetually preserve, a perfect: harmony, or concord, in this political system.
A PLAN, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND OF SECURE DEFENCE, IN INDIA.
The Company’s system of military government and defence in India is, at least, equally defective, faulty, and absurd; and, therefore, doth equally demand reformation, as doth her political system. For the same cause that renders the power of the Company’s several deputed governors perfectly arbitrary and discretional, in civil matters; namely, the Directors having preserved to themselves the charge of immediately directing and superintending those governments; confers, upon these deputed governors, a like arbitrary and discretional power, in military matters. And surely it is impossible to conceive any thing more ridiculously extravagant, than is this military system of the Company; which affords to each governor of four different capital settlements, the absolute, independent, and discretional power, of applying the military force of his own government; and likewise of directing the measures of defence: whilst each, of these four governors, holds a particular interest of his own, which is, not only distinct from, but opposite to that of all the others.
Can it be supposed that four men, thus opposite in their personal views and interests, and thus independent of each other, should heartily concur in general measures; or should cordially unite in a system of common defence? Common sense informs us that they will not; and experience convinces us that they do not. For it hath been known that one, of these settlements, hath furnished arms and ammunition; and hath otherwise befriended a power, at open war with one of the others. And, in the case of any one of these settlements being attacked, the others are extremely backward in supporting it; because each, of the four governors, giving the preference to his own particular charge, in which his own personal interest is more immediately concerned, considers all communication of his force, to any of the other settlements, as a diminution of his own security, and even of his importance. So that, upon such terms, the union betwixt these four distinct, and mutually independent, governments, can scarcely be termed federal.