How far the interest of this foreign dominion hath been injured by the Company’s political misgovernment; or how near it may be reduced to a state of utter inability to afford any farther benefit to Britain, is but little known by the public. For though people have heard in the gross, that affairs in those countries are rather in a bad situation, yet do not they either understand or believe it to be so very bad as it really is; or rather they do not comprehend how it should be so bad; as not being acquainted with the full power of the cause that hath produced the evil; and every one will form his notion of effects that he neither feels nor sees, from his knowledge or opinion of the nature and power of the causes that produced them. In the case before us, people have been taught to consider the oppression and extortion of its government, (of which certain instances are quoted) as the sole cause of evil to Bengal: of consequence it is supposed that Bengal hath suffered no farther damage from its government, than what may have been caused by some private acts of extortion, exercised by the few persons vested with the powers of governing: and, besides that the authenticity of these acts is denied or disputed, and men who are to judge only from report are apt to make allowance for the prejudice or passion of the accuser who brings a charge against individuals; still if all these acts of oppression that have been narrated should be fully credited; nay, if the hearer should suppose still more than is represented, yet cannot he conceive or allow himself to believe that such acts of extortion, exercised by a small number of individuals, could suffice to reduce the lately rich commercial kingdom of Bengal to such a deplorable state of misery, poverty, and distress: the cause assigned will appear too trivial for the effect; and of course the effect, at least the degree of it, will be discredited.

But he who means to acquire a just notion of the present state of those countries, and the extent of damage they have sustained from their present Government, must fully inform himself of the true nature and condition of that Government, and the manner of its operation on the general interest of the people governed; he must learn, not only that which it hath done, but likewise that which it hath not done; for the interest of a community may suffer far more detriment from the nonaction, than from the oppression, of its government. To the end, therefore, that every one may be enabled to form a proper judgment on these matters, we mean to present a general view of the nature, and effects, of the Company’s Government in Bengal.

THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE COMPANY’S GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL.

The English East India company is, under the title of Dewan, the real and actual sovereign of Bengal, Behar, and Orixa: a dominion equal to almost any one state in Europe, in respect of either extent and fertility of country, or numbers of ingenious and industrious subjects; and exceeding most of them in the internal materials of commerce, or resources of wealth. The Company executes the government of this dominion by a deputation, consisting of a Governor and Council; who reside at Calcutta, the Company’s original presidency, or chief factory in Bengal. And the Directors, who, as possessing the executive authority of the Company, may be termed the supreme sovereigns of this Indian dominion, have preserved to themselves the sole power of immediately ordering, directing and controuling the government; for this deputed government communicates its purposes, receives its orders, and accounts for its conduct to none but the Directors.

But it is evident, that the distance of situation must render the immediate controul of the Directors perfectly impotent, ineffectual, and nugatory; for it would be absurd to suppose, that the government of Bengal should defer the execution of any one purpose until it shall have communicated with, and received the opinion of the Directors, which cannot be effected in the space of a whole year; consequently the directors cannot interfere in the direction, or ordering of this government, farther than in some few cases of the most general or invariable nature: but the execution of even these general orders depends upon the will and discretion of the deputed government; seeing the Directors cannot, at that distance, enforce it themselves: and the same cause puts it out of their power to prevent or restrain abuse; so that they hold neither positive nor negative authority in the immediate execution of this government. And the condition or situation of these directorial sovereigns at home, renders their retrospective controul equally impotent and ineffectual; for they have no power in themselves to inflict other punishment on their deputies, for the most audacious disobedience, or for maladministration, than dismission from their service; and this becomes no punishment, because the delinquents are previously prepared for it, being ready to set out of their own accord with a princely fortune for the mother country; where they set the authority of the Directors at defiance; for there these sovereigns of India are themselves subjects, and cannot call their quondam ministers to account, except in an ordinary court of justice; and the difficulty of obtaining evidence requisite to convict in these courts; the dread of bringing to light, in the course of a legal process, some abstruse mysteries of government; and the apprehension of danger arising to the interest of the present direction from a powerful combination at the next election, will ever deter the Directors from seriously prosecuting a lawsuit against their deputies, even in cases of peculation from the sovereign; but if it respects only the interest of the subject, they will be more apt to palliate and defend the offence. We must therefore perceive, that this deputed government acts perfectly independent of either the immediate controul, or future awe of the sovereign: whilst the sovereign is compelled to blindly support, with its whole power, the authority of this government; and, without choice, to enforce all its measures; seeing that to oppose the will of the deputy, is opposing the authority of the sovereign.

And, as to the native subjects, the power of this deputed government over them is perfectly absolute and complete. For the inhabitants of those countries, being disposed by nature or climate to passive obedience, and by long custom habituated to despotic authority, and being farther impressed with a particular awe of Europeans, from a notion of their natural superiority, implicitly submit to the will of their present government, without once daring to either examine its right, dispute its authority, or question its conduct. The subject therefore holds not the smallest voice in the administration of government; the jurisdiction, the police, the finances, the military government and defence, are all incontroulably directed by the Company’s deputation: and the entire interests of those countries, the lives and property of the inhabitants, are subjected to its discretion, and depend on its will.

So that this deputation of the Company executes the government of Bengal with a power perfectly unlimited by any exterior controul; and if we consider that it is at the same time foreign to the country governed, mutable, and of very short duration, we shall find that it is equally unrestrained by any internal check. It is therefore the most unlimited government on earth; or rather it is the only government that can, with propriety, be termed arbitrary and despotic.

For all other deputed governments are sufficiently restrained by the authority of the sovereign; and we have no idea of despotism, except in governments that are supreme or sovereign. But the idea of actual despotism in a supreme government is merely imaginary; seeing that, in one and all of these governments, the power of governing is conditional, limited by rule, and subjected to controul both external and internal. For it is evident, that, in all supreme governments, the power of governing, and the means that support this power, must needs be derived from the people governed; and therefore cannot exist in despight of their consent; and though, in some of these governments, the condition, upon which this power and these means are granted, is not specially expressed, yet is it perfectly understood, and invariably enforced in all of them; inasmuch as there are examples in each, of sovereigns who have suffered the utmost punishment, for attempting to transgress the limits of this condition; nay, there is scarce one instance where the prince, thus transgressing, escaped the resentment of the people; and examples of this nature are most frequent in these governments that are falsely termed despotic. These examples must therefore convince all sovereigns, that there is a power in the people, superior to, and capable of controuling them; and the sense of this must ever prove an effectual external controul on the conduct of a supreme government. But self-interest, that primum and perpetuum mobile of human action, which we may term an internal check, operates still more forcibly, constantly, and immediately on the will of a supreme government; not simply restraining it from doing or permitting injury, but impelling it to promote the good of the people governed. For a government that is sovereign, and perpetual (or durante vita and hereditary) cannot possibly separate its own private interest from that of the community which it governs; being indeed itself a part of that community: and this is so evident, that no prince ever attempted to advance a distinct interest of his own, at the expence of the general weal, who was not a fool, before he became a tyrant. But a wise sovereign considers his people as the channel through which alone he can receive substantial good or evil; and, acting upon this principle, he will, however absolute and disposed by nature to tyranny, abstain from injuring the general interest, because he is sensible that such injury will recoil upon himself; and he will exert himself to promote the prosperity of his people, as the only means of advancing his own power, grandeur, or wealth. So that a sovereign prince, who understands his own real interest, though otherwise void of virtue, will ever study to govern well; nay, the private vices of such a prince do often operate public good; a striking instance of which we meet with in our Henry the Seventh; whose extreme and sordid avarice was the source of English commerce and wealth; and his mean self-love, and jealousy of power, established universal liberty.

But the nature of this Bengal government differs, in every circumstance, from that of a supreme government; being deputed, foreign, mutable, and temporary, it is no way interested in the lasting prosperity of the community which it governs; on the contrary, this government holds an interest which is not only distinct from, but diametrically opposite to that of the subject. For these Governors return to Europe immediately on the expiration of their office, which seldom dures above three years, often less; therefore their sole aim is to amass all the wealth they can, during the short term of their power, in order to transport it along with their persons to their own country. But the wealth which a government amasses, must needs be extorted from the people governed; consequently self-interest leads this government to pillage and plunder the subject: and we have seen that it is not restrained, by any external controul, from advancing its own distinct interest at the expence of the community which it governs, seeing it is perfectly exempted from all awe of either the sovereign or the subject; and it cannot be restrained by any internal check, because it holds no concern in the lasting welfare of the people.

Such then is the ruling principle of this government: nor are the means which it employs to promote its own interest less extraordinary than is its power to enforce them. For this government, which arbitrarily directs the jurisdiction and police, together with the imposition and collection of taxes, doth at same time act in the capacity of a merchant. And this commercial despotism, or despotic power lodged in the hands of a few foreign merchants, hath, in its nature and consequences, proved infinitely more destructive to the interest of that commercial country, than all the operations of political tyranny have been: for from it sprung these cruel monopolies, which struck at the very root of manufacture, commerce, and even population.