Upon the 1st of January, 1809, the Emperor Napoleon took possession of Astorga. On that day seventy thousand French infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and two hundred pieces of artillery, after many days of incessant marching, were thus united. The assemblage of this mighty force, while it evinced the energy of the French monarch attested also the genius of the English general, who, with a handful of men, had found means to arrest the course of the conqueror, and to draw him, with the flower of his army, to this remote and unimportant part of the Peninsula, at the moment when Portugal, and the fairest provinces of Spain, were prostrate before him. That Sir John Moore intercepted the blow which was then descending on Spain no man of honesty can deny; for what troops were there in the south to have resisted even for an instant the progress of a man, who in ten days, and in the depth of winter, crossing the snowy ridge of the Carpentinos, had traversed two hundred miles of hostile country, and transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga in a shorter time than a Spanish diligence would have taken to travel the same distance? This stupendous march was rendered fruitless by the quickness of the adversary; but Napoleon, though he had failed to destroy the English army, resolved nevertheless to drive it from the Peninsula; and being himself recalled to France by tidings that the Austrian storm was ready to burst, he fixed upon the Duke of Dalmatia to continue the pursuit, adding, for this purpose, three divisions of cavalry and three of infantry to his command. This formidable pursuing force was separated into three divisions, and entrusted to the command of Laborde, Heudelet, and Loison; so that after leaving a considerable corps in reserve in the Montagna de St. Andre, nearly sixty thousand men and ninety-one guns were put on the track of the English army.
About this period of the retreat an affair took place in the rear which excited the admiration of all who heard it, and has seldom been exceeded for cool and determined valour under circumstances the most disadvantageous. So rapid were the advances of the British troops on their route to Corunna, that none but men of athletic mould and vigorous health could keep in column. As an unavoidable result, many of the weaker men, and some that had been overtaken by sickness, were at some distance behind. The number of stragglers thus compelled to fall out was nearly five hundred. They were placed under the direction of Sergeant William Newman, no other officer being present. In addition to the personal ailments of these poor fellows, they were little more than half clothed, and many of them barefooted, so that but for their muskets, which they knew how to handle, they exhibited an appearance altogether pitiable and defenceless. Shortly after the army had quitted the village of Betanzos, an alarm was given that the French cavalry was approaching, when the men were instantly thrown into confusion by an eager but fruitless endeavour to overtake the British forces. In this exigence, Sergeant Newman pushed on a little way to a narrow part of the road. He there managed to hasten on the most feeble of the detachment, and detained about a hundred of the best men, whom he ordered to face about and contest the passage. This was promptly done, and with complete success. The little corps of invalids, consisting of soldiers from different regiments, withstood and repelled repeated attacks of the French horsemen. The sergeant then gave orders to retire, and when again pressed, reformed as before, and again repulsed the enemy. In this spirited manner they covered the retreat of their helpless comrades for four miles, when they were relieved from their perilous situation by the rearguard of the British cavalry. It is pleasing to add, that the intrepid sergeant who led this spirited movement was promoted to an ensigncy in the 1st West India regiment; besides which, by way of putting him in gentlemanly trim, a gift was added of fifty pounds sterling.
Thus Sir John Moore was pressed in his retreat with fury that seemed to increase every moment. The separation of the light brigade already alluded to, a measure which he adopted by advice of the quarter-master-general, weakened the army by three thousand men. Fifteen days; only had elapsed since Sir John Moore had left Salamanca; and already the torrent of war, diverted from the south, was foaming among the rocks of Gallicia. Nineteen thousand British troops, if posted on strong ground, might have offered battle to very superior numbers; but where was the use of merely fighting an enemy who had three hundred thousand men in Spain? Sir John Moore felt the impolicy and rashness of such an attempt; his resolution therefore was, to fall down to the coast, and embark with as little loss and delay as might be. Vigo, Corunna, and Ferrol were the principal harbours, and their relative advantage could be determined only by the reports of the engineers, none of which had yet been received, so rapidly did the crisis of affairs come on.
It will be imagined by every person, civil or military, that the mind of a commander, though of the firmest texture, in the situation of Sir John Moore, must have been severely exercised; and during this stage of the retreat the unavoidable difficulties of the army were inflamed by the unhappy intemperance of several who ought to have known and acted better. On arriving at Bembibre, the immense wine vaults established there exhibited such temptations, that hundreds of the men, unable to exert themselves, or even to stand, were unavoidably left behind. That refreshment was needed, no one can doubt; but it is more difficult to be temperate than abstemious; the first healthful draught led to many an inordinate one. Confusion worse confounded was the necessary result. There was an heterogeneous mass of marauders, drunkards, muleteers, women, and children; the weather was dreadful; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the superior officers, when the reserve marched next morning the number of these unfortunate persons was not diminished. Leaving a small guard to protect this bacchanalian crew, Sir John Moore proceeded to Calcabellos; and scarcely had the reserve marched out of the village, when some French cavalry appeared. In a moment the road was filled with the miserable stragglers, who came crowding after the troops, some with loud shrieks of distress, others with brutal exclamations. Many, overcome with fear, threw away their arms. Many more who preserved theirs were so stupidly intoxicated that they were unable to fire; and kept reeling to and fro, insensible both to their danger and disgrace. The enemy’s horsemen perceiving this confusion bore down at a gallop, broke through the disorderly mob, cutting to the right and left as they passed, and riding so close to the columns, that the infantry were forced to halt in order to check their forwardness.
Nothing, in the nature of things, can be more mischievous, though it endure only for a day, or even half that time, than such a violation of discipline as that recorded. It not only tends to produce discouragement in the ranks of well-ordered troops, whose resolution, founded on mutual support, is by such means sadly assailed, but so far as it is observed, and it can seldom be concealed, it gives proportionate confidence to the enemy, of which, on this very occasion, there was almost instantaneous proof. On the 3rd of January, 1809, just after mid-day, the French general, Colbert, approached with six or eight squadrons; but observing the ground behind Calcabellos strongly occupied, he demanded reinforcements. Marshal Soult, believing the English did not mean to make a stand, sent orders to Colbert to charge without delay. The latter, stung by the message, which he thought conveyed an imputation on his courage, obeyed with precipitate fury. The riflemen had withdrawn when the French first came in sight, and were just passing the bridge when a crowd of staff officers, the cavalry, and the enemy, came in upon them in one mass. In the confusion, thirty or forty men were taken; and Colbert, crossing the river, charged on the spur up the road. The remainder of the riflemen threw themselves into the vineyards, and permitting the enemy to approach within a few yards, suddenly opened such a deadly fire, that the greater number of the French horsemen were killed on the spot, and among the rest Colbert himself. His fine, martial figure, his voice, his gestures, and, above all, his daring valour, had excited the admiration of the British, and a general feeling of sorrow prevailed when he fell. The French voltigeurs then crossed the river, and a smart skirmish was maintained, in which two or three hundred men on both sides were killed or wounded. Night put an end to the combat.
The reserve at length reached Nogales, having by a forced march of thirty-six miles gained twelve hours’ start of the enemy: but at this period of retreat the road was crowded with stragglers and baggage; the peasantry, although armed, did not molest the French, but, fearing both sides alike, drove their cattle and carried away their effects into the mountains on each side of the line of march. Under the most favourable circumstances, the drooping portion of a retreating force indicates sensible distress; and on the road near Nogales the followers of the army were dying fast from cold and hunger. The soldiers, barefooted, harassed, and weakened by their excesses at Bembibre and Villa Franca, were dropping to the rear by hundreds. Broken carts, dead animals, and the piteous appearance of women with children struggling or falling in the snow, completed the picture of war and its desolating results. On the evening of the 4th the French recovered their lost ground, and passed Nogales, galling the rearguard with a continual skirmish. Here it was that dollars to the amount of twenty-five thousand pounds were abandoned. This small sum was kept near headquarters to answer sudden emergencies; and the bullocks that drew it being tired, the general, who could not save the money without risking an ill-timed action, had it rolled down the side of a mountain. Part of it was gathered by the enemy, and part by the Gallician peasantry.
After exchanging several shots with the enemy, wherever appearances called for resistance, the army retired to Lugo, in front of which the entire force was assembled; and on the 7th of January Sir John Moore announced his intention to offer battle. Scarcely was the order issued, when the line of battle, hitherto so peeled and spread abroad, was filled with vigorous men, full of confidence and courage. At day-break on the 8th the two armies were still embattled. On the French side seventeen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery were in line; but Soult deferred the attack till the 9th. On the English side sixteen thousand infantry, eighteen hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery awaited the assault. No advance was, however, made; darkness fell without a shot being fired; and with it the English general’s hope of engaging his enemy on equal terms.
This was a season of singular and almost unexampled peril. The French were posted on the declivity of a precipitous range of mountains, with a numerous body of cavalry to protect their infantry, wherever necessary. Besides this, twenty thousand fresh troops were at the distance of two short marches in the rear. Then it should be considered that the British army was not in a condition to fight more than one battle. It was unprovided with draught cattle, had no means of transporting reserve ammunition, no magazines, no hospitals, no second line, no provisions. In the opinion of competent judges a defeat would have been irretrievably ruinous, and a victory of no real use. Some have suggested that Sir John Moore might have remained longer in expectation of a battle. That was not only inexpedient, but impossible. The state of the magazines decided the matter; for there was not bread for another day’s consumption in the stores at Lugo. It is true the soldiers were at the moment in fighting mood, but want of necessary food would have deprived them of physical energy; so that to expose an army of gallant but starving men to the uncertain issue of an obstinate and probably prolonged engagement would, not only have been absurd in policy, but have amounted to a wanton and unmeaning waste of human life. An effort, therefore, to gain a march as quietly as possible, and get on board without molestation, or at least so to establish the army as to cover the embarkation, was the most, if not the only, reasonable proposition to which prudence ought to listen.
The general adopted this third plan, and prepared to decamp in the night. He ordered the fires to be kept bright, and exhorted the troops to make a great effort, which he trusted would be the last required of them. The face of the country immediately in the rear of the position was intersected by stone walls and a number of intricate lanes. Precautions were taken to mark the right track by placing bundles of straw at certain distances, and officers were appointed to guide the columns. At ten o’clock the troops silently quitted their ground, and retired in excellent order; but at this critical juncture a terrible storm of wind and rain arose, so that the marks were destroyed and the guides lost the true direction. Only one of the divisions gained the main road; the other two were bewildered, and when daylight broke, the rear columns were still near Lugo. The fatigue and depression of mind occasioned by this misfortune, and the want of shoes especially, contributed to break the order of the march, and the stragglers were becoming numerous, when, unhappily, one of the generals commanding a leading division, thinking to relieve the men during a nightly halt, desired them to take refuge from the weather in some houses a little way off the road. Complete disorder followed this untimely indulgence. From that moment it became impossible to make the soldiers of the division keep their ranks; and in this disastrous condition the main body of the army, which had bivouacked for six hours in the rain, arrived at Betanzos on the evening of the 9th. During the two following days Sir John Moore was indefatigable in restoring the needful order and discipline. He assembled the army in one solid mass. The loss of men in the march from Lugo to Betanzos had been greater than in all the former part of the retreat; so that the infantry then in column did not much exceed fourteen thousand men.
