The dangers of this tunnel system and the difficulties of negotiating the mass of wire in this area necessitated careful practice in the action of the troops holding it. Posts were manned daily from the tunnel system, this action being timed and every Officer, N.C.O., and man thus learnt his way about the whole system of defence.
The action of the Battalion in support was definitely laid down. No counter-attack across the open was to be made on account of the number of apron fences; in the event of the enemy penetrating at any point into the line, further penetration was to be stopped by the supports, and when the enemy was pocketed he was to be cut off by movement along the trench system against his flanks and rear. All posts and strong points were wired in all round, and had orders to fight to the last even if surrounded. All this careful preparation bore fruit later, on April 9th, which was, as a battle, a most remarkable example of the value of taking the British soldier into your confidence and making him understand why he was ordered to do something.
On the 15th, seven Other Ranks joined us as reinforcements.
On the 17th, at 3 15 a.m., a silent raiding party of enemy rushed the crater post of D Company, under cover of smoke bombs. The enemy were quickly ejected, and left two dead in our lines. Our casualties were:—Second Lieutenant Westwood and two Other Ranks wounded, three Other Ranks missing.
The next day we hit back, sending a patrol into the enemy’s front line, who searched it for 200 yards without finding anybody. The attempt was repeated on the following day, and an enemy wiring party was rushed.
On the 20th the 1/4th King’s Own relieved us by daylight, and we moved into support, Headquarters and A, B, and C Companies being in the village line and D Company in LE PREOL. The following days were quiet, and we were busy repairing the defences. Seven men went sick.
On the 25th we relieved the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers in the right sector, by daylight, the dispositions being similar but Companies from right to left being—D, B, C, and A. Our patrols found enemy machine gun fire very active. Second Lieutenant W. H. F. Smith went to Field Ambulance sick.
The following day was quiet, and at night our patrols were very active trying to get into the enemy’s lines to secure a prisoner. Ultimately the enemy got so “windy” that they sent up their S.O.S., and their barrage came down on our support lines. After 40 minutes’ retaliation by our guns everything became normal. Second Lieutenant James-Alfred was wounded. Thirty-two Other Ranks reinforcements joined us.
The next day was quiet, but the night was lively, four patrols being in No Man’s Land searching for enemy all night. From enemy machine gun fire we had the misfortune to lose Second Lieutenant Adamson, M.C., who was killed. Second Lieutenant Hulme was sent to Field Ambulance sick.
On the 28th there was the usual amount of artillery activity during the day. At 7 30 p.m. a raiding party, consisting of Second Lieutenants Taylor and Cooper and 28 Other Ranks, raided an enemy machine gun post but found it empty, and could not penetrate further owing to machine gun fire.