The enemy actually entered our lines at several places, notably GIVENCHY KEEP, PICCADILLY TRENCH, WARE ROAD, MOAT FARM, BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, HITCHEN ROAD, and WINDY CORNER, but he was very quickly driven out, except at GIVENCHY KEEP, BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, and WINDY CORNER; the situation at these three points was not really satisfactory until after mid-day.
The enemy’s northern attack failed to take any strong points covering the north flank of the GIVENCHY salient; it did succeed in taking LE PLANTIN SOUTH and in penetrating into WINDY CORNER, but was then held up by the garrison and Battalion Headquarters details in HERTS REDOUBT and SOUTHMOOR VILLA.
The enemy looted the Divisional Canteen and established his Battalion Headquarters there, thus being immediately in rear of the Battalion sector. A counter-attack by the 165th Infantry Brigade re-took LE PLANTIN SOUTH, and a local counter-attack organised by Battalion Headquarters, restored the situation at WINDY CORNER, but not before the enemy had captured our Aid Post and some 50 prisoners, including the Padre, and had sent small patrols forward toward LONE FARM, who, however, were destroyed by our advanced 18-pounders, which blew them to pieces at close range, bits of Boche being scattered on the trees and hedges in the vicinity.
Ultimately the German Battalion Commander and 120 Boches were captured in HITCHEN ROAD. These men were all found to be loaded with the contents of our Divisional Canteen; needless to say, they were quickly relieved of their loot.
The Boche continued to press his troops forward into the angle between GIVENCHY HILL and the LE PLANTIN—FESTUBERT LINE, suffering very severe losses from our heavy and continuous fire on his flanks; in many instances his own machine guns, manned by our Lewis gunners, were turned against him with excellent results. He could get no further and was completely disorganised by the fog and wire, and the situation on this flank became stabilised for the moment. The 1/4th King’s Own, who were holding the right sector of the Brigade front, had suffered very heavy losses from the preliminary bombardment, owing to the lack of shell-proof cover, the trench system having been practically destroyed.
The enemy, advancing over the flat between the southern crater and the canal, overran the main line of defence, but failed to take the most advanced sap, “Death or Glory,” situated on the bank of the canal. The garrison of this sap, consisting of one Platoon, about 18 strong (of the 1/4th King’s Own), maintained a heavy enfilade fire on the advancing enemy, causing him very heavy casualties. Though cut off for five hours, this garrison most gallantly held its position, and later in the day sallying forth, captured a machine gun and crew.
Despite the losses incurred from “Death or Glory” sap, the Boche pushed on and captured ORCHARD KEEP, the garrison of which had been destroyed by shell fire, and penetrated into GUNNERS’ SIDING, at its junction with the main communication trench, ORCHARD ROAD. He, however, failed to take either MARIE KEEP to the north or SPOIL BANK KEEP to the south. His further progress beyond GUNNERS’ SIDING was checked by supports pushed up by the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers. His endeavours to push north of GUNNERS’ SIDING were checked by the few men of the garrison and the anti-tank 18-pounder gun in the trench. This gun, though damaged by shell fire to such an extent that the breach had to be opened with a pick, fired no fewer than 150 rounds at a range of 200 yards at the enemy. Time after time the enemy tried to rush it across the open or along the trench, but were beaten off by the infantry covering the gun.
At about 10 45 a.m. the situation had stabilised on the front of our Brigade, and was as follows:—
A large number of the enemy were in the low ground in the angle between the north face of the GIVENCHY salient and the LE PLANTIN SOUTH-FESTUBERT line. Another large force were on the flat plateau between MARIE KEEP, GUNNERS’ SIDING, SPOIL BANK KEEP, and DEATH AND GLORY SAP. In other words, the enemy were divided into two, and contained in two deep pockets. At 11 a.m. the fog cleared, and there was a very marked increase in the rifle and machine gun fire, as all along the front small parties of troops, acting on their own initiative, began at once to attack the nearest Boche in flank and rear, forcing him to maintain his position in the pockets.
Orders were then issued to push every available man up to close the mouths of the two pockets. The forces available were divided into two parties, the northern of which was to seize GRENADIER ROAD, thereby closing the mouth of the northern pocket and cutting off all the enemy in it.