August was a trying month. The line held extended from MALTZHORN FARM, where we linked up with the French on the right, to a point near ARROW HEAD COPSE. The trenches were incomplete, as they were newly dug, and besides being narrow and shallow, they had not been joined up in several places. The enemy bombardment was more or less severe every day, and on the 3rd Second Lieutenants C. S. Munro and J. Hunt were wounded, along with 16 Other Ranks, whilst three men were killed. About this time enemy snipers were very active along a ridge about 150 yards ahead, where they appeared to have established themselves. This ridge was on the south side of and abutted on the sunken road which ran from our line to GUILLEMONT. Part of this sunken road was held as a trench by the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, who were thus enfiladed by the enemy snipers on the ridge and consequently had a considerable number of casualties daily, the losses among the Officers being especially heavy.
It was decided, therefore, to attack this ridge and establish a strong point there which would deny that ground to the enemy. This minor operation was considered important in view of the casualties mentioned and also because it would afford facilities for reconnoitring GUILLEMONT and the lines of approach, this being most essential in view of the contemplated general attack on the GUILLEMONT—MAUREPAS line.
At a conference held by the Brigadier with Major Crump and Major H. Parker, it was decided that Major Parker should carry out the operation with two strong platoons of D Company on the evening of the 5th of August; that under Brigade arrangements communication trenches (which were exceedingly narrow) should be kept clear to facilitate the movement of the troops taking part in the attack up to the front line; and that a barrage would be put down by the Divisional artillery who would also do counter-battery work.
When the attacking party commenced to move up to the starting-off place, it was found that the communication trenches had not been cleared as arranged, and it would have been impossible to get up in time by using them. The party therefore moved up over the open and managed to arrive in time, but, unfortunately, not till after dark.
Second Lieutenant A. Hague and his platoon attacked. The second platoon with consolidating material was kept in reserve in our front line, but the enemy was found to be in considerable force on the ridge, occupying a strong point, and a switch line running back towards Wedge Wood.
The attacking platoon encountered heavy rifle and machine gun fire, and our barrage brought down enemy artillery fire, which caused considerable loss to working parties in communication trenches. Three attacks in all were made, but finally the attempt had to be abandoned for that night. Second Lieutenant Hague was reported missing, two men were killed, and 25 wounded.
Major Parker subsequently reported to the Brigadier that he thought that he could attain his objective on the evening of the 6th August, provided he was allowed to attack at dusk without barrage but with only five minutes’ preparation with two Stokes’ Mortars, and this plan was assented to. The same troops were employed, having been brought up to strength. The attacking platoon, led by Lieutenant R. S. De Blaby, attacked at 20.30 hours. The attack was successful, the position was consolidated, and our troops were relieved by the 1/5th Liverpool Regiment just before dawn. During consolidation Major Parker went out with a patrol and located the enemy switch line, finding it heavily wired and strongly held.
The troops engaged in this operation rejoined the Battalion (which had been withdrawn to reserve) on the morning of the 7th August.