3. I believe the whole duty of man is comprised in this one great republican principle—Do just as you would be done unto.—My reasons for believing thus are, in the first place, that this first 'cause is wise and powerful beyond our conception, is clearly evinced in the wonderful formation and disposition of nature, exhibited in every thing that we have any perception of. That he is good, the whole creation proves: for we find nothing made but what is useful, beneficial, and conducive to the happiness of the whole. And that he is too far above the reach of human actions to be affected by any thing that can be done on earth, is inferred from nature, reason, and experience: for the only idea that we can form of the Deity is, that he is a perfect, unchangeable being; and if we suppose that he so particularly notices the conduct of mankind as to be differently affected by their different actions, we must allow that he is an imperfect, changeable being, liable to be pleased or vexed at the mere will and pleasure of his creatures, and dependent upon the whim and caprice of man.

In the second place, it appears from the experience of mankind in all ages, that Nature, in the creation of man, acts impartially and equally; but leaves his talents, disposition, &c. to be regulated by mere accidental circumstances. That conscience has an universal power, is evident from the dislike and abhorrence, with which all mankind look upon actions that tend to the injury of society. And not to believe in the unerring authority of natural reason, would be to accuse the Deity of injustice for not creating us capable of distinguishing good from evil, and then punishing us for the evil we commit.

In the third place, that the whole duty of man is comprised in this one great republican principle, "Do as you would be done unto," has appeared so notorious to the world in all ages, that it has been universally agreed upon, as the unerring rule of action, and the basis of happiness: by the observing of which there can be neither oppression, deceit, or injustice of any kind. The duty of man is his interest; his interest is to make himself happy; and the surest and best way of doing this is to promote the prosperity of the whole.

Finally, that system of religion which contradicts itself, cannot be wholly true.—That which is not consistent with reason, or agreeable to the order of nature, must be false, as different from the will of the Deity, displayed in all his works:—And, that which tends to promote discord, pride, and deceit, is prejudicial to society, and ought to be discountenanced and opposed by every good man.

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ON MIRACULOUS CONVERSIONS.

It appears to be the general opinion among the learned, that all matter is, more or less, in a continual state of transmutation; that there is a perpetual repulsion and attraction in nature. It is also the opinion of many philosophers, that the human mind is never quite stationary.

That locality, early habits, examples, affections, and associations have the greatest effect in forming the characters and opinions of men, is evident to our senses; and that after the character may be considered to be formed, a contrary course of habits, &c. of equally long or longer continuance will generally produce a contrary character.

Every attentive observer must perceive, that we sometimes dislike and entertain an unfavourable opinion of what we at another time approve and cordially agree to. To a cursory examiner these alterations may appear to take place arbitrarily: but to one acquainted with the philosophy of the human mind, accustomed minutely to trace the different links and associations which bias our ideas, they will appear, so far from being arbitrary or supernatural, to be perfectly natural and agreeable to the wise order of things. It would seem that most parties agree to the reasons given by the learned for such alterations, &c., except they be in matters of religion; here each party abandons the usual methods of philosophising, and has recourse to the supernatural interference of divine agency.

That extraordinary instances of conversion from vice to virtue, from error to truth, sometimes take place, for which the most profound and subtle reasoners fail to give satisfactory causes, is most readily granted; but still it may be said, that our not being able to trace a natural cause is no proof of there being none; for past experience has abundantly proved to the world the folly of such kind of inferences. Many things in science and philosophy are now even demonstrable, that formerly were, with equally good reason, considered to be miraculous or supernatural.