KUT.
PROGRESS IS BEING MADE AT KUT, IT NOW HAS ITS MUNICIPALITY.
| TOWNSHEND'S TRENCHES, KUT. | LOOKING TOWARDS KUT. | THE KUT MINARET. |
At 3-30 p.m. we advanced, and soon had passed the two field batteries covering our front, and reached, without opposition, the lines of the first brigade extended on the east side of the railway. About four o'clock our patrols reported that the enemy was holding not only the main ridge that joins Sugar Loaf Hill with the railway embankment, but also a broken line of low sandhills a few hundred yards in front of the main position. At the same time some shrapnel burst over our leading platoons, and a party of Turks, directly on our left, opened long-range rifle fire. The battalion halted under cover of some sandhills, the final orders were issued, and half a company and two machine-guns were sent to clear the enemy firing from our left flank.
Happily the latter retired at once when fired on, and the battalion advanced in perfect order, the small columns extending into line as the enemy's rifle fire grew more and more severe. The Turkish batteries now kept up a regular fire of both shrapnel and high-explosive shell, but these detonated badly, and our losses on this account were small. A rafale of shrapnel will of course destroy any infantry moving in the open, but intermittent shelling, although it appears to be terribly destructive, will not stop resolute troops determined to press forward. But the farther we advanced the more evident it became that Sugar Loaf Hill was the key of the position. It stood seven or eight hundred yards west of the railway, and the enemy's riflemen from the entrenchments on top brought a deadly enfilade fire to bear on our advancing lines. The Gurkhas moving in echelon on our left escaped this, but to meet it and to dominate the enemy's fire, the Highlanders were compelled to extend to the left, their supporting platoons being used to fill up the gap. Two machine-gun sections also pressed gallantly forward, and in spite of continual and heavy losses from now onwards, did much to help us to gain superiority of fire over the enemy.
The battle was now divided into two parts. On our left the Turks had been forced to retire from their advanced positions, but on the right they still held some trenches among the broken ground near the railway, two hundred yards in advance of the main position on the ridge; but on the right our losses had not been so severe, nor was our line so extended.
On the left the Turk occupied no advanced positions, but he outflanked our line, and the enfilade fire from his commanding positions was causing such losses that it seemed impossible for our men to continue the advance without strong artillery support. Unfortunately this was not forthcoming at the time, because our covering batteries had found they were at extreme range, and were now in the act of moving to a more forward position. If an attacking line wavers and halts within close range of an enemy entrenched, that attack is done until supports come up and give it again an impetus forward. But there were now few supports available, and the moment most critical.
Yet all along our front small sections of Highlanders still continued to rise up, make a rush forward, and fling themselves down, weaker perhaps by two or three of their number, but another thirty yards nearer the enemy. Now the last supports pressed into the firing line, and as one leader fell, another took his place. One platoon changed commanders six times in as many minutes, but a lance-corporal led the remaining men with the same dash and judgment as his seniors.