By the 18th April, the British were holding that part of the Median Wall that runs roughly for a couple of miles eastwards from the Dujail River to the River Tigris, other troops, also in rear of the Median Wall, continued our line on the west bank of the Dujail, and a third body was held in reserve. The open nature of the country, and the difficulty of distinguishing the enemy's main position from his advanced trenches, made the problem of attack uncommonly difficult, and the thorough bombardment of his trenches before assault almost impossible.
The key to the position was obviously the high double wall of the Dujail River. These walls are a hundred to a hundred and fifty yards wide at the top, and being very broken and uneven give some cover to skirmishers in attack or defence. An attack along this line is also made somewhat easier by a small ridge of sandhills that had originally formed the walls of an old canal, which flowed in earlier centuries between the Tigris and the Dujail. Photographs taken by our airmen showed that the Turks had strengthened their line where it crossed the Dujail, by building a strong redoubt on its eastern bank some 300 yards long by 150 broad; here too were a number of machine gun emplacements and, a little in rear, six or eight gun pits.
On the 18th a Highland Regiment pushed forward a strong patrol along the east bank of the Dujail, an Indian Battalion doing the same on the west bank, the two patrols working together and giving each other mutual support. Both Regiments encountered the Turkish outposts within six hundred yards, and after driving them some distance back, the patrols were withdrawn at night.
As an attack on the enemy position was decided on, the Battalion Commander suggested that a line of strong points should be constructed about a mile ahead of our line, that when these had been made good, a second line of strong points a further eight hundred yards in advance should be constructed, so that by this means the final assault might be made from a short distance to the enemy's main position, and also by this means artillery officers would be able to locate definitely the enemy's main trenches and the guns could be brought up within 2,000 yards before the Infantry should assault. This idea was adopted.
During the 19th the Highland Regiment, by some fine patrol work, drove the enemy advanced troops back with little loss, and during the night three strong points were built a mile in advance, two on the east and one on the west bank of the Dujail. From these points both the Highlanders and the Punjabis skirmished further forward on the 20th, and the enemy's position was becoming seriously threatened with but little loss to ourselves.
One incident in this patrol fighting must not pass unnoted. An artillery officer had been sent forward in the morning to observe the ground and enemy positions from our strong point on the east bank of the Dujail. It was a task of considerable danger, for already several of our men had been hit by enemy snipers, and at this moment a wounded man was being carried back by the stretcher bearers. The artillery officer had crawled a little ahead of the Strong Point in order to observe more freely, but his gallantry was ill rewarded by a bullet striking him and incapacitating him from coming back, or even escaping from his exposed position. Easton had been Sergeant of the Highlanders stretcher bearers since his predecessor had been killed when recovering wounded, and he himself had won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for a fine piece of work in France. Without hesitation Easton now ran forward from the strong point and, though the enemy snipers were dropping bullets all round, roughly bandaged the officer, picked him up on his back, staggered down to the river and got him across under the welcome shelter of the other bank, though the stream was over six feet deep. For this action Sergeant Easton now wears a bar to his Distinguished Conduct Medal.
