On the breaking out of the Civil War in the early part of 1861, there were borne on the rolls of the Regular Army 1,083 commissioned officers and 15,367 enlisted men. These officers and men had been maintained by the Government, under the long existing organization and administration before referred to, for the main purpose of preparing them for the emergency that was then suddenly thrust upon them, as a nucleus for the large army then organizing.
Let us see how well they were prepared for that serious business: 282 of the officers abandoned their flag, leaving 801, with almost the full number of enlisted men remaining loyal. These, under a proper organization and administration, should have completely officered, with abundance to spare, the entire 2,000 volunteer regiments called into the Federal Army, but when they came in contact with them, there arose great distrust and want of confidence, the volunteers alleging that the Regular Officer was supercilious and determined to enforce upon them discipline which they deemed degrading and dishonorable. On the contrary, the Regular Officers asserted that the volunteers were ignorant, insubordinate, and unappreciative of the great trials that were set before them, and it came to pass that by long isolation on the plains and martinetism the Regular Army had become so alienated from the sympathies and confidence of the people that even as late as April 1, 1863, but 112 of the 801 had attained the rank of General, and comparatively few of these were successful. On the contrary, there were some 175 officers who had ceased to belong to the Army—most of them having discarded it, but some having been discarded by it—who had for years mingled with the people, becoming known to them and in sympathy with them. Of these, 45 had become general officers by the same date, and a remarkable proportion of them successful ones. But here again comes the remarkably instructive fact that for 23 years after the retirement of General Scott in November, 1861, the Army was commanded exclusively from this latter class—McClellan for 1 year, Halleck for 2 years, Grant for 5 years, and Sherman for 14 years; the only officers borne on the list of the Army at the breaking out of the war who succeeded to command it being Generals Sheridan and Schofield, and these latter not until long after the war had closed.
Then comes the additional instructive fact that of the 18 most distinguished Army and Corps commanders during the war, 12—Grant, Sherman, McClellan, Halleck, Fremont, Rosecrans, Hooker, Burnside, Meade, Dix, Curtis, and Slocum (two-thirds), came from the same class of ex-officers while only 6—Hancock, Thomas, Buell, Pope, McDowell, and Sheridan (one-third) were from continuous service in the Army.
The only plausible explanation that can be given for these remarkable facts is that after 5 or 10 years' service in the Army, in time of peace, under its present organization and administration, ambition, grasp, individuality, and self-reliance are dwarfed, as compared with the school of the ex-officer who enters the list of civil pursuits on the lines of "The survival of the fittest."
As to the 15,000 enlisted men above referred to, from whom such great service was reasonably expected, they—by reason of the great gulf that had been placed between them and their officers—had lost much of their self-reliance, and personal pride, and made small figure in this four years' terrible war.
To illustrate what unwise and unjust discriminations are brought about by our present Army organization, where the enlisted men have so little voice and influence, here is a possible case, an extreme one it is true, but possible—many of its incidents often occurring.
First Sergeant Jones, sixty years of age, has forty years' continuous service; receives for his services in pay and allowances $32.81 per month; his grandson, Smith, with no other merit than the personal preferment of his Congressman, at the age of sixteen receives his education and $45 per month for four years while at West Point, at the expiration of which time he joins his grandfather, who is now sixty-four, and assumes command of the company, his pay jumping to $125 per month, but his grandfather's remaining the same. If they should both be killed the next day in battle (see paragraphs 85 and 162, Army Regulations) Sergeant Jones, the grandfather, may be buried but at an expense not exceeding $15; Lieutenant Smith, the grandson, may be buried by the Government at an expense not exceeding $75.
If they should both be disabled by wounds or otherwise and retired, Jones, the grandfather, receives $27 per month, while Smith, the grandson, receives $93.75.
If Smith, the grandson, approaches a guard in command of his company under arms, the guard will turn out and salute. If Jones, the grandfather, in command of the same company under arms, approaches the same guard, neither the company nor its commander will be honored.
If both these officers are ordered from San Francisco to New York as witnesses before a court martial, and travel on the same train throughout the distance, the grandfather, Jones, receives the actual cost of his ticket and $7.50 only for commutation during the journey. Smith, the grandson, receives the actual cost of his ticket and $156.64 as mileage, etc.