“As soon as Lord Grey was commissioned by the King to form an administration, he sent for me.” These are the concluding words of that autobiography, of which mention has been made. Lord Grey sent for him, and he became Foreign Minister.
Writing to his brother on the 22nd of December, 1830, Lord Palmerston says; “I’ve been ever since my appointment like a man who has been plumped into a mill race, scarcely able by all his kicking and plunging to keep his head above water.” We can understand that the kicking and plunging must have been very violent. The question had already arisen whether Belgium should or should not be made a kingdom of itself, with a king and constitution of its own. By the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 it had been decreed that for certain purposes which were in themselves no doubt wise, Belgium and Holland should be one. The United Provinces would be strong enough to form a barrier against the encroachments of France, and the balance of power in Europe and the maintenance of liberty might be so maintained. But the governing power had been left with the Dutch, and it was felt that the Dutch had oppressed the Belgians. The King of Holland had, as a temporary measure, assumed the power of appointing the judges in the two lands, and was unwilling to abandon it. He had then been assisted by the judges in depriving the Press of its liberty. And the Dutch had insisted that their language should be used in all public documents and all trials, although the Belgians had a language of their own, the Flemish language, and although French was the language of society, of the Courts and shops. And in all matters affecting religion and education, a strong bias was shown in favour of Protestant Holland over Catholic Belgium.
It can be understood that here in England feelings on this subject should run strong, and that the entire weight of the opposition to the new Government should be enlisted on the side of Protestant Holland. The Treaty of Vienna had been partly their work, and Lord Palmerston, who was now the Whig Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had co-operated as Tory Secretary at War in the work which he was now anxious to dissolve. As regards the Treaty of Vienna, this division of Holland and Belgium was, no doubt, a breach of that compact; but a treaty can be only binding when taken as a whole, and this breach of it was justified by the breach of one of its terms made by the King of Holland in assuming to himself powers which had been expressly taken out of his hands by the Treaty. This, however, was understood much less accurately by those out of office than by those in, and Lord Palmerston no doubt became more hot in his own defence the more he was attacked by his opponents.
We have his correspondence respecting the affairs of Belgium with Lord Granville, our Ambassador at Paris, and it is interesting to see how speedily and how warmly he takes up the Belgian question. An Englishman reading this should of course remember that Lord Palmerston was an English Minister, filled with English convictions at the moment, and that he (the reader) will of course only get the English view. But the letters do leave the impression that the English Minister only wanted what was just; and our history tells us that his views have been carried out, and that the measure, as directed by him, has been pre-eminently successful. But there is from the very first a tone of superiority in them which, though they were addressed to our own Ambassador, must have been offensive to French Ministers as they trickled through to their ears. Talleyrand, who was the French Ambassador in London, had asked that, as part of the arrangement, “Luxembourg might be given to France.” But Palmerston would not hear of it, and he then writes to Lord Granville; “It may not be amiss for you to hint, upon any fitting occasion, that though we are anxious to cultivate the best understanding with France, and to be on terms of the most intimate friendship with her, yet that it is only on the supposition that she contents herself with the finest territory in Europe, and does not mean to open a new chapter of encroachment and conquest.” Then we are told that, when the Luxembourg question had been given up, Talleyrand “fights like a dragon” for two Belgian fortresses,—Philippeville and Marienburg. “We had no power,” says Palmerston, “to give what belongs to Belgium and not to us, and we could not, under the pretence of settling the quarrel between Holland and Belgium, proceed to plunder one of the parties, and that, too, for the benefit of one of the mediators.” Talleyrand has asked questions about some increased force to our navy. “You may as well mention this conversation to Sebastiani, and take that opportunity of asking again about the Toulon ships. It is no harm, however, that the French should think that we are a little upon the alert with respect to our navy.” Then there is the question, Who shall be the new King of Belgium? as to which our Minister had at first wished that a son of the King of Holland should be named. Louis Philippe wished that one of his sons should have the new throne. But Lord Palmerston will not hear of it. “I must say that if the choice falls on Nemours, and the King of the French accepts, it will be a proof that the policy of France is like an infection clinging to the walls of the dwelling, and breaking out in every successive occupant.” “We are reluctant even to think of war; but if ever we are to make another effort, this is a legitimate occasion; and we find we could not submit to the placing of the Duc de Nemours on the throne of Belgium without danger to the safety, and a sacrifice of the honour of the country.” “If they are straightforward in their intentions, why cannot they be so in their proceedings? Why such endless intrigues and plots, and such change of plans, all tending to the same object.” Then there comes a letter, purposely written and sent in an unusual way, that it may certainly be read by Sebastiani. For it was sent through the French Foreign Office, and not by our own messengers; as to which Lord Granville observes that it will have the desired effect. “Sebastiani should really be made to understand that he must have the goodness to keep his temper, or, when it fails him, let him go to vent his ill-humour upon some other quarter, and not bestow it upon England. We are not used to being accused of making people dupes.” What was Sebastiani’s personal nature, we do not know. This may have made him keep his temper. But it must surely have taught him to think that our Minister was very uncivil, as he of course knew well why the letter had been sent through the French Foreign Office.
Other attempts are made by the French to get other morsels of territory into their hands, and a strong French feeling is roused in Belgium, which troubles Lord Palmerston almost as much as the French overtures made for direct French objects. A Regent, in the interests of France, was appointed during the vacancy of the throne, of whom Palmerston refuses to take any notice. “The greater part of our difficulties with the Belgians have arisen from the double diplomacy, double dealing infirmity of purpose, and want of principle in the French Government.” A M. D’Arschot is sent to England as a diplomate, but Lord Palmerston refuses to see him officially. “I shall be happy to receive M. D’Arschot at my house as an individual; I cannot ask him to the office.” Then he goes on. “The moment we give France a cabbage garden or a vineyard, we lose all our vantage-ground of principle; and it becomes then a mere question of degree or the relative value of the different things which, one after the other, she will demand.” And he lays down a general principle, by which it will be found that he always acted. “You don’t stave off war or stop demands by yielding to urgent demands, however small, from fear of war. The maxim of giving way to have an easy life will, if you follow it, lead to your having a life without a moment’s ease.”
At length the question as to what king should be chosen was settled by the election of Leopold to the throne of Belgium,—altogether with the good-will of Palmerston, though a Dutch Prince had been his first choice, as has been already said. But this had been done without the assent of the King of Holland; and Dutch troops marched into Belgium on one side, and French troops on the other to support Belgium. The French obtained some success, and immediately there arose the renewal of French encroachments. “As to the fortresses,” says Lord Palmerston, still writing to Lord Granville, “if they expected that we were to sign a treaty with them for the destruction of those fortresses, I would tell him that I would never put my hand to such a treaty, even if the Government agreed to it.” “One thing is certain,—the French must go out of Belgium, or we have a general war, and war in a given number of days.” “I told him we never would agree to mix up the two questions, the departure of the French troops, and the question of the fortresses. I asked him whether his Government wished that people hereafter should believe the French Government or its word.” “I have seldom seen a stronger feeling than that of the Cabinet about the question of the fortresses.” “But let us stave off all these nibblings,” he says in reference to a demand expressed by Prussia that Philippeville and Marienburg should be given up to France. “If once these great Powers begin to taste blood, they will never be satisfied with one bite, but will speedily devour their victim.”
At last the Belgian question was settled, and a kingdom was formed, which has since remained, respected by all men, and the strongest in its circumstances among the lesser nations of the earth. To name Belgium, is to speak of good faith and constitutional well-being. The love for it which England bears was strongly evinced during the German and French war in 1870, when Bernal Osborne asked a question in the House of Commons as to the part which England would take if either party carried their armies over the frontier into Belgium. The French at that moment had been driven up into a corner at Sedan, and were compelled either to surrender or to trespass on the Belgian territory. But the question asked in the House of Commons, and the answer given, sufficed for the purpose; and no armed Frenchman and no armed German trod upon the soil which had become the Kingdom of Belgium.
Lord Palmerston had no doubt done his work well in helping the arrangement. He was disinterested throughout on the part of England, and wise, and honest, and very brave. He had allowed no foreign diplomate to hoodwink him. England, looking back at his conduct, has reason to be proud of him. But there can be no doubt that he did make himself very offensive to his French colleagues in the arrangements, and took upon himself to speak, as though he were the only honest man concerned in the work. Whether it was essential to his purpose that he should do so must now be a matter of opinion; but there can be no doubt that he made himself odious to Louis Philippe and the French Ministers, who must have looked upon him as an English bear altogether unacquainted with diplomatic courtesies. Such I think must have been the opinion held by Louis Philippe to the end. For in these years of his life it seems to have been Palmerston’s business to have thwarted Louis Philippe in all his politics.
But, during the period in which the Kingdom of Belgium was being formed, the English Reform Bill was passed, a measure of such vital importance to England as almost, in English eyes, to obliterate these first struggles of Belgian infancy. But Lord Palmerston, true to his theory of political life, took but little heed of the Reform Bill. He did speak on the subject, as it was essential that he should do so; and explained how it had come to pass with him, as with others, that he had grown wiser as he had grown older. It was necessary that one, who had come into power among Lord Liverpool’s Tories, should defend his vote by such an argument. But there is nothing to make us think that his heart was with the Reformers. Indeed, as long as he remained at the Foreign Office his heart was with foreign affairs. And though, as a member of a Cabinet, he was bound to support that Cabinet’s measures, I should doubt whether he asked many questions on the subject. His heart was then in Belgium, and in the Quadruple Alliance for establishing free institutions in Spain and Portugal, and afterwards in creating the kingdom of Greece, and in endeavouring to stop the abominable iniquities of Louis Philippe in reference to the Spanish marriages. But he supported the Reform Bill, and in consequence of his doing so,—or in consequence, rather, of his belonging to a Whig Ministry,—he lost his seat for the University of Cambridge, and, at the general election 1832, was returned to Parliament by South Hampshire, his own county.
Allusion has been made to the pride which Lord Palmerston took in the Quadruple Alliance. The Quadruple Alliance was a compact made between England, France, Spain, and Portugal, for preserving the thrones of Spain and Portugal on behalf of Isabella and Maria, and defending the two Princesses from the machinations of their uncles, Don Carlos and Don Miguel. That the two Princesses were the legitimate heirs to the thrones need not now, specially in England, be more than stated. But the collateral object was to ensure freedom under the rule of the two Queens, instead of despotism, with all its bitterness, under the two Kings. That at least was Lord Palmerston’s object; though, when we come to the story of the Spanish marriages, we shall find that Louis Philippe had a further object of his own. For some account of the kind of misery to be looked for under Don Miguel, to whom Palmerston was specially hostile, I may refer my readers to an article in the Edinburgh Review of September, 1831, on the condition of Portugal.