Lord Palmerston

by Anthony Trollope

But though the Tories were strong in hope, and Sir Robert Peel had hurried back from Italy very fast,—but hardly fast enough to satisfy the longings of his party,—they were not destined to remain in power. On April 21, 1835, he once more writes to his brother from the Foreign Office, “Here I am again at my old work.” But at the general election he had lost his seat for South Hampshire, the county having a county’s dislike to a Whig member. Lord Palmerston had, however, found a seat at Tiverton, which he kept till he died. We are told that at this period he nearly slipped out of official life, having in truth but few strong ties by which he was bound to other men. Some asked themselves the question, why was he there,—he who had so lately been a Tory, and had done so little for his adopted party? For his work had been office work, diplomatic work, silent work, done by the pen rather than by the tongue, and had not recommended itself to the Radicals. The Foreign Office was a place of great power, and very desirable. Why should it not be given to some man who had made himself hot with the heat of the battle of Reform? And when the time came that he was without a seat it might have been easy to pass him over. He did not belong to any great Whig ducal house, nor had he put himself forward as a popular speaker. But he had his eyes wide open, and knew well how to say a word in season. And he selected his special friends with judgment. Lord Melbourne was his friend, and Lord Melbourne reinstated him at the Foreign Office.

On his reappointment, he expressed an opinion to his brother, the truth of which every Englishman will feel. “The truth is that English interests continue the same, let who will be in office, and that upon leading principles and great measures men of both sides, when they come to act dispassionately and with responsibility upon them, will be found acting very much alike.” The meaning of this is that an English statesman cannot dare to be other than honest. The right thing to do must be the right thing, whether Lord Aberdeen or Lord Palmerston be in power. When some vital question comes up as to the spreading or confining the British Empire in India, and adding a new nation to our responsibilities, then there may be a difference in policy, and one set of Ministers may fail to carry out the projects of their predecessors. But in the ordinary affairs of European politics, in which clear-seeing eyes may certainly discern what honesty demands, Whigs and Tories, Liberals and Conservatives, will be found “acting very much alike.”

It was now that Lord Palmerston obtained the sanction of the Cabinet for the British Legion in Spain. It was intended to assist Queen Isabella in opposing the priests and the Inquisition. It no doubt did have that effect, though it was not altogether a success, and Sir de Lacy Evans, at the head of the Legion, was so badly handled as to make the matter appear a fitting subject for a Parliamentary attack on Lord Palmerston. This was done with great vigour and, through a debate which lasted for three nights, it was almost doubtful which way the majority might decide. Towards the end of it Lord Palmerston spoke, and proved that the silence which was usual to him did not come from want of capacity to speak, or want of fire in speaking when the subject seemed to justify it. The speech is thus described by Mr. Edward Ellice; “It is, however, useless to say any more of it than that Palmerston has made so admirable a speech in every respect as completely to have gained the House, and to have re-established himself entirely in their good opinion, if there was a question of his having lost it in some quarters. He spoke for three hours; and I never heard a more able, vigorous, or successful defence of the foreign policy of a Government, or war better or more happily and fearlessly carried into the enemy’s quarters.” And we are told that the House was riotous with cheering throughout. When it divided, however, there was a majority of no more than thirty-six among five hundred and twenty members.

In reading the letters from Lord Palmerston to his brother and to Lord Granville, we cannot but feel sometimes that they were written with a view to the public. They contain sententious morsels of didactic wisdom, which would not have not been put there in the hurry of private correspondence unless they had been intended for other eyes. “When two of the most powerful maritime nations accept us as mediators upon a point of national honour, it is clear that they must think that we have not forfeited our own.” “England,” he says, “is to be as full of railways as a ploughed field is of furrows, but the crop they will bear is more doubtful.” “The nobles both in Spain and Portugal are the most incapable part of the nation, and therefore a remodelling of the Upper Chambers in both countries seems a reasonable thing.” “No empire is likely to fall to pieces if left to itself, and if no kind neighbours forcibly tear it to pieces.” “Half the wrong conclusions at which mankind arrive are leached by the abuse of metaphors.” And we do not always feel that he is right. He gets a little out of his element when he attempts to draw the conclusions at which he arrives. But when he tells of a fact, and of his conclusion from that, he is always correct. In reference to the King’s speech in January, 1837, he says: “On Foreign affairs we shall say little, and especially not a word about France or French Alliance. We can say nothing in their praise, and therefore silence is the most complimentary thing we can bestow upon them.” At this period we certainly could have said nothing complimentary respecting France, as the Spanish marriages were coming on, and the preparations for the Spanish marriages were being made.

In 1837 King William died, and the present Sovereign came to the throne. She was then but eighteen years old, but immediately showed her fitness for her high office. “The Queen went through her task to-day with great dignity and self-possession,” Lord Palmerston says, writing to Lord Granville. “One saw she felt much inward emotion; but it was fully controlled. Her articulation was peculiarly good; her voice remarkably pleasing.” “They,” the foreign Ministers, “were introduced one by one. Nothing could be better than her manner of receiving them; it is easy, and dignified, and gracious.” “There will be lots of extra ambassadors, and shoals of princes, at our coronation. Heaven knows what we shall do with them, or how and where they will find lodging. They will be disappointed, both as to the effect they will themselves produce, and as to the splendour of the ceremony they come to witness. State coaches, fine liveries, and gilt harness make no sensation in London, except among coachmakers and stablemen.” And then he adds: “I do not think that marriage has yet entered the Queen’s head; perhaps some of her visitors may inspire her with the idea; but after being used to agreeable and well-informed Englishmen, I fear she will not find a foreign prince to her liking.” As to the foreign prince, however, Palmerston proved himself to have been absolutely wrong.

In 1838 and 1839 Mehemet Ali was a great man. He had obtained for himself the Pashalic of Egypt and the Dominion of Syria. Not content with that, he desired further influence in European Turkey; and had probably conceived in his brain the idea of first upsetting, and then occupying the throne of the Sultan. Though in this he would not have succeeded, as the powers were too strong for him, he would probably have enabled the Emperor of Russia to have taken possession of Constantinople, as the protector of the Turk, but for the zeal and readiness of the English. It must not be told here how Sir Charles Napier,—Don Carlos de Ponza, as Lord Palmerston called him,—put an end to this dream by taking first Sidon, and then Acre, and created that enthusiasm in the mind of Palmerston which afterwards led to the unfortunate dinner at the Reform Club, to the taking of Bomarsund in lieu of Cronstadt, and resulted at last in the bitterness of the Admiral’s parliamentary attacks on his old friends when the Crimean war was over. It is useless now to look back and to suggest what would have happened had things been allowed to take another course. But if Russia had then been the protector of Turkey instead of England, the latter campaign, if fought at all, would have taken place nearer to the more hospitable regions of Middle Europe than the Crimea. As it was, Mehemet Ali was stopped, and Turkey was defended, and Russia for awhile kept in its place, I must not say by the zeal of Lord Palmerston,—because it would be going too far to give to him the entire credit of doing what England did,—but with his co-operation and in conformity with his councils. It was at the time presumed that Mehemet Ali was struggling for supreme power, in conformity with French tactics; or, in other words, that France was seeking to obtain the upper hand in Egypt. We were then awake to the necessity of maintaining for ourselves a way through Egypt to India. This we were bound to do for the preservation of our Indian Empire, and should probably have done it under any circumstances; but Lord Palmerston took so prominent a part in the matter that it is necessary to follow him in his eagerness for a few pages.

There were three parties with whom he had to carry on the contest; and among the three the first was that which occasioned him the least trouble. They were Mehemet Ali himself, the King of the French, and the opposing members of our own Cabinet. It was comparatively easy to dispose of Mehemet Ali, with the assistance of Sir Charles Napier; but Louis Philippe was an antagonist with whom it was much more difficult to deal. Palmerston put no trust in Louis Philippe, regarding him from first to last as an enemy to English practices and English aspirations; but neither was he afraid of Louis Philippe and his Minister. He was afraid of some among his own colleagues, who could only with great difficulty be got to act with him in opposition to French counsels. He writes as follows to Lord Granville; “Let the French say what they like, they cannot go to war with the four Powers in support of Mehemet Ali. Would they hazard a naval war for such an object? Where are they to find ships to equal or to contend with the British navy alone, leaving out the Russian navy, which in such case would join us? What would become of Algiers if they were at war with a Power superior to France at sea? Would they risk a Continental war? And for what? Could they help Mehemet Ali by marching to the Rhine? And would they not be driven back as fast as they went? It is impossible. The French may talk big, but they cannot make war for such a cause. It would be very unwise to underrate the force of France and the evils of a war with her in a case in which she had national interest and a just cause; but it would be equally inexpedient to be daunted by big words and empty vapouring in a case in which a calm view of things ought to convince one that France alone would be the sufferer by a war hastily, capriciously, and unjustly undertaken by herself.” Thiers and Guizot were at this time the chief advisers of Louis Philippe, M. Guizot having become the French Ambassador in London. But Lord Palmerston believed not much in any of the three. “The truth is,” he says, “however reluctantly one may avow the conviction, that Louis Philippe is a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed. However, there he is, and we call him our ally; only we ought to be enlightened by experience and not to attach to his assertions or professions any greater value than really belongs to them; more especially when, as in the case of Egypt, his words are not only at variance with his conduct, but even inconsistent with each other. The Cabinet have determined that we must without delay bring the French to a clear and definite arrangement about their fleet.” Austria, Prussia, and Russia were willing to act with us, but were not willing to take a part so active as that which Palmerston desired on the part of England.

But it was necessary to act in co-operation with these Powers, and it was found very difficult to obtain the accord of the entire British Cabinet. In consequence of this we find him writing to Lord Melbourne on the 5th of July, 1840, and offering to resign his post “The difference of opinion which seems to exist between myself and some members of the Cabinet upon the Turkish question, has led me, upon full consideration, to the conviction that it is a duty which I owe to myself and to my colleagues to relieve you and others from the necessity of deciding between my views and those of other members of the Cabinet on these matters, by placing, as I now do, my office at your disposal. My opinion upon this question is distinct and unqualified. I think that the object to be attained is of the utmost importance for the interests of England, for the preservation of the balance of power, and for the maintenance of peace in Europe. I find the three Powers entirely prepared to concur in the views which I entertain on this matter if these views should be the views of the British Government. I can feel no doubt that the four Powers, acting in union with, and in support of the Sultan, are perfectly able to carry those views into effect; and I think that the commercial and political interests of Great Britain, the honour and dignity of the country, good faith towards the Sultan, and sound views of European policy, all require that we should adopt such a course. If we draw back, and shrink from a co-operation with Austria, Russia, and Prussia in this matter, because France stands aloof and will not join, we shall place this country in the degraded position of being held in leading-strings by France, and shall virtually acknowledge that, even when supported by the other three Powers of the Continent, we dare embark in no system of policy in opposition to the will of France, and consider her positive concurrence as a necessary condition for our action. The ultimate results of such a decision will be the practical division of the Turkish Empire into two separate and independent states, whereof one will be the dependency of France, and the other a satellite of Russia; and in both of which our political influence will be annulled, and our commercial interests will be sacrificed; and this dismemberment will inevitably give rise to local struggles and conflicts which will involve the Powers of Europe in most serious disputes.” “Twice my opinion on these affairs has been overruled by the Cabinet, and twice the policy which I recommended has been set aside. First, in 1833, when the Sultan sent to ask our aid before Mehemet Ali had made any material progress in Syria, and when Russia expressed her wish that we should assist the Sultan,—saying, however, that if we did not, she would. Secondly, in 1835, when France was ready to have united with us in a treaty with the Sultan for the maintenance of the integrity of his empire.” “We have now arrived at a third crisis, when the resolution of the British Cabinet will exercise a deciding influence upon future events; but this time the danger is more apparent and undisguised, and the remedy is more complete and within our reach. The matter to be dealt with belongs to my department, and I should be held in a peculiar degree personally responsible for the consequences of any course which I might undertake to conduct. I am sure, therefore, that you cannot wonder that I should decline to be the instrument for carrying out a policy which I disapprove, and that I should consequently take the step which I have stated in the beginning of this letter.”

Lord Melbourne, however, induced him to withdraw his resignation, assuring him that it would involve the dissolution of the Government. “And,” he added, “how another is to be formed in the present state of parties and opinions I see not.” The Cabinet yielded, and Lord Palmerston had his way, as he usually did have, by a singular mixture of undaunted pluck and rectitude of purpose. I do not venture to assert that in this Turkish question Lord Palmerston did that which the welfare of the East of Europe certainly demanded. It is useless now to think whether the Bulgarian horrors might have been avoided in 1876 had not Lord Palmerston supported the Sultan in 1840, as it is also to argue that England could not have maintained her power in Europe and her hold over Egypt had she not then supported Turkey. Considerations of matters so intricate are too difficult for a little book such as this, however fitting they may be for deeper and longer volumes. My business is here to explain the nature of the conduct and character of Lord Palmerston. And when I speak of his rectitude of purpose I allude rather to his motives than to his actions. To do the best he could for English interests, and to do that best in an honest and manly manner, was his object; and the world may therefore give him credit for rectitude of purpose. The world must give him credit also for positive success.

Just when Palmerston was offering to resign his seat in the Cabinet, meaning to show thereby that his power of carrying his own views in the Government was not to be contested seriously, though questions concerning it might be raised, a whole series of pamphlets appeared against him, in which he was accused of selling his own country to Russia. These charges came chiefly from one Mr. Urquhart, who had been put into the Civil Service by Lord Palmerston himself, and had since filled himself with an idea that his former employer had become false to his country. Mr. Urquhart’s furor was so like madness that it would not be here mentioned, were it not worth our while to spend a page in showing the kind of things which were published at the time. There was a Mr. Doubleday, who, at a meeting at Newcastle, spoke as follows;—“I hereby declare my conviction that Lord Palmerston is a traitor, and ought to be impeached; and, if found guilty before a tribunal of his country, his head ought to roll upon the scaffold!” “I happen to know that this man was, a few years ago, as poor as a person called a lord could well be conceived to be,—that he was hunted about, and had half a dozen executions in his house at once,—and now, without any visible cause, without any visible means of making a better livelihood, this man has suddenly become rich, has paid all his debts, and is living upon the fat of the land. What rational conclusion can one come to but that he is enabled to do this by means of Russian gold?” For these calumnies there is not a tittle of excuse. There was not a word of truth in them. We are sometimes inclined to think that bitterness of speech against public men has now attained a worse acrimony than it ever did. But when we look back at some of these speeches against Lord Palmerston, we shall see that it is not so.