It is, however, very desirous that the fares should be lowered, and the great profits accruing to the railway prove that this may be done. Eventually they doubtless will be lowered.
The only other line of railway which now seems to be spoken of as practicable for the passage of the isthmus is one the construction of which has been proposed across the republic of Honduras, from a spot called Port Cortez, in the Bay of Honduras, on the northern or Atlantic side, to some harbour to be chosen in the Bay of Fonseca, on the southern or Pacific side. Mr. Squier, who was Chargé d'Affaires from the United States to Central America, and whose work on the republics of Central America is well known, strongly advocates this line, showing in the first place that from its position it would suit the traffic of the United States much better than that of Panama; as undoubtedly it would, seeing that the transit from New York to California, viâ Panama, must go down south as far as latitude 7° north; whereas, by the proposed route through Honduras it need not descend below lat. 13° north, thus saving double that distance in the total run each way.[*] Mr. Squier then goes on to prove that the country of Honduras is in every way suited for the purposes of a railway; but here I am not sure that he carries me with him. The road would have to ascend nearly three thousand feet above the sea-level; and though it may be true that the grades themselves would not be more severe than many that are now to be found on railways in full work in other countries, nevertheless it must be felt that the overcoming such an altitude in such a country, and the working over it when overcome, would necessarily add greatly to the original cost of the line, and the subsequent cost of running. The Panama line goes through a country comparatively level. Then the distance across Honduras is one hundred and fifty miles, and it is computed that the line would be two hundred miles: the length of the Panama line is forty-seven or forty-eight miles.
[*Not that we may take all that Mr. Squier says on this subject as proved. His proposed route for the traffic of the United States is from the western coast of Florida to the chosen port, Port Cortez, in Honduras; and he attempts to show that this is pretty nearly the only possible passage in those seas free from hurricanes and danger. But this passage is right across the Gulf of Mexico, and vessels would have to stem the full force of the gulf-stream on their passage down from Florida.
In all such matters where a man becomes warm on a scheme he feels himself compelled to prove that the gods themselves have pointed out the plan as the only one fit for adoption, as the only one free from all evil and blessed with every advantage. We are always over-proving our points.]
The enormous cost of the Panama line arose from the difficulty of obtaining the necessary sort of labour. The natives would not work as they were wanted, and Europeans died there; so that, at last, labour was imported from the coast of New Granada. At the high level named as the summit of the Honduras route, the climate would no doubt be comparatively mild, and labour easy to be borne; but near the coast of the Bays, both of Honduras and Fonseca, the heat would be as great as at Aspinwall and Panama, and the effects probably the same.
As regards our British traffic, the route by the Isthmus of Panama is the better situated of the two. Looking at a map of the world—and it is necessary to take in the whole world, in order that the courses of British trade may be seen—it does not seem to be of much consequence, as regards distance, whether a bale of goods from London to Sydney should pass the isthmus by Honduras or Panama; but in fact, even for this route, the former would labour under great disadvantages. A ship in making its way from Honduras up to Jamaica has to fight against the trade winds. On this account our mail steamer from Belize to Jamaica is timed only at four miles an hour, though the mail to Honduras is timed at eight miles an hour. This would be the direct route from the terminus of the Honduras line to Europe, and matters would be made only worse if any other line were taken. But the track from Panama to Jamaica is subject to what sailors call a soldier's wind; even working to St. Thomas, and thereby getting a stronger slant of the trade winds against them, our mail steamers can make eight or nine miles an hour.
As regards our trade to Chili and Peru, it is clear that Honduras is altogether out of our way; and as regards our coming trade to Frazer River and Vancouver's Island, though the absolute distance, via Honduras, would be something shorter, that benefit would be neutralized by the disadvantageous position of the Bay of Honduras as above explained.
But the great advantage which the Panama line enjoys is the fact of its being already made. It has the nine points which possession gives it. Its forty-eight miles cost one million six hundred thousand pounds. It cannot be presumed that two hundred miles through Honduras could be made for double that sum; and seeing that the Honduras line would be in opposition to the other, and only be used if running at fares lower than those of its rival, I cannot see how it would pay, or where the money is to be procured. I am not aware that the absolute cost of the proposed line through Honduras has been accurately computed.
As regards the public interest, two lines would no doubt be better than one. Competition is always beneficial to the consumer; but in this case, I do not expect to see the second line made in our days. That there will in future days be a dozen ways of commodiously crossing the isthmus—when we have thoroughly learned how best to carve our leg of mutton—I do not at all doubt.
It may be as well to state here that England is bound by a treaty with Honduras, made in 1836, to assist in furthering the execution of this work by our countenance, aid, and protection, on condition that when made, we Britishers are to have the full use of it; as much so, at least, as any other people or nation. And that, as I take it, is the sole and only meaning of all those treaties made on our behalf with Central America, or in respect to Central America—Clayton-Bulwer treaty, new Ouseley treaty, and others; namely, that we, who are desirous of excluding no person from the benefits of this public world-road, are not ourselves to be excluded on any consideration whatever. And may we not boast that this is the only object looked for in all our treaties and diplomatic doings? Is it not for that reason that we hold Gibraltar, are jealous about Egypt, and resolved to have Perim in our power? Is it not true that we would fain make all ways open to all men? that we would have them open to ourselves, certainly; but not closed against any human being? If that, and such like, be not what our diplomatists are doing, then I, for one, misunderstand their trade.
So much for the two railways, and now as to the proposed canals. Here no happy undertaking can boast of the joys of possession. No canal is as yet open carrying men and goods with, shall we say, twenty-five per cent. profit on the outlay. Ah, that is an elysium which does not readily repeat itself. Oh, thou thrice happy Colonel Totten, who hast constructed a railway resulting in such celestial beatitude!