And some say that he declared the soul to be unoriginated and imperishable[113] when he says: “All soul is immortal for that which is ever moving is immortal,” and when he shows that it is self-moving and the beginning of movement. But others say that he makes it originated but imperishable[114] through God’s will; and yet others composite and originated and perishable. For he also supposes that p. 35. there is a mixing-bowl for it,[115] and that it has a splendid body, but that everything originated must of necessity perish. But those who say that the soul is immortal are partly corroborated by those words wherein he says that there are judgments after death, and courts of justice in the house of Hades, and that the good meet with a good reward and that the wicked are subjected to punishments.[116] Some therefore say that he also admits a change of bodies and the transfer of different pre-determined souls into other bodies according to the merit of each; and that after certain definite peregrinations they are again sent into this ordered world to give themselves another trial of their own choice. Others, however, say not, but that they obtain a place according to each one’s deserts. And they call to witness that he says some souls are with Zeus, but that others of good men are going round with other gods, and that others abide in everlasting punishments, (that is), so many as in this life have wrought evil and unjust deeds.[117] And they say that he declared some conditions to be p. 36. without intermediates, some with intermediates and some to be intermediates. Waking and sleep are without intermediates and so are all states like these. But there are those with intermediates like good and bad; and intermediates like grey which is between black and white or some other colour.[118] And they say that he declares the things concerning the soul to be alone supremely good, but those of the body or external to it to be no longer supremely good, but only said to be so. And that these last are very often named intermediates also; for they can be used both well and ill. He says therefore that the virtues are extremes as to honour, but means as to substance.[119] For there is nothing more honourable than virtue; but that which goes beyond or falls short of these virtues ends in vice. For instance, he says that these are the four virtues, to wit, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and Fortitude, and that there follow on each of these two vices of excess and deficiency respectively. Thus on Prudence follow thoughtlessness by deficiency and cunning by excess; on Temperance, intemperance by deficiency and sluggishness by excess; on Justice, over-modesty by deficiency and greediness by excess; and on Fortitude, p. 37. cowardice by deficiency and foolhardiness by excess.[120] And these virtues when inborn in a man operate for his perfection and give him happiness. But he says that happiness is likeness to God as far as possible. And that any one is like God when he becomes holy and just with intention. For this he supposes to be the aim of the highest wisdom and virtue.[121] But he says that the virtues follow one another in turn and are of one kind, and never oppose one another; but that the vices are many-shaped and sometimes follow and sometimes oppose one another.[122]
He says, again, that there is destiny, not indeed that all things are according to destiny, but that we have some choice, as he says in these words: “The blame is on the chooser: God is blameless,” and again, “This is a law of Adrasteia.” And if he thus affirms the part of destiny, he knew also that something was in our choice.[123] But he says that transgressions are involuntary. For to the most beautiful thing in us, which is the soul, none would admit something evil, that is, injustice; but that by ignorance and mistaking the good, thinking to do something fine, they p. 38. arrive at the evil.[124] And his explanation on this is most clear in the Republic, where he says: “And again do you dare to say that vice is disgraceful and hateful to God? How then does any one choose such an evil? He does it, you would say, who is overcome by the pleasures (of sense). Therefore this also is an involuntary action, if to overcome be a voluntary one. So that from all reasoning, reason proves injustice to be involuntary.” But some one objects to him about this: “Why then are men punished if they transgress involuntarily?” He answers: “So that they may be the more speedily freed from vice by undergoing correction.”[125] For that to undergo correction is not bad but good, if thereby comes purification from vices, and that the rest of mankind hearing of it will not transgress, but will be on their guard against such error.[126] He says, however, that the nature of evil comes not by God nor has it any special nature of its own; but it comes into being by contrariety and by following upon the good, either as excess or deficiency as we have before said about the virtues.[127] Now Plato, as p. 39. we have said above, bringing together the three divisions of general philosophy, thus philosophized.
17. About Aristotle.
Aristotle, who was a hearer of this last, turned philosophy into a science and reasoned more strictly, affirming that the elements of all things are substance and accident.[128] He said that there is one substance underlying all things, but nine accidents, which are Quantity, Quality, Relation, the Where, the When, Possession, Position, Action and Passion. And that therefore Substance was such as God, man and every one of the things which can fall under the like definition: but that as regards the accidents, Quality is seen in expressions like white or black; Quantity in “2 cubits or 3 cubits long or broad”; Relation in “father” or “son”; the Where in such as “Athens” or “Megara”; the When in such as “in the Xth Olympiad”; for Possession in such as “to have acquired wealth”; Action in such as “to write and generally to do anything”; and Passion in such as “to be struck.” He also assumes that some things have means and that others have not, as we have said also about Plato. p. 40. And he is in accord with Plato about most things save in the opinion about the soul. For Plato thinks it immortal; but Aristotle that it remains behind after this life and that it is lost in the fifth Body which is assumed to exist along with the other four, to wit, fire, earth, water and air, but is more subtle than they and like a spirit.[129] Again whereas Plato said that the only good things were those which concerned the soul and that these sufficed for happiness, Aristotle brings in a triad of benefits and says that the sage is not perfect unless there are at his command the good things of the body and those external to it. Which things are Beauty, Strength, Keenness of Sense and Completeness; while the externals are Wealth, High Birth, Glory, Power, Peace, and Friendship; but that the inner things about the soul are, as Plato thought: Prudence, Temperance, Justice and Fortitude.[130] Also Aristotle says that evil things exist, and come by contrariety to the good, and are below the place about the moon, but not above it.
Again, he says that the soul of the whole ordered world is eternal, but that the soul of man vanishes as we have said p. 41. above. Now, he philosophized while delivering discourses in the Lyceum; but Zeno in the Painted Porch. And Zeno’s followers got their name from the place, i. e. they were called Stoics from the Stoa; but those of Aristotle from their mode of study. For their enquiries were conducted while walking about in the Lyceum, wherefore they were called Peripatetics. This then Aristotle.[131]
18. About the Stoics.
The Stoics themselves also added to philosophy by the increased use of syllogisms,[132] and included it nearly all in definitions, Chrysippus and Zeno being here agreed in opinion. Who also supposed that God was the beginning of all things, and was the purest body, and that His providence extends through all things.[133] They say positively, however, that existence is everywhere according to destiny using some such simile as this: viz. that, as a dog tied to a cart, if he wishes to follow it, is both drawn along by it and follows of his own accord, doing at the same time p. 42. what he wills and what he must by a compulsion like that of destiny.[134] But if he does not wish to follow he is wholly compelled. And they say that it is the same indeed with men. For even if they do not wish to follow, they will be wholly compelled to come to what has been foredoomed. And they say that the soul remains after death, and that it is a body[135] and is born from the cooling of the air of the ambient, whence it is called Psyche.[136] But they admit that there is a change of bodies for Souls which have been marked out for it.[137] And they expect that there will be a conflagration and purification of this cosmos, some saying that it will be total but others partial, and that it will be purified part by part. And they call this approximate destruction and the birth of another cosmos therefrom, catharsis.[138] And they suppose that all things are bodies, and that one body passes through another; but that there is a resurrection[139] and that all things are filled full and that there is no void. Thus also the Stoics.
19. About Epicurus.
p. 43.But Epicurus held an opinion almost the opposite of all others. He supposed that the beginnings of the universals were atoms and a void; that the void was as it were the place of the things that will be; but that the atoms were matter, from which all things are. And that from the concourse of the atoms both God and all the elements came into being and that in them were all animals and other things, so that nothing is produced or constructed unless it be from the atoms. And he said that the atoms were the most subtle of things, and that in them there could be no point, nor mark nor any division whatever; wherefore he called them atoms.[140] And although he admits God to be eternal and imperishable, he says that he cares for no one and that in short there is no providence nor destiny, but all things come into being automatically. For God is seated in the metacosmic spaces, as he calls them. For he held that there was a certain dwelling-place of God outside the cosmos called the metacosmia, and that He p. 44 took His pleasure and rested in supreme delight; and that He neither had anything to do Himself nor provided for others. In consequence of which Epicurus made a theory about wise men, saying that the end of all wisdom is pleasure. But different people take the name of pleasure differently. For some understood by it the desires, but others the pleasure that comes by virtue. But he held that the souls of men were destroyed with their bodies as they are born with them. For that these souls are blood, which having come forth or being changed, the whole man is destroyed. Whence it follows that there are no judgments nor courts of justice in the House of Hades, so that whatever any one may do in this life and escapes notice, he is in no way called to account for it.[141] Thus then Epicurus.