A telegram was read from General Kornilov, urging that capital punishment should be introduced in the rear, chiefly in order to cope with the licentious bands of Reservists; that disciplinary powers should be vested in the Commanding Officers; that the competence of the Army Committees should be restricted and their responsibilities fixed; that meetings should be prohibited as well as anti-national propaganda, and visits to the Front prohibited to various delegations and agitators. All this was practically implied in my programme, but under another shape, and was described as “military reaction.” But Kornilov had other suggestions. He advocated that Commissars should be introduced into the Army Corps and given the right to confirm the verdicts of the Military Revolutionary Tribunals, as well as to effect a “cleansing” of the commanding staffs. This last proposal impressed Kerensky by its “breadth and depth of vision”—greater than those which emanated from the “old wiseacres,” whom he considered intoxicated “with the wine of hate....” There was an obvious misunderstanding, because Kornilov’s “cleansing” was not intended against the men of solid military traditions (mistakenly identified with Monarchist Reaction), but against the hirelings of the Revolution—unprincipled men, deprived of will-power and of the capacity of taking the responsibility upon their own shoulders.
Savinkov, the Commissar of the South-Western Front, also spoke, expressing his own views only. He agreed with the general description of the Front which we had given, and pointed out that it is not the fault of the Revolutionary Democracy that the soldiery of the old régime is still distrustful of their Commanding Officers; that all is not well with the latter from the military and political points of view, and that the main object of the new Revolutionary institutions was to restore normal relations between these two elements of the Army.
Kerensky made the closing speech of the Conference. He tried to justify himself—spoke of the elemental character of the inevitable “Democratisation” of the Army. He blamed us for seeing in the Revolution, and in its influence upon the Russian soldier, the only cause of the débâcle of July, and he severely condemned the old régime. Finally, he gave us no definite directions for future work. The members of the Conference dispersed with a heavy feeling of mutual misunderstanding. I was also discouraged, but at the bottom of my heart I was pleased to think—alas! I was mistaken—that our voices had been heeded. My hopes were confirmed by a letter from Kornilov which I received soon after his appointment to the Supreme Command:
“I have read the Report you made at the Stavka on July 16th with deep and sincere satisfaction. I would sign such a Report with both hands; I take off my hat to you, and I am lost in admiration before your firmness and courage. I firmly believe that, with the help of the Almighty, we will succeed in accomplishing the task of reconstructing our beloved Army and of restoring its fighting power.”
Fate has, indeed, cruelly derided our hopes!
[CHAPTER XXX.]
General Kornilov.
Two days after the Moghilev Conference General Brussilov was relieved of the Supreme Command. The attempt to give the leadership of the Russian Armies to a person who had not only given proof of the most complete loyalty to the Provisional Government, but had evinced sympathy with its reforms, had failed. A leader had been superseded, who, on assuming the Supreme Command, gave utterance to the following:
“I am the leader of the Revolutionary Army, appointed to this responsible post by the people in revolution and the Provisional Government, in agreement with the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates. I was the first to go over to the people, serve the people. I will continue to serve them, will never desert them.”[51]