The Russian Turmoil; Memoirs: Military, Social, and Political

by Anton Ivanovich Denikin

[CHAPTER XI.]

The Bolshevik Struggle for Power—The Power of the Army and the Idea of a Dictatorship.

In the first period—from the beginning of the Revolution until the coup d’état of November—the Bolsheviks were engaged in struggling to seize power by destroying the Bourgeois régime and disorganising the Army, thus paving the way for the avénement of Bolshevism, as Trotsky solemnly expressed it. On the day after his arrival in Russia Lenin published his programme, of which I will here mention the salient points:

(1) The War waged by the “Capitalist Government” is an Imperialistic, plundering War. No concessions, therefore, should be made to Revolutionary “Defensism.” The representatives of that doctrine and the Army in the field should be made clearly to understand that the War cannot end in a truly Democratic peace, without coercion, unless Capitalism is destroyed.

The troops must fraternize with the enemy.

(2) The first stage of the Revolution by which the Bourgeoisie came into power must be followed by the second stage in which power must pass into the hands of the Proletariat and of the poorest peasants.

(3) No support should be given to the Provisional Government, and the fallacy of its promises should be exposed.

(4) The fact must be acknowledged that, in the majority of the Soviets, the Bolshevik party is in a minority. The policy must therefore be continued of criticising and exposing mistakes, while at the same time advocating the necessity for the transfer of Supreme Power to the Soviet.

(5) Russia is not a Parliamentary Republic—that would have been a step backwards—but a Republic of the Soviets of Workmen’s and Peasants’ Deputies.

The police (Militia?), the Army, and the Civil Service must be abolished.

(6) With regard to the agrarian question, the Soviets of farm-labourers’ deputies must come to the fore. All landowners’ estates must be confiscated, and all land in Russia nationalised and placed at the disposal of Local Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies. The latter to be elected among the poorest peasants.

(7) All the banks in the country must be united in one National Bank, controlled by the Soviet.

(8) Socialism must not be introduced now, but a step must be taken towards the ultimate control by the Soviet of all industries and of the distribution of materials.

(9) The State shall become a Commune, and the Socialist Democratic Bolshevik Party shall henceforward be called “The Communist Party.”

I shall not dwell upon this programme, which was put into practice, with certain reservations, in November, 1917. During the first period the activities of the Bolsheviks, which are of great importance, were based upon the following three principles:

(1) The overthrow of the Government and the demoralisation of the Army.

(2) The promotion of class war in the country and discontent in the villages.

(3) The seizure of power by the minority, which, according to Lenin, was to be “well-organised, armed and centralised,” i.e., the Bolshevik party. (This was, of course, a negation of Democratic forms of Government.)

The ideas and aims of the party were, of course, beyond the understanding not only of the ignorant Russian peasantry, but even of the Bolshevik underlings scattered throughout the land. The masses wanted simple and clear watchwords to be immediately put into practice, which would satisfy their wishes and demands arising from the turmoil of the Revolution. That “simplified” Bolshevism inherent in all popular movements against the established power in Russia was all the easier to institute in that it had freed itself from all restraining moral influences and was aiming primarily at destruction pure and simple, ignoring the consequences of military defeat and of the ruin of the country. The Provisional Government was the first target. In the Bolshevik Press, at public meetings, in all the activities of the Soviets and Congresses, and even in their conversations with the members of the Provisional Government, the Bolshevik leaders stubbornly and arrogantly advocated its removal, describing it as an instrument of counter-Revolution and of International reaction. The Bolsheviks, however, refrained from decisive action, as they feared the political backwardness of the country as a whole. They began what soldiers call “a reconnaissance,” and carried it out with great intensity. They seized several private houses in Petrograd, and organised a demonstration on the 20th and 21st of April. That was the first “review” of the proletariat, at which an estimate was made of the Bolshevik forces. The excuse for this demonstration, in which the workmen and the troops participated, was given by Miliukov’s Note on International Policy. I say excuse because the real reason lay in the fundamental divergence of opinion mentioned above. Everything else was only a pretext. As a result of the demonstration there were great disturbances and armed conflicts in the capital, and many casualties. The crowds carried placards bearing the inscriptions: “Down with the Miliukov Policy of Conquests,” and “Down with the Provisional Government.”

The review was a failure. In the course of the debate in the Soviet on this occasion, the Bolsheviks demanded that the Government be deposed, but there was a note of hesitation in their speeches: “The proletariat should first discuss the existing conditions and form an estimate of its strength.” The Soviet passed a resolution condemning both the Government’s policy of conquest and the Bolshevik demonstration, while at the same time “congratulating the Revolutionary Democracy of Petrograd, which had proved its intense interest in international politics by meetings, resolutions and demonstrations.”

Lenin was planning another armed demonstration on a large scale on June 10th during the Congress of the Soviets; but it was countermanded, as the great majority of the Congress was opposed to it. The demonstration was likewise intended as a means of seizing power. This internal struggle between the two wings of the Revolutionary Democracy, which were bitterly antagonistic to one another, is extremely interesting. The Left wing made every endeavour to induce the “Defensist” block, which was preponderant, to break with the Bourgeoisie and to assume power. The block was also resolutely opposed to such a course.