The war occurred at an unpropitious moment not only for Germany, but for her ally, Austria-Hungary, so far as sea power was concerned. This country had, it is true, almost completed her first programme of four “Dreadnoughts,” but her navy was still deficient in cruisers—possessing six only—as well as in torpedo craft. In combination Austria-Hungary and Italy could have faced the naval forces of France and Great Britain in the Mediterranean, but in isolation the former’s position was from the first well-nigh hopeless, and her ships retired to Pola at the outbreak of the war.
The French fleet was in good condition to take the seas. Under the spur furnished by German acts and German words it had been strengthened in ships and men, its administration ashore remodelled, and its fleets at sea reorganised. The Republican Government had confided the supreme command of its battle forces to one of the most conspicuously able sailors of the period, Admiral Boué du Lapeyrère, and could enter on the war in its naval aspects with confidence and courage.
Russia was not so fortunate. She had only comparatively recently taken serious steps to replace the fleet she lost in the war with Japan. A ship-building project, known as the “Minor Programme,” was being carried out, but so far none of the vessels it comprised had become available for service. When war occurred, four “Dreadnoughts,” which were begun as far back as 1909, were not yet ready, and seven others were on the stocks, but not yet launched. Eight small cruisers laid down under the “Minor Programme” were building, two of them in a German yard, and the remainder in Russia, and there was besides a large flotilla of torpedo craft under construction. With all these vessels in commission, the Russian Navy would have become once more a factor to be reckoned with. As it happened, Russia faced the war practically without any considerable sea power.
When hostilities had begun, a dramatic incident reminded the world that Japan, the ally of Great Britain in the Far East, was not viewing the course of events unconcerned. On Monday, August 16th, it was announced that the Japanese Government had delivered an ultimatum to Germany in the following terms:
“We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in the Far East, and to safeguard general interests as contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain.
“In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:
- 1. Withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German men-o’-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.
- 2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15th to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.
“The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23rd an answer from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advices offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation.”
When Germany was confronted with heavy odds, Japan remembered the events following the war of 1894-5, when this Power, having joined in robbing her of the spoil of her victory over China, herself entered into possession of Kiao Chau, as the price for the lives of two murdered missionaries.
Thus, at the touch of German arrogance, four great sea Powers of the world arrayed themselves against her—the British, French, and Russian fleets in European waters, and the great navy of Japan in the Pacific.