When the year 1883 arrived, General von Stosch published a Memorandum on the execution of his plan. It is significant of the change that had come over public opinion that the Government had not dared to ask the Reichstag for a substitute for the armoured frigate Grosser Kurfürst, which was lost in collision off Folkestone, and that consequently one of the eight vessels of her type was lacking. The last of the six armoured corvettes had yet to be built, and instead of five monitors thirteen armoured gunboats had been constructed, because it was thought that the latter class of ship was better suited for the defence of the Jade, Weser, and Elbe. It had been decided not to build the floating batteries, which would have been an easy prey to the "fish" torpedo, introduced as a weapon of naval warfare since they were projected. One out of the twenty corvettes, and eight large and nine small torpedo craft were also still wanting. German national vanity had, however, secured a questionable triumph: the Empire was now entirely independent of foreigners so far as its warships were concerned. But if Germany had continued to purchase some of her warships in England while she was still but a tyro in the art of naval architecture, she would have saved much money, and made more rapid progress.
General von Stosch simultaneously presented another Memorandum, dealing with the future development of the navy. In it he laid stress on the reasons which could be adduced against the principle hitherto followed, and since readopted, of fixing the building programme in advance for a longer period, and advised that it was inexpedient to look farther ahead than three or four years. While admitting that "the seas are ever more ceasing to separate the nations," and that "the course of history seems ever more to indicate that a State cannot withdraw from the sea if it is striving to maintain for itself a position in the world beyond the immediate future," he laid down the axiom that "naval battles alone seldom decide the destinies of States, and for immeasurable time the decision of every war will for Germany lie with her land army." Thus, though he admitted the desirability of "a concentrated high sea fleet always ready for action," he considered it best to defer the construction of battleships till further experience had shown whether their functions could not be equally well performed by vessels of a smaller type. The conclusion reached by the Memorandum was that it was necessary to add without delay to only one class of vessel—namely, that which served the purposes of coast defence. In this connection the following words were used:
"Here it is the torpedo-boat, which, especially when used in large numbers at night, will render the carrying through of a blockade almost impossible. Every night the blockading ships would be compelled to withdraw to a distance under steam. Their coal consumption would thereby be much increased, the tension of the crews, in consequence of the need for unremitting vigilance, would become intolerable, and at night the blockaded harbours would be accessible. Even when in motion, the blockading ships would not be safe at night. The torpedo-boats would follow them and recognize their aim by the lights which the enemy would not be able to do without when steaming in squadron formation. The torpedo-boat is a weapon which is of special advantage to the weaker on the sea. A few States already possess a considerable strength in torpedo craft. For the German Navy 150 torpedo-boats are considered necessary, and of these thirty-five will be ready for service shortly."
It was while the German Fleet was still impotent for all serious purposes that the Empire acquired the mass of its colonies: South-West Africa, Togo, the Cameroons, German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Marshall Islands were all annexed in 1884. The decisive step towards the acquisition of German East Africa was taken in the following year.
William I. lived just long enough to lay the foundation-stone of the Kiel Canal, which had been one of the dreams of the Frankfort patriots forty years earlier. His death was followed after an interval of three months by that of Frederick I., and with the accession of William II., in 1888, the latest era of German naval policy may be said to have commenced. Until, however, Admiral Tirpitz was put in charge of the Ministry of Marine, in 1897, practically nothing was done to add to the fighting strength of the fleet. Any progress which was made in connection with the navy was confined to developments of organisation, and to the exchange of German rights in Zanzibar and Witu for the islet of Heligoland. This transaction was scoffed at by Bismarck, then in retirement, who, however, only contemplated the possibility of a naval war with France, and it was bitterly resented by German public opinion, and especially by that heated section of it which poses as the pioneer on the path of militarism, navalism, and colonism. Only during the last three or four years has the conviction gradually begun to gain ground, that perhaps, after all, Germany did not make such a bad bargain, and Heligoland has simultaneously taken an ever more and more prominent place in the speculations of political prophets as to the probable outcome of an Anglo-German war.
The keen interest of the Emperor William, and his ambition to play the leading part on the stage of the world, would not, in themselves, have sufficed to bring about the change which has been wrought during the past seventeen years. The decisive personal factors here have been the fixed purpose, the steady will, the unflagging energy, the inexhaustible patience, the profound political insight, and the rare diplomatic skill of Admiral Tirpitz, the nearest approach to a really great man that Germany has produced since Bismarck. He is the true creator of the German fleet.
FOOTNOTES:
[6] Thaler = about 3s.