Majestic Class. Worth Class.
Length Over all, 413 ft. (390 ft. at water-line.) 380 ft. 6 in. (354 ft. 3 in. at water-line.)
Beam 75 ft. 65 ft. 6 in.
Mean draught 27 ft. 6 in. 24 ft. 4 in.
Armour Partial 9-in. Harveyed belt, 16 ft. broad, and 220 ft. long; bulkheads, 14 in. (max.); barbettes, 14 in.; barbette-shields, 10 in.; casemates (12), 6 in.; protected deck 2·5 to 4 in.; forward conning tower, 14 in.; after conning tower, 3 in. Complete belt, 11·8 to 15·7 in. (compound in earlier, steel in later, ships); barbettes and conning-tower, 11·8 in.; ammunition hoists, 11·8 in.; gun-hoods, 5 in.; cellulose cofferdam belt; casemate for 4·1-in. guns, 3 in.; steel deck, 3 in., flat on top of belt.
Armament 4 12-in. 46-ton (wire-wound) breech-loading; 12 6-in. quickfirers in casemates; 16 12-pounder quickfirers; 2 12-pounder boat-guns; 12 3-pounder quickfiring; 2 Maxims; 5 torpedo-tubes (18-in.), 4 submerged, 1 above water astern. 6 11-in. Krupp breech-loading, 2 in each barbette; 8 4·1 in. quickfiring of 30 calibres in a casemate forward of the centre barbettes; 8 3·4-in. quickfirers of 30 calibres; 2·23 in. breech-loading boat or field guns; 12 1-pounder quickfirers; 8 machine; 3 torpedo tubes, 2 submerged.

influence either upon European or world policy. The truth of this statement is conclusively proved by the following table showing the relative strength of the only five navies of the world which were, at that time, of appreciable importance, the fleets of Japan and of the United States being then still in their infancy:

Britain. France. Russia. Italy. Germany.
Battleships:
First-class 29 14 6 8 4
Second-class 7 8 4 2 4
Third-class 18 7 5 3 6
———— ———— ———— ———— ————
Total battleships 54 29 15 13 14
———— ———— ———— ———— ————
Coast-defence ships 14 16 13 18
———— ———— ———— ———— ————
Cruisers:
First-class 23 8 6 1
Second-class 47 13 3 5 3
Third-class 34 9 1 9 9
———— ———— ———— ———— ————
Total cruisers 104 30 10 14 13
———— ———— ———— ———— ————
Torpedo gunboats 34 19 8 15 4
———— ———— ———— ———— ————

It must be confessed that at this time the German Fleet bore no reasonable relation to Germany's growing trade and oversea interests. But the mass of the people of the German Empire were still unconscious of any deficiency, and, blinded by the success of their armies during the war with France and the small influence which naval power exerted in that struggle, they had refused for many years to take upon themselves the burden which the new naval ambitions represented.

But with the passage of the Navy Act of 1898, and the widespread agitation carried on by the Navy League, under the highest patronage, and—even more important—by the Press Bureau under Admiral von Tirpitz, a change immediately occurred; and the success with which the British forces were enabled to conduct their military operations in South Africa, while Europe was forced to stand by inactive, owing to the supreme control which the British Fleet possessed of sea communications, produced a revulsion of feeling. The current of European events, and the reception with which the Emperor's speeches met, convinced the Government, within a comparatively few months of the passage of the Act of 1898, that they might safely abandon this modest measure and replace it by a new Bill.

What had happened in the meantime? This: the outbreak of the Boer War had generated in Germany an absolutely unprecedented hostility to Great Britain, which was afterwards roused to white heat by the seizure of the mail steamer Bundesrat and other German vessels on the African coast. Admiral von Tirpitz had a unique opportunity such as was never likely to present itself to him again. He made prompt and full use of it, and while Great Britain was in the thick of the embarrassments of the early stages of the South African War, the great Navy Bill of 1900 was passed into law.

The seizure of the German vessels was admitted by the British Government to have been a blunder. An apology was tendered to Germany on account of it, and promises made that similar incidents should not recur. The action of the British warships did nothing but harm, and would certainly never have been taken if the Foreign Office in London had been properly informed on the situation in Germany by its representatives in Berlin, and had itself kept the Admiralty fully posted.

Consequently, in the spring of 1900, the Act of 1898 was replaced by a new one, in face of all Admiral von Tirpitz's protestations of two years before. This measure set up an establishment of almost twice the size of the former one, and embraced ships intended for battle purposes on the high seas. During the discussion of the measure in the Reichstag the Centre Party compelled the Government to modify their original scheme, and to drop five large and five small cruisers for service on foreign stations, while the reserve of cruisers was reduced by one large and two small vessels. In the course of the debate the Naval Secretary announced that, while the Government were compelled to agree to the amendment of their proposals, they still insisted upon the necessity of providing the original number of ships for duty in foreign seas, but would agree to postpone the final settlement of the question until a subsequent date.

In its final form, as it received the approval of the Reichstag and of the Emperor, and as it was published in the Imperial German Gazette of June 20th, 1900, the Bill set up the following establishment for the Fleet:

The Battle Fleet.