The Justificatory Memorandum to the Navy Law (of 1898) left no doubt as to the military significance of the Battle Fleet. It is therein expressly stated:
"Against greater sea-powers the Battle Fleet would have importance merely as a sortie fleet."
That is to say, the fleet would have to withdraw into the harbour and there wait for a favourable opportunity for making a sortie. Even if it should obtain a success in such a sortie, it would nevertheless, like the enemy, suffer considerable loss of ships. The stronger enemy could make good his losses, we could not. In war with a substantially superior sea-power, the Battle Fleet provided for by the Navy Law would render a blockade more difficult, especially in the first phase of the war, but would never be able to prevent it. To subdue it, or, after it had been considerably weakened, to confine it in its own harbour would always be merely a question of time. So soon as this had happened, no great State could be more easily cut off than Germany from all sea intercourse worthy of the name—of her own ships as also of the ships of neutral Powers. To effect this it would not be necessary to control long stretches of coast, but merely to blockade the few big seaports.
In the same way as the traffic to the home ports, the German mercantile ships on all the seas of the world would be left to the mercy of an enemy who was more powerful on the sea. Hostile cruisers on the main trade-routes, in the Skager-Rack, in the English Channel, off the north of Scotland, in the Straits of Gibraltar, at the entrance to the Suez Canal, and at the Cape of Good Hope, would render German shipping practically impossible.
Also with regard to this the Justificatory Memorandum to the Naval Law (of 1898) speaks unambiguously. In it is observed:
"Protection of sea trade on all the seas would occur principally in time of peace. In case of war it would be the task of the foreign service cruisers to afford their own mercantile ships the 'utmost possible protection.'"
That is to say, the ships would do the "utmost possible." What would be possible in this respect is clear when it is realized that the Navy Law provides altogether for forty-two cruisers, whilst the greatest Naval Power, for example, to-day already possesses 206 cruisers (finished or under construction), and, moreover, has at its disposal bases and coaling stations on all the chief trade-routes.
To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies in the existing circumstances there is only one means—Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world.
For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Battle Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.
In order to attain the goal which has been set, the protection of our sea trade and of our colonies by ensuring a peace with honour, Germany requires, according to the standard of the strength-relationships of the great Sea-Powers, and having regard to our tactical formations, two double squadrons of efficient battleships, with the necessary cruisers, torpedo-boats, and so on, pertaining thereto. As the Navy Law (of 1898) provides for only two squadrons, the building of a third and fourth squadron is contemplated. Of these four squadrons two will form a fleet. The second fleet is to be organized in its tactical composition in the same way as the first fleet provided for in the Navy Law.