Colonel John Brown, of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, the Brave Accuser of Benedict Arnold

by Archibald Murray Howe

He was chosen Ensign of the Company of Minute Men, and finally delegate to the First Provincial Congress. This Congress appointed him to a very important Committee on Correspondence with Canada, and that winter the committee sent him to Canada with full power to get information, confer with Canadians, whether English or French, and report back the condition of affairs and whether they would act with the Colonies. This mission was peaceful in its aim. He conferred with men from Montreal and Quebec, assuring all whom he met that the Colonies desired peace with Great Britain, but, if war came, they would surely respect the rights of all men to worship God in their own way and would maintain a democratic form of government.

Mr. Brown showed himself to be diplomatic and faithful. He endured much personal hardship and risk during the winter, and his report was most valuable. The part of it best known is under date of March 29, 1775, wherein he recommended that, if war came, Ticonderoga should be taken. "The people in the New Hampshire Grants," he wrote, "have engaged to do the job." Recently it has been stated that in February, 1775, he was at Chesterfield, Mass., and that about that time he led a party of Berkshire and Hampshire men to Deerfield and arrested a Tory or some Tories who were suspected of being in direct communication with General Gage at Boston. April 27, 1775, there appeared in the Hartford Courant a notice signed "John Brown" by order of the Committee of Inspection in the towns of Pittsfield, Richmond, and Lenox, in the following words: "Whereas Major Israel Stoddard and Woodbridge Little Esq., both of Pittsfield in the County of Berkshire, have fled from their respective homes and are justly esteemed the common pests of society and incurable enemies of their country and are supposed to be somewhere in New York Government moving sedition and rebellion against their country, it is hereby recommended to all friends of American liberty and to all who do not delight in the innocent blood of their countrymen, to exert themselves that they may be taken into custody and committed to some of his Majesty's jails till the civil war which has broken out in this Province shall be ended." Surely, Brown was an active partisan, though not at Lexington in April, 1775. In May he was at Ticonderoga with Ethan Allen, not holding any military rank. Allen commended him to the government as fit for military command.

The oft-told tale of how Ethan Allen took the fortress, proclaiming its capture in the name of "Almighty God and the Continental Congress," need not be rehearsed here. Allen took possession of Ticonderoga, its garrison, and its valuable military property with the aid of Connecticut and Berkshire men, and at his request Brown rode his horse rapidly to Philadelphia to announce to the Continental Congress the capture which was attained without their authority or aid. At this point Benedict Arnold must be referred to. In April, 1775, he had broken open an arsenal at New Haven, and with his militia company hurried to Cambridge. As he rode one day from New Haven towards Cambridge, he met Captain Parsons, who was going to Hartford to plan with some Connecticut leaders for the capture of Ticonderoga. Hearing Parsons's plan, Arnold pushed on to Watertown and got a commission from the Massachusetts government as colonel as well as an order for power to recruit men, for horses and ammunition. Meeting Ethan Allen on his way to Ticonderoga, Arnold produced his Massachusetts authority, but not his men, on the same day that Allen was fully prepared for his work. Arnold began his interference with the concerted plan, hoping for a separate command and the glory of victory. He promised payments of money to Berkshire men from the southern towns, which he failed to pay from funds given him for that purpose. This was the beginning of an angry and long-continued dispute between Easton, Brown's colonel, and Brown, on the one hand, and Arnold, on the other. Unhappily for Easton and Brown, as for all men who possess the truth about the characters of men who are undoubtedly able to fight battles, though brutal and even wicked in their lives, the controversy was long and bitter, but, while war exists, the common law and legal procedure rarely have weight and even martial law becomes ineffective.

"War is hell," said the great Sherman. Hell is irrational, as is war. Reason fails to have even its usual part in man's destiny during all wars. Chance has sway, and men often get what is called glory when others, almost unknown to fame, should win the approval of all men.

Whether Washington had his doubts about Arnold's character may never be known, but more than once he gave him opportunities to hold high command because he fought battles through. So Lincoln, when told that Grant drank whiskey, asked for more such whiskey for other generals. Sparks, the historian, a Unitarian clergyman, when writing Arnold's life, detailed his sins, his youthful desertion from the British army, his financial dishonor at New Haven, his overbearing self-assertion, and yet he added, when telling of the attitude of the members of Congress towards Arnold, that "these stern patriots, regarding virtue as essential to true honor, did not consider great examples of valor, resource, and energy even of arousing and sustaining the military ardor of a country as an adequate counterpoise to a dereliction of principle and a compromising integrity." "How far a judicious policy and a pure patriotism were combined on this occasion," writes Sparks, "as to what extent party zeal contributed to warp the judgment, we need not now inquire."

And here, my friends, is our solemn warning against war. No inquiry will ever justify war. War is justified only upon the sad assumption that, as men are "poor weak mortals" and naturally wicked, they will go to war, and justice fails where might makes right. Who thinks I can here and now fully justify John Brown as a soldier, if he was too aggressive in attack or too ardent in his antagonism of a dastardly traitor whom he knew through and through, but whom Washington, Schuyler, and other generals felt obliged to support? Perhaps not fully justify on the grounds that seem necessary to the success of war, but I can fully support Brown as a man who fought nobly for his country and in defence of the unprotected inhabitants of the Mohawk Valley, who was never false to his aims as an American patriot, who served with distinction under Allen, Montgomery, Schuyler, Arnold, Lincoln, and Van Rensselaer, and finally died while attempting to defend the Canajoharie settlements from the hostile attack of a murderous foe and acting in obedience to the command of his superior officer.

When the Massachusetts government understood the situation at Lake Champlain, Brown was appointed major of the Berkshire Regiment, and sent again to Canada with four scouts. This time the business was very dangerous. The French Canadians often helped him, but he might have been treated as a spy, and a military police chased him for many miles with two parties of fifty men each. On his return he reached Crown Point within a day of the time General Schuyler had expected him, after five days on the lake in a canoe. Early in August, 1775, he urged by letter and every other means in his power the immediate invasion of Canada. Soon he was put in command of a flotilla on Lake Champlain, and then followed his well-known exploits at St. Johns and Chamblee, where he co-operated with James Livingston, a brave New Yorker. His capture of Chamblee on the 19th of October, 1775, just five years before his death, brought promises of reward from Congress. Then came the reckless expedition of Ethan Allen which led to his capture, and which has long been believed to be the result of a failure on the part of Brown to co-operate with Allen when he could have supported him. Here the burden of proof rests on the accusers of Brown, and they never have had other proof than an implication drawn from the "Allen's narrative" that he did not make his best effort to help him, although Allen does not make any direct charge. Furthermore, the narrative is often far from correct; and as Allen was reckless in act and statement, and as Brown was continued in service under Montgomery, who was friendly to him, we may infer that Brown's failure was unavoidable. Allen's plan was not approved by Schuyler or Montgomery. Washington hoped that Allen's misfortune "would teach a lesson of prudence and subordination to others who may be anxious to outshine their general officers."

It has been intimated that Brown was one of these junior officers who chafed under the limitations set by his superiors, but he certainly retained his position as a regimental officer, and achieved such results in this Canadian invasion during the advance to Quebec that he was highly commended by his associates, promised promotion by Montgomery, and finally given his Lieutenant-colonelcy by Congress. He took part in the attack of December 31, 1775, on Quebec, and on the death of Montgomery served under Arnold for months, commanding a detachment of Berkshire and other men who were willing to re-enlist if he stayed. [[See Note 2.]] One of his letters written to his wife, March 15, 1776, when commanding an outpost near Quebec, says he expects to be "another Uriah because he does not agree very well with Mr. General Arnold." He had been "ordered to attack with his attachment of two hundred men, one-half of whom were sick in the hospital" (his brave brother, Captain Jacob Brown, died of small-pox). He himself marched out with his men, but the enemy retired into their fort too soon for him to attack them. He "expected another storm from Arnold, or to be punished for disobedience to orders." Truly, he was not easily subordinate to Arnold, but he was not again "set in the forefront of the battle, that others might retire from him and that he might be smitten and die," as David planned for Uriah, because he was truly loyal to the cause he so nobly served, and Arnold did not dare to destroy him.

To fully describe his conduct in denouncing Arnold and Arnold's tergiversation and intrigues against him would lead me far afield. No doubt his accusations interfered with Arnold's promotion by Congress,—promotion he earned as a great leader in battle,—but as an officer responsible for property he was repeatedly unsuccessful. Brown again and again renewed his charges against the arch-traitor, but was not able to get proper attention from the tribunals that should have relieved him from Arnold's false charges. [[See Note 3.]]

Again and again historians declare that Arnold was led to treason because he had been unjustly treated by the Continental Congress. What a false view this is! He is willing enough to throw himself into battle for glory and for his country's honor at Saratoga without definite authority, and again he was ready for a fight or an expedition for the relief of this valley when he could lead, but he was always in trouble financially. His Philadelphia extravagances and the increase of his indebtedness did not escape all censure.