A country which, like England, depends on the command of the sea for its very existence may well keep a sharp eye on any invention that tends to render that command more certain. In recent years we have heard a lot said, and read a lot written, about the importance of swift boats which in war time could be launched against a hostile fleet, armed with the deadly torpedo. The Russo-Japanese War has given us a fine example of what can be accomplished by daring men and swift torpedo craft.
For some reason or other the British Navy has not kept abreast of France in the number of her torpedo vessels. Reference to official figures shows that, while our neighbours can boast 280 "hornets," we have to our credit only 225. In the House of Commons, on August 10th, 1904, Mr. Henry Norman, M.P., asked the Secretary of the Admiralty whether, in view of the proofs recently afforded of trustworthiness, speed, simplicity, and comparatively low cost of small vessels propelled by petrol motors, he would consider the advisability of testing this class of vessel in His Majesty's Navy. The Secretary replied that the Admiralty had kept a watch on the recent trials and meant to make practical tests with motor pinnaces. In view of the danger that would accompany the storage of petrol on board ship, the paraffin motor was preferable for naval purposes; and an 80 h.p. four-cylindered motor of this type has been ordered from Messrs. Vosper, of Portsmouth.
Mr. Norman, writing in The World's Work on the subject, says: "There can be no question that such high speed and cheap construction (80 h.p. giving in the little boat as much speed—to consider that only—as eight thousand in the big boat) point to the use of motor boats for naval purposes in the near future. A torpedo boat exists only to carry one or two torpedoes within launching distance of the enemy. The smaller and cheaper she can be, and the fewer men she carries, provided always she be able to face a fairly rough sea, the better. Now the ordinary steam torpedo boat carries perhaps twenty men, and costs anything from £50,000 to £100,000. A motor boat of equal or greater speed could probably be built for £15,000, and would carry a crew of two men. Six motor boats, therefore, could be built for the cost of one steamboat, and their total crews would not number so many as the crew of the one. Moreover, they could all be slung on board a single vessel, and only set afloat near the scene of action. A prophetic friend of mine declares that the most dangerous warship of the future will be a big vessel, unarmoured and only lightly armed, but of the utmost possible speed, carrying twenty or more motor torpedo boats slung on davits. She will rely on her greater speed for her own safety, if attacked; she will approach as near the scene of action as possible, and will drop all her little boats into the water, and they will make a simultaneous attack. Their hulls would be clean, their machinery in perfect order, their crews fresh and full of energy, and it would be strange if one of the twenty did not strike home. And the destruction of a battleship or great cruiser at the cost of a score of these little wasps, manned by two-score men, would be a very fine naval bargain."
Mr. Norman omits one recommendation that must in active service count heavily in favour of the motor boat, and that is its practical invisibility in the day or at night time. The destroyer, when travelling at high speed, betrays its presence by clouds of smoke or red-hot funnels. The motor boat is entirely free from such dangerous accompaniments; the exhaust from the cylinders is invisible in every way. The very absence of funnels must also be in itself a great advantage. The eye, roving over the waters, might easily "pick up" a series of stumpy, black objects of hard outline; but the motor boat, riding low and flatly on the waves, would probably escape notice, especially when a search-light alone can detect its approach.
It may reasonably be said that the Admiralty knows its own business best, and that the outsider's opinion is not wanted. The "man in the street" has become notorious for his paper generalship and strategy, and fallen somewhat into disrepute as an adviser on military and naval matters. Yet we must not forget this: that many—we might say most—of the advances in naval mechanisms, armour, and weapons of defence have not been evolved by naval men, but by the highly educated and ingenious civilian who, unblinded by precedent or professional conservatism, can watch the game even better in some respects than the players themselves, and see what the next move should be. That move may be rather unorthodox—like the application of steam to men-o'-war—but none the less the correct one under the circumstances. We allowed other nations to lead us in the matter of breech-loading cannon, armour-plate, submarines, the abolition of combustible material on warships. Shall we also allow them to get ahead with motor boats, and begin to consider that there may be something in motor auxiliaries for the fleet when they are already well supplied? If there is a country which should above all others lose no time in adding the motor to her means of defence, that country is Great Britain.
FOOTNOTE:
[12.] The Motor Boat, March 16th, 1905.