And he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from the contrary: that is, since Pain was in itself an object of avoidance to all the contrary must be in like manner an object of choice.
Again he urged that that is most choice-worthy which we choose, not by reason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is confessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to what purpose he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself choice-worthy.
Again, that when added to any other good it makes it more choice-worthy; as, for instance, to actions of justice, or perfected self-mastery; and good can only be increased by itself.
However, this argument at least seems to prove only that it belongs to the class of goods, and not that it does so more than anything else: for every good is more choicewortby in combination with some other than when taken quite alone. In fact, it is by just such an argument that Plato proves that Pleasure is not the Chief Good:[[3]] “For,” says he, “the life of Pleasure is more choice-worthy in combination with Practical Wisdom than apart from it; but, if the compound better then simple Pleasure cannot be the Chief Good; because the very Chief Good cannot by any addition become choice-worthy than it is already:” and it is obvious that nothing else can be the Chief Good, which by combination with any of the things in themselves good comes to be more choice-worthy.
What is there then of such a nature? (meaning, of course, whereof we can partake; because that which we are in search of must be such).
As for those who object that “what all aim at is not necessarily good,” I confess I cannot see much in what they say, because what all think we say is. And he who would cut away this ground from under us will not bring forward things more dependable: because if the argument had rested on the desires of irrational creatures there might have been something in what he says, but, since the rational also desire Pleasure, how can his objection be allowed any weight? and it may be that, even in the lower animals, there is some natural good principle above themselves which aims at the good peculiar to them.
Nor does that seem to be sound which is urged respecting the argument from the contrary: I mean, some people say “it does not follow that Pleasure must be good because Pain is evil, since evil may be opposed to evil, and both evil and good to what is indifferent:” now what they say is right enough in itself but does not hold in the present instance. If both Pleasure and Pain were bad both would have been objects of avoidance; or if neither then neither would have been, at all events they must have fared alike: but now men do plainly avoid the one as bad and choose the other as good, and so there is a complete opposition.
Nor again is Pleasure therefore excluded from being good because it does not belong to the class of qualities:[[4]] the acts of Virtue are not qualities, neither is Happiness [yet surely both are goods].
Again, they say the Chief Good is limited but Pleasure unlimited, in that it admits of degrees.
Now if they judge this from the act of feeling Pleasure then the same thing will apply to justice and all the other virtues,[[5]] in respect of which clearly it is said that men are more or less of such and such characters (according to the different virtues), they are more just or more brave, or one may practise justice and self-mastery more or less.