Reports concerning the sales of public lands give the quantity of land sold in Illinois toward the close of the territorial period, the figures for 1817 and 1818 being as follows:
| Acres in 1817. | Acres in 1818. | Jan. 1, 1818. | Sept. 30, 1818. | |
| Shawneetown | 72,384 | 216,315 | $291,429 | $637,468 |
| Kaskaskia | 90,493 | 121,052 | 209,295 | 406,288 |
| Edwardsville[251] | 149,165 | 121,923 | 301,701 | 451,499[252] |
| 312,042 | 459,290 | $802,425 | $1,495,255 |
The percentage of debt showed a marked increase in the first nine months of 1818. There were received in three-quarters of 1817 and 1818, respectively:
| 1817. | 1818. | |
| At Shawneetown | $32,837 | $112,759 |
| At Kaskaskia | 41,218 | 68,975 |
| At Edwardsville | 41,426 | 78,788 |
During this same period the receipts at Steubenville, Marietta, and Wooster, Ohio, decreased,[253] showing that Illinois was beginning to surpass Ohio as an objective point for emigrants wishing to enter land.
The Indian question was interwoven with the land question during the territorial period. In 1809 the Indians relinquished their claim to some small tracts of land lying near the point where the Wabash ceases to be a state boundary line.[254] No more cessions were made until after the war of 1812. Although the population of Illinois increased, during the territorial period, from some eleven thousand to about forty thousand, the increase before the war was slight, and thus it came about that during the war the few whites were kept busy defending themselves from the large and hostile Indian population. So well does the manner of defence in Illinois illustrate the frontier character of the region that a sketch of the same may be given. When, in 1811, the Indians became hostile and murdered a few whites, the condition of the settlers was precarious in the extreme. Today the term city would be almost a favor to a place containing no more inhabitants than were then to be found in the white settlements in Illinois. Moreover, few as were the whites, they were dispersed in a long half-oval extending from a point on the Mississippi near the present Alton southward to the Ohio, and thence up that river and the Wabash to a point considerably north of Vincennes. This fringe of settlement was but a few miles [pg 107] wide in some places, while so sparse was the population near the mouth of the Ohio that the communication between northern and southern Indians was unchecked. Carlyle was regarded as the extreme eastern boundary of settlements to the westward; a fort on Muddy River, near where the old Fort Massac trace crossed the stream, was considered as one of the most exposed situations; and Fort La Motte, on a creek of the same name above Vincennes, was a far northern point. The exposed outside was some hundreds of miles long, and the interior and north were occupied by ten times as many hostile savages as there were whites in the country, the savages being given counsel and ammunition by the British garrisons on the north.[255] Under conditions then existing, aid from the United States could be expected only in the event of dire necessity. Stout frontiersmen were almost ready to seek refuge in flight, but no general exodus took place, although in February, 1812, Governor Edwards wrote to the Secretary of War: “The alarms and apprehensions of the people are becoming so universal, that really I should not be surprised if we should, in three months, lose more than one-half of our present population. In places, in my opinion, entirely out of danger, many are removing. In other parts, large settlements are about to be totally deserted. Even in my own neighborhood, several families have removed, and others are preparing to do so in a week or two. A few days past, a gentleman of respectability arrived here from Kentucky, and he informed me that he saw on the road, in one day, upwards of twenty wagons conveying families out of this Territory. Every effort to check the prevalence of such terror seems to be ineffectual, and although much of it is unreasonably indulged, yet it is very certain the Territory will very shortly be in considerable [pg 108] danger. Its physical force is very inconsiderable, and is growing weaker, while it presents numerous points of attack.”[256]
To the first feeling of fear succeeded a determination to hold the ground. Before the middle of 1812, Governor Edwards had established Fort Russell, a few miles northwest of the present Edwardsville, bringing to this place, which was to be his headquarters, the cannon which Louis XIV. had had placed in Fort Chartres;[257] and two volunteer companies had been raised, and had “ranged to a great distance—principally between the Illinois and the Kaskaskia rivers, and sometimes between the Kaskaskia and the Wabash—always keeping their line of march never less than one and sometimes three days' journey outside of all the settlements”[258]—which incidentally shows what great unoccupied regions still existed even in the southern part of Illinois. As the rangers furnished their own supplies, the two companies went out alternately for periods of fifteen days. Sometimes the company on duty divided, one part marching in one direction and the other in the opposite, in order to produce the greatest possible effect upon the Indians. Settlers on the frontier—and that comprised a large proportion of the population—“forted themselves,” as it was then expressed. Where a few families lived near each other, one of the most substantial houses was fortified, and here the community staid at night, and in case of imminent danger in the daytime as well. Isolated outlying families left their homes and retired to the nearest fort. Such places of refuge were numerous and many were the attacks which they successfully withstood.
Rangers and frontier forts were used with much effect, but the great dispersion of settlement and the large numbers of Indians combined to make it wholly impossible to make such means of defence entirely adequate. In August, 1812, the Governor wrote to the Secretary of War: “The principal settlements of this Territory being on the Mississippi, are at least one hundred and fifty miles from those of Indiana, and immense prairies intervene between them. There can, therefore, be no concert of operations for the protection of their frontiers and ours.... No troops of any kind have yet arrived in this Territory, and I think you may count on hearing of a bloody stroke upon us very soon. I have been extremely reluctant to send my family away, but, unless I hear shortly of more assistance than a few rangers, I shall bury my papers in the ground, send my family off, and stand my ground as long as possible.”[259] The “bloody stroke” predicted by the Governor fell on the garrison at Fort Dearborn, where Chicago now stands. Some regular troops were subsequently sent to the territory, but the war did not lose its frontier character. One of the most characteristic features was that troops sometimes set out on a campaign of considerable length, in an uninhabited region, without any baggage train and practically without pack horses, the men carrying their provisions on their horses, and the horses living on wild grass.[260] Unflagging energy was shown by the settlers, several effective campaigns being carried on, and by the close of 1814 the war was closed in Illinois.[261]
Extinction of Indian titles to land was retarded by the war and also by the policy of the United States, which was expressed by Secretary of War Crawford, in 1816, as follows: [pg 110] “The determination to purchase land only when demanded for settlement will form the settled policy of the Government. Experience has sufficiently proven that our population will spread over any cession, however extensive, before it can be brought into market, and before there is any regular and steady demand for settlement, thereby increasing the difficulty of protection, embarrassing the Government by broils with the natives, and rendering the execution of the laws regulating intercourse with the Indian tribes utterly impracticable.”[262] Some progress, however, was made in extinguishing Indian titles during the territorial period after the close of the war. In 1816, several tribes confirmed the cession of 1804 of land lying south of an east and west line passing through the southern point of Lake Michigan, and ceded a route for an Illinois-Michigan canal.[263] At Edwardsville, on September 25, 1818, the Peoria, Kaskaskia, Michigamia, Cahokia, and Tamarois ceded a tract comprising most of southern and much of central Illinois.[264] The significance of this cession would have been immense had it not been that it was made by weak tribes, while the powerful Kickapoo still claimed and held all that part of the ceded tract lying north of the parallel of 39°—a little to the north of the mouth of the Illinois river. This Kickapoo claim included the fertile and already famous Sangamon country, in which the state capital was eventually to be located, and squatters were pressing hard upon the Indian [pg 111] frontier, yet the Indians still held the land when Illinois became a state.
During the territorial period, Illinois gained the long-sought right of preëmption; the French claims ceased to retard settlement; some progress was made in the extinction of Indian titles, and the sale of public land was begun. The new state was to find the Indian question a pressing one, and some changes in the land system were yet desired, but the crucial point was passed.