CHAPTER XVII.
THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM AND THE FLIGHT TO EGYPT.
The story of the battle of Actium has troubled historians of all periods, and no one has been able to offer a satisfactory explanation of the startling incidents which occurred in it or of the events which led up to them. I am not able to accept the ingenious theory set forward by Ferrero, nor is it easy to agree wholly with the explanations given by classical authors. In the following chapter I relate the events as I think they occurred, but of course my interpretation is open to question. The reader, however, may refer to the early authors to check my statements; and there he will find, as no doubt he has already observed in other parts of this volume, that while the incidents and facts all have the authority of these early writers, the theories which explain them, representing my own opinion, are frankly open to discussion.
For the time being Octavian did not care to be at too close quarters to Antony, and he therefore fortified himself in a position a few miles back from the actual entrance to the Gulf of Ambracia. Antony at once shipped a part of his army across from Actium to the north side of the great harbour’s mouth, and thus placed himself in command of the passage into the inland water. Octavian soon threw up impregnable earthworks around his camp, and built a wall down to the shore of the Ionian Sea, so that the enemy could not interfere with the landing of his supplies, all of which had to come from across the water. He stationed his ships in such a position that they could command the entrance to the Gulf of Ambracia; and, these vessels proving to be extremely well manned and handled, Antony soon found that his own fleet was actually bottled up in the Gulf, and could not pass into the open sea without fighting every inch of the passage out through the narrow fairway. Octavian was thus in command of the Ionian Sea, and was free to receive provisions or munitions of war day by day from Italy. He could not, however, leave his fortified camp, for Antony commanded all the country around him. Thus, while Octavian blockaded Antony’s fleet in the Gulf, Antony besieged Octavian’s army in their camp; and while Octavian commanded the open sea and obtained his supplies freely from Italy, Antony commanded the land and received his provisions without interruption from Greece. A deadlock therefore ensued, and neither side was able to make a hostile move. It seems clear to me that a decisive battle could only be brought on by one of two manœuvres: either Antony must retire from Actium and induce Octavian to come after him into Greece, or else his fleet must fight its way out of the Gulf and cut off Octavian’s supplies, thus starving him into surrender. Many of Antony’s generals were of opinion that the former movement should be undertaken, and they pressed him to retire and thus draw Octavian from his stronghold. Cleopatra, however, appears to have been in favour of breaking the blockade and regaining possession of the sea. She may have considered Antony’s army to be composed of too many nationalities to make success on land absolutely assured, and any retreat at this moment might easily be misinterpreted and might lead to desertions. On the other hand, she had confidence in her Egyptian fleet and in Antony’s own ships, if, by cutting down their number, their crews could be brought up to the full complement; and she believed that with, say, 300 vessels Octavian’s blockade could be forced, and his own position subjected to the same treatment. I gather that this plan, however, was hotly opposed by Domitius Ahenobarbus and others; and, since a loss of time was not likely to alter the situation to their disadvantage, no movement was yet made.
Some time in June Antony sent a squadron of cavalry round the shores of the Gulf to try to cut off Octavian’s water-supply, but the move was not attended with much success and was abandoned. Shortly after this the deserter Titius defeated a small body of Antony’s cavalry, and Agrippa captured a few of his ships which had been cruising from stations outside the Gulf; whereupon Octavian sent despatches to Rome announcing these successes as important victories, and stating that he had trapped Antony’s fleet within the Gulf. He also sent agents into Greece to try to shake the confidence of the inhabitants in his enemy, and these men appear to have been partially successful in their endeavours.
These small victories of Octavian seem to have unnerved Antony, and to have had a dispiriting effect upon the army. Cleopatra, too, must have been particularly depressed by them, for they seemed to be a confirmation of the several ominous and inauspicious occurrences which had recently taken place. An Egyptian soothsayer had once told Antony that his genius would go down before that of Octavian; and Cleopatra, having watched her husband’s rapid deterioration in the last two years, now feared that the man’s words were indeed true. News had lately come from Athens that a violent hurricane had torn down the statue of Bacchus, the god whom Antony impersonated, from a group representing the Battle of the Giants; and two colossal statues of Fumenes and Attalus, each of which was inscribed with Antony’s name, had also been knocked over during the same cyclone. This news recalled the fact that a few months previously at Patrae the temple of Hercules, the ancestor of Antony, had been struck by lightning; and at about the same time a small township founded by him at Pisaurum, on the east coast of Italy, north of Ancona, had been destroyed by an earthquake. These and other ill-omened accidents had a very depressing effect on Cleopatra’s spirits, and her constant quarrels with Antony and his generals seem to have caused her to be in a state of great nervous tension. Towards the end of July or early in August, when the low-lying ground on which their camp was pitched became infested with mosquitos, and when the damp heat of summer had set the tempers of everybody on edge, the quarrels in regard to the conduct of the campaign broke out with renewed fury. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Dellius, Amyntas, and others, again urged Antony to retire inland and to fight a pitched battle with Octavian as soon as he should come after them. Cleopatra, however, still appears to have considered that the forcing of the blockade was the most important operation to be undertaken, and this she urged upon her undecided husband. It was of course a risky undertaking, but by reason of the very danger it made a strong appeal to Cleopatra’s mind. If their fleet could destroy that of Octavian, they would have him caught in his stronghold as in a trap. They would not even have to wait for the surrender; but, leaving eighty or a hundred thousand men to prevent his escape, they might sail over to Italy with twenty or thirty thousand legionaries and take possession of empty Rome. There was not a senator nor a military force in the capital, for Octavian had lately made the entire senate in Rome come over to his camp, in order to give tone to his proceedings; and, when once Octavian’s sea-power had been destroyed, Antony and Cleopatra would be free to ride unchecked into Rome while the enemy was starved into surrender in Greece. A single naval battle, and Rome would be theirs! This, surely, was better than a slow and ponderous retreat into the interior.
Antony, however, could not persuade his generals to agree to this. The risk was great, they seem to have argued; and even if they were victorious, was he going to march into Rome with Cleopatra by his side? The citizens would never stand it, after the stories they had heard in regard to the Queen’s magical power over him. Let her go back to Egypt, nor any longer remain to undermine Antony’s popularity. How could he appear to the world as a good republican with royal Cleopatra’s arm linked in his? By abandoning the idea of a naval battle the Egyptian fleet could be dispensed with, and could be allowed to depart to Egypt if it succeeded in running the blockade. Cleopatra had supplied ships but hardly any soldiers, and a land battle could be fought without her aid, and therefore without cause for criticism; nor would Octavian any longer be able to say that he was waging war against Cleopatra and not against Antony. The money which she had supplied for the campaign was almost exhausted, and thus she was of no further use to the cause. Let Antony then give up the projected naval battle, and order the Queen to go back quickly with her ships to her own country: for thus, and thus only, could the disaffected republican element in their army be brought into line. Cleopatra, they said, had been the moving spirit in the war; Cleopatra had supplied the money; it was against Cleopatra that Octavian had declared war; it was Cleopatra’s name, and the false stories regarding her, which had aroused Rome to Octavian’s support; it was Cleopatra who was now said on all sides to be supreme in command of the whole army; and it was of Cleopatra that every senator, every vassal king, and every general, was furiously jealous. Unless she were made to go, the whole cause was lost.
Antony seems to have realised the justice of these arguments, and to have promised to try to persuade his wife to retire to Egypt to await the outcome of the war; and he was further strengthened in this resolve when even Canidius, who had all along favoured the keeping of Cleopatra with the army, now urged him to ask her to leave them to fight their own battle. He therefore told the Queen, it would seem, that he desired her to go, pointing out that in this way alone could victory be secured.
Cleopatra, I take it, was furious. She did not trust Antony, and she appears to have been very doubtful whether he would still champion her cause after victory. She even doubted that he would be victorious. He was now but the wreck of the man he had once been, for a too lifelike impersonation of the god Bacchus had played havoc with his nerves and with his character. He had no longer the strength and the determination necessary for the founding of an imperial throne in Rome; and she felt that, even if he were successful in arms against Octavian, he would make but a poor regent for her son Cæsarion. Having used her money and her ships for his war, he might abandon her cause; and the fact that they were fighting for Cæsar’s son and heir, which had already been placed in the background, might be for ever banished. It must have seemed madness for her to leave her husband at this critical juncture. In order to prevent further desertions he would probably proclaim his republican principles as soon as her back was turned; and, in his drunken weakness, he might commit himself so deeply that he would never be able to go back upon his democratic promises. Since she was unpopular with his generals, he would perhaps at once tell them that she was nothing to him; and for the sake of assuring victory he might even divorce her. Of course, it was obvious that he was devoted to her, and relied on her in all matters, seeming to be utterly lost without her; but, for all she knew, his ambition might be stronger than his love. She therefore refused absolutely to go; and Antony was too kind-hearted, and perhaps too much afraid of her anger, to press the matter.