A History of Rome to 565 A. D.

by Arthur E. R. Boak

V. The Roman Conquest of South Italy: 281–270 b. c.

Italians and Greeks in South Italy. The only parts of the peninsula that had not yet acknowledged the Roman overlordship were the lands of the Lucanians and Bruttians and the few Greek cities in the south that still maintained their independence. Of these latter the chief was Tarentum, a city of considerable commercial importance. From the middle of the fourth century these cities had been engaged in continual warfare with the Lucanians and [pg 40]Messapians, and in the course of their struggles Tarentum had come to assume the rôle of protector of the Hellenes in Italy. But even this city had only been able to make head against its foes through assistance obtained from Greece. In 338, King Archidamus of Sparta, and in 331 Alexander, king of Epirus and uncle of Alexander the Great, fell fighting in the service of the Italian Greeks. In 303, Cleonymus of Sparta, more fortunate than his predecessors, compelled the Lucanians to conclude a peace, which probably included the Romans, at that moment their allies. A little later (c. 300 B. C.) Agathocles, king of Syracuse, assisted the Tarentines against the same foe, and incorporated in his own kingdom the Bruttians and the Greek cities in the southwest. But with his death in 289, his kingdom, like that of Dionysius I, fell apart and the Greeks in the west were left again without a protector. Consequently, when the Lucanians renewed their attacks upon Thurii, that city, being unable to find succor in Greece and distrusting Tarentum, appealed to Rome (282). Rome gave ear to the call, relieved and garrisoned Thurii. But this action brought Roman ships of war into the Gulf of Tarentum contrary to an agreement between the two cities (perhaps that of 303). Enraged, the Tarentines attacked the Roman fleet, sank some Roman triremes, and then occupied Thurii. The ensuing Roman demands for reparation were rejected, their ambassadors insulted, and war began (281).

The war with Pyrrhus and Tarentum. The Tarentines were able to unite against Rome the Messapians, Lucanians, Samnites and Bruttians, but Roman successes in the first campaign forced them to call in the aid of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus. Pyrrhus was probably the most skilful Greek general of the time, and he brought with him into Italy an army organized and equipped according to the Macedonian system of Alexander the Great, which had become the standard in the Greek world. His force comprised 20,000 heavy-armed infantry forming the phalanx, and 3,000 Thessalian cavalry. Besides, he had a number of war elephants; animals which had figured on Greek battlefields since Ipsus (301). The first engagement was fought near Heraclea (280) and after a severe struggle the Romans were driven from the field. The superior generalship of Pyrrhus, and the consternation caused by his war elephants, won the day, but his losses were very heavy, and he himself was wounded. As fighters the Romans had shown themselves the equal of the foe, and their [pg 41]tactical organization, perfected in the Samnite Wars, had proved its value in its first encounter with that developed by the military experts of Greece. As a result of his victory at Heraclea, Pyrrhus was able to advance as far north as Latium, but withdrew again without accomplishing anything of importance. The next year, he won another hard-fought battle near Ausculum in Apulia. Thereupon the Romans began negotiations which Pyrrhus welcomed, sending the orator Cineas to Rome to represent him. But, before an agreement was reached, the Carthaginians, who feared the intervention of Pyrrhus in Sicily, offered the Romans assistance. Their proffer was accepted; the negotiations with Pyrrhus ended; and Rome and Carthage bound themselves not to make a separate agreement with the common foe, while the Carthaginian fleet was to coöperate with the Romans.

Pyrrhus in Sicily, 278–5 B. C. Nevertheless, Pyrrhus determined to answer an appeal from the Sicilian Greeks and to leave Italy for Sicily. After the death of Agathocles, tyrant and king of Syracuse (317–289), who had played the rôle of another Dionysius I, the Greeks in Sicily had fallen upon evil days. The Carthaginians had renewed their attacks upon them, and a new foe had appeared in the Mamertini, Campanian mercenary soldiers who had seized Messana and made it their headquarters for raiding the territory of the Greek cities. Caught between these two enemies, the Greeks appealed to Pyrrhus who came to their aid, possibly with the hope of uniting Sicily under his own control. His success was immediate. The Carthaginians were forced to give up all their possessions except Lilybaeum, and Pyrrhus stood ready to carry the war into Africa. But, at this juncture, the exactions that he laid upon his Sicilian allies and their fear that his victory would make him their permanent master caused them to desert his cause and make peace with their foes. Deprived of their assistance, and seeing that his allies in Italy were hard pressed by the Romans, he abandoned his Sicilian venture.

The end of the war. Pyrrhus returned to Italy, with the loss of his fleet in a naval battle with the Carthaginians, reorganized his forces, and advanced into Lucania or Samnium to meet the Romans. While manœuvering for an attack, one of his divisions sustained a severe repulse at Beneventum (275), whereupon he abandoned the offensive and retired to Tarentum. Leaving a garrison in that city [pg 42]he withdrew the rest of his forces to Greece, with the intention of attacking Antigonus Gonatas in Macedonia. His initial successes in this enterprise led him to withdraw his garrison from Tarentum and abandon the Western Greeks to their fate. Thereupon the Romans soon reduced the Samnites and Lucanians, while Tarentum and the other Greek cities, one after another, were forced to submit and enter the Roman alliance. By 270 B. C., all South Italy had in this way been added to the Roman dominions.

By 265 B. C. after a few more brief struggles with revolting or still unsubdued communities in central and northern Italy, the Romans had completed the subjugation of the entire Italian peninsula.

VI. The Roman Confederacy

Roman foreign policy. By wars and alliances Rome had united Italy. But it is not to be supposed that this was a goal consistently pursued through many generations by Roman statesmen. Probably it was not until the end was nearly within sight that the Romans realized whither their policy was leading them. Indeed, it is certain that many of Rome’s wars were waged in defence of Rome’s territory or that of the Roman allies. This seems particularly true of the period prior to the Gallic inroad of 387. According to the ancient Roman formula employed in declaring war, that uttered by the Fetiales, war was looked upon as the last means to obtain reparation for wrongs that were suffered at the hands of the enemy. Yet, although the Roman attitude in such matters was doubtless at one time sincere, we may well question how long this sincerity continued, and whether the injuries complained of were not sometimes the result of Roman provocation. Such attempts to place the moral responsibility for a war upon the enemy are common to all ages and are not always convincing. However, if we may not convict the Romans of aggressive imperialism prior to 265, at any rate the methods which they pursued in their relations with the other peoples of Italy made their domination inevitable in view of the Roman national character and their political and military organization. These methods early became established maxims of Roman foreign policy. The Romans, whenever possible, waged even their defensive wars offensively, and rarely made peace save with a beaten foe. As a rule, the enemy was forced to conclude a treaty with Rome which [pg 43]placed his forces at the disposal of the Roman state. This treaty was regarded as perpetually binding, and any attempt to break off the relationship it established was regarded as a casus belli. Possibly, the Romans looked upon this as the only policy which would guarantee peace on their borders, but it inevitably led to further wars, for it resulted in the continuous extension of the frontiers defended by Rome and so continually brought Rome into contact and conflict with new peoples. Nor were the voluntary allies of Rome allowed to leave the Roman alliance: such action was treated as equivalent to a declaration of war and regularly punished with severity. This practice gradually transformed Rome’s independent into dependent allies. From the middle of the fourth century, it seems that Rome deliberately sought to prevent the development of a strong state in the southern part of Italy, and to this end gladly took under her protection weaker communities that felt themselves threatened by stronger neighbors, although such action inevitably led to war with the latter. Furthermore, a conquered state frequently lost a considerable part of its territory. Portions of this land were set aside for the foundation of fortress colonies to protect the Roman conquests and overawe the conquered. The rest was incorporated in the ager Romanus to the profit of both the rich proprietors and the landless citizens. Usually, the Roman soldiers shared directly in the distribution of the movable spoils of war; sometimes a huge booty, as after the subjugation of the Sabines and Picentes in 290. A long series of successful and profitable wars, for Rome was ultimately victorious in every struggle after 387, had engendered in the Roman people a self-confidence and a martial spirit which soon led them to conquests beyond the confines of Italy. During this period of expansion within Italy, Roman policy had been guided by the Senate, a body of unrecorded statesmen of wide outlook and great determination, who not only made Rome mistress of the peninsula but succeeded in laying enduring foundations for the Roman power.

Rome and Italy. But although Italy was united under the Roman hegemony it by no means formed a single state. Rather it was an agglomerate of many states and many peoples, speaking different tongues and having different political institutions. The largest single element, however, was formed by the Roman citizens. These were to be found not only in the city of Rome and its immediate neighborhood, but also settled in the rural tribal districts (35 in [pg 44]number after 241) organized on conquered territory throughout the peninsula. In addition, groups of 300 citizens had been settled in various harbor towns as a sort of resident garrison to protect Roman interests. In all, down to 183 B. C., 22 of these maritime colonies were established, whose members in view of their special duties were excused from active service with the Roman legions. All these were full Roman citizens, but there were others who, while enjoying the private rights of Roman citizenship, lacked the right to vote or to hold office (cives sine suffragio). Such were the inhabitants of most of the old Latin communities and some others which had been absorbed in the Roman state. Such communities were called municipia (municipalities). Some of these were permitted to retain their own magistrates and city organization: others lacked this privilege of local autonomy. Of the former class, Gabii, conquered during the monarchy, is said to have been the prototype. This municipal system had the advantage of providing for local administration and at the same time reconciling the conquered city to the loss of its freedom. It was a distinctly Roman institution, and shows the wisdom of the early Roman statesmen who thus marked out the way for the complete absorption of the vanquished into the Roman citizen body, which was thus strengthened to meet its continually increasing military burdens. By 265, the Roman territory in Italy had an area of about 10,000 square miles. It extended along the west coast from the neighborhood of Caere southwards to the southern border of Campania, and from the latitude of Rome it stretched northeastwards through the territory of the Sabini to the Adriatic coast, where the lands of the Picentes and the Senones had been incorporated in the ager Romanus.