The higher magistrates were simply committees of senators elected by the assemblies. Their interests were those of the Senate as a whole, and constitutional practice required them to seek its advice upon all matters of importance. The Senate assigned to the consuls and praetors their spheres of duty, appointed pro-magistrates and allotted them their commands, and no contracts let by the censors were valid unless approved by the Senate. Except when the consuls were in the city, the Senate controlled all expenditures from the public treasury.
The chief weapon of the tribunes, their right of veto, which had [pg 106]been instituted as a check upon the power of the Senate and the magistrates, became an instrument whereby the Senate bridled the tribunate itself. For, since after 287 the plebeians speedily came to constitute a majority in the senate chamber, it was not difficult for this body to secure the veto of the tribunes upon any measures of which it disapproved, whether they originated with a consul or a tribune.
And, because the popular assemblies could only vote upon such measures or for such candidates as were submitted to them by the presiding magistrates, the Senate through its influence over magistrates and tribunes controlled both the legislative and elective activities of the comitia.
The Senate and the public policy. Since the Senate was a permanent body, easily assembled and regularly summoned by the consuls to discuss all matters of public concern, it was natural that the foreign policy of the state should be entirely in its hands—subject, of course, to the right of the Assembly of the Centuries to sanction the making of war or peace—and hence the organization and government of Rome’s foreign possessions became a senatorial prerogative. And, likewise, it fell to the Senate to deal with all sudden crises which constituted a menace to the welfare of the state, like the spread of the Bacchanalian associations which was ended by the Senatus Consultum of 186 B. C. And, finally, the Senate claimed the right to proclaim a state of martial law by passing the so-called Senatus Consultum ultimum, a decree which authorized the magistrates to use any means whatsoever to preserve the state.
Polybius and the Roman Constitution. Thus in spite of the fact that the Greek historian and statesman, Polybius, who was an intimate of the governing circles in Rome about the middle of the second century B. C., in looking at the form of the Roman constitution could call it a nice balance between monarchy, represented by the consuls, aristocracy, represented by the Senate, and democracy, represented by the tribunate and assemblies, in actual practice the state was governed by the Senate. It is true that the Senate was not always absolute master of the situation. Between 233 and 217 B. C., the popular leader Caius Flaminius, as tribune, consul and censor, was able to carry out a democratic policy at variance with the Senate’s wishes, but with his death the control of the Senate became firmer than ever. From what has been said it will readily be seen that the Senate’s power rested mainly upon custom and precedent and upon the [pg 107]prestige and influence of itself as a whole and its individual members, not upon powers guaranteed by law. The Roman republic never was a true democracy, but was strongly aristocratic in character.
The aristocracy of office. The Senate was representative of a narrow circle of wealthy patrician and plebeian families, which constituted the new nobility that came into being with the cessation of the patricio-plebeian struggle and which was in truth an office-holding aristocracy. For, after the initial widening of the circle of families enobled by admission to the Senate, the third century saw these create for themselves a real, if not legal, monopoly of the magistracies and thus of the regular gateway to the senate chamber. This they could do because the expense involved in holding public offices, which were without salary, and in conducting the election campaigns, which became increasingly costly as time went on, deterred all but persons of considerable fortune from seeking office, and because the exercise of personal influence and the right of the officer conducting an election to reject the candidature of a person of whom he disapproved, made it possible to prevent in most cases the election of any one not persona grata to the majority of the senators. It was only individuals of exceptional force and ability, like Cato the Elder, and in later times Marius and Cicero, who could penetrate the barriers thus established. Such a person was signalled as a novus homo, a “new-comer.”
The goal of office. While Rome was hard-pressed by her enemies and while the issue of the struggle for world empire was still in doubt, the Senate displayed to a remarkable degree the qualities of self-sacrifice and steadfastness which so largely contributed to Rome’s ultimate triumph, as well as great political adroitness in the foreign relations of the state. But with the passing of all external dangers, personal ambition and class interest became more and more evident to the detriment of its patriotism and prestige. Office-holding, with the opportunities it offered for ruling over subject peoples and of commanding in profitable wars, became a ready means for securing for oneself and one’s friends the wealth which was needed to maintain the new standard of luxurious living now affected by the ruling class of the imperial city. The higher magistracies were rendered still more valuable in the eyes of the senators when the latter were prohibited from participating directly in commercial ventures outside of Italy by a law passed in 219 B. C., which forbade senators to own ships of seagoing capacity, with the object probably of preventing the foreign [pg 108]policy of the state from being directed by commercial interests. As a consequence the rivalry for office became extremely keen, and the customary canvassing for votes tended to degenerate into bribery both of individuals and of the voting masses. In the latter case it took the form of entertaining the public by the elaborate exhibition of lavish spectacles in the theatre and the arena.
Attempts to restrain abuses. However, the sense of responsibility was still strong enough in the Senate as a whole to secure the passing of legislation designed to check this evil. The Villian law (lex Villia annalis) of 180 B. C. established a regular sequence for the holding of the magistracies. Henceforth the quaestorship had to be held before the praetorship, and the latter before the consulate. The aedileship was not made imperative, but was regularly sought after the quaestorship, because it involved the supervision of the public games and festivals, and in this way gave a good opportunity for ingratiating oneself with the populace. The tribunate was not considered as one of the regular magistracies, and the censorship, according to the custom previously established, followed the consulship. The minimum age of twenty-eight years was set for the holding of the quaestorship, and an interval of two years was required between successive magistracies. Somewhat later, about 151 B. C., re-elections to the same office were forbidden. In the years 181 and 159 B. C. laws were passed which established severe penalties for the bribery of electors. Another attempt to check the same abuse was the introduction of the secret ballot for voting in the assemblies. The Gabinian Law of 139 provided for the use of the ballot in elections; two years later the Cassian Law extended its use to trials in the comitia, and in 131 it was finally employed in the legislative assemblies.
But these laws accomplished no great results, as they dealt merely with the symptoms, and not with the cause of the disorder. And the Roman Senate, deteriorating in capacity and morale, was facing administrative, military, and social problems, which might well have been beyond its power to solve even in the days of its greatness. As we have indicated the Senate’s power rested largely upon its successful foreign policy, but its initial failures in the last wars with Macedonia and Carthage, and the long and bloody struggles in Spain, had weakened its reputation and its claim to control the public policy was challenged, from the middle of the second century B. C., by the new commercial and capitalist class.
The Roman Constitution from 265 to 133 B. C. During the period in question there were few changes of importance in the political organization of the Roman state. The dictatorship had been discarded, although not abolished, before the close of the Hannibalic War, a step which was in harmony with the policy of the Senate which sought to prevent any official from attaining too independent a position. In 242 B. C. a second praetorship, the office of the praetor peregrinus or alien praetor was established. The duty of this officer was to preside over the trial of disputes arising between Roman citizens and foreigners. Two additional praetorships were added in 227, and two more in 197 B. C., to provide provincial governors of praetorian rank. In 241 B. C. the last two rural tribal districts were created, making thirty-five tribes in all. Hereafter when new settlements of Roman colonists were undertaken, or new peoples admitted to citizenship, they were assigned to one or other of the old tribes, and membership therein became hereditary, irrespective of change of residence.