Spartacus. While Pompey was fighting Sertorius in Spain and Lucullus was pursuing Mithradates in Bithynia a serious slave war arose in Italy. It began in 73 B. C. with the revolt of a band of gladiators from a training school in Capua under the leadership of the Thracian Spartacus and the Gauls, Crixus and Onemaus. Taking refuge on the slopes of Vesuvius they rapidly recruited large numbers of runaway slaves. They defeated the armies of two Roman praetors and overran Campania, Lucania, and all southern Italy. By the end of the year 73 B. C. their number had grown to 70,000.
In the next year they divided their forces; the Gauls and Germans followed Crixus, the Thracians Spartacus. The two consuls took the field against them; Crixus and his horde were defeated in Apulia. Spartacus marched north, intending to make his way through the Alps to Thrace. The consuls pursued him, and he defeated them one after the other. Thereupon his followers refused to leave Italy and turned southwards, plundering as they went. Again Spartacus defeated the consuls but dared not attack Rome and retired to South Italy.
Crassus in command, 71 B. C. In 71 B. C. the consuls displayed no enthusiasm to undertake the command against Spartacus, and so the Senate appointed as extraordinary commander the praetor Marcus Licinius Crassus, one of Sulla’s veteran officers, who volunteered his services. After restoring discipline among his troops, Crassus succeeded in penning up Spartacus in the peninsula of Bruttium. Spartacus hired some Cilician pirates to transport him to Sicily, but, after [pg 156]receiving their price, they abandoned him to his fate. He succeeded in breaking through Crassus’ lines, but his forces divided into two detachments, each of which was caught and beaten. Spartacus fell in battle; while 6000 of his following were taken and crucified. Crassus had bent all his energies to bring the revolt to a close before the arrival of Pompey, who was on his way from Spain. This he might fairly claim to have accomplished although a body of 5000 slaves who had escaped to North Italy were met by Pompey and annihilated.
IV. The Consulate of Pompey and Crassus: 70 b. c.
Pompey and Crassus consuls. Both Pompey and Crassus, flushed by their victories in Spain and in Italy, now demanded the right to stand for the consulship for 70 B. C. Both sought triumphs and under this pretext did not disband their armies. The Senate resisted their claims, for Pompey’s candidature was clearly unconstitutional, and since Crassus was praetor in 71 he was not eligible for the consulate in the following year. Furthermore both were distrusted because of their ambitious natures. In view of this opposition Crassus, in spite of mutual jealousy between himself and Pompey, made overtures to the latter and they agreed to unite their forces. They also made a bid for the support of the populares by promising to restore the tribunate to its former privileges and for that of the equestrians by promising to reinstate them in the jury courts. This combination overawed senatorial opposition, their candidatures were legalized by special bills and both were elected. In their consulate the tribunes were relieved of the restrictions which Sulla had placed upon their activities, and the jury courts were reorganized. However, the latter were not given over completely to the equestrians, but each panel of jurors was to consist of three equal sections, one drawn from the Senate, one from the equites, and one from the tribuni aerarii, the class of citizens whose assessment was next to that of the equites. The Sullan régime was at an end, and in the tribunate emancipated from the Senate’s control the ambitious general of the future was to find his most valuable ally.
Trial of Verres. In the same year, prior to the passing of the Aurelian Law which reformed the juries, occurred the trial of Caius Verres, ex-propraetor of Sicily, a case notable because the prosecu[pg 157]tion was conducted by the young Marcus Tullius Cicero, whose accusation contained in his published Orations against Caius Verres constitutes a most illuminating commentary upon provincial misgovernment under the Sullan régime. The senatorial juries after 82 B. C., had protected the interests of the provinces no better than had the equestrian juries established by Caius Gracchus. They had shown themselves shamelessly venal, and a provincial governor who made judicious disbursements could be confident that he would be acquitted of any charges of extortion brought against him. Relying upon this Verres, who was propraetor of Sicily in 73, 72 and 71 B. C., had carried off from that province money and valuables estimated at 40,000,000 sesterces ($2,000,000). He had openly boasted that he intended the profits of one year for himself, those of the second for his friends and patrons, and those of the third for his jurors. At the opening of the year 70 B. C. the Sicilian cities sued Verres for restitution of damages and chose Cicero as their advocate. Cicero was a native of Arpinum, the birthplace of Marius, and was now in his thirty-sixth year. His upright conduct as quaestor in western Sicily in 75 B. C. had earned him the confidence of the Sicilians, and his successful conduct of the defense in several previous trials had marked him as a pleader of exceptional ability. But Verres had entrusted his case to Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, regarded at the time as the foremost of Roman orators, and every conceivable device was resorted to in order to prevent the case from coming to trial. Another prosecutor appeared, who claimed to have a better right than Cicero to bring suit against Verres. This necessitated a trial to decide which could better claim to represent the Sicilians. Cicero was able to expose the falsity of the claims of his rival, who was acting in collusion with Verres. He then proceeded to Sicily where he gathered his evidence in fifty of the hundred and ten days allowed him for the purpose. Before the hearing the elections for the next year were held and Hortensius elected consul, but Cicero was returned as aedile in spite of all the efforts of his opponents to weaken his prestige by a defeat at the polls.
The trial was set for the fifth of August, and as there were fifty holidays for various festivals between that date and the end of the year, the defense hoped to drag out the trial until after January first, when a praetor friendly to Verres would preside over the court for extortion. But Cicero defeated their hopes by abstaining from any [pg 158]long formal speech of accusation and contenting himself with a brief statement of the obstacles the defense had placed in his way, a threat to punish in his capacity of aedile any attempts at corruption, and a short statement of the charge against Verres. He then called his witnesses. Hortensius found himself without any arguments to combat and could not refute the evidence. Before the hearing of the witnesses was concluded Verres went into exile. He was condemned in his absence and Cicero became the leading advocate of the day. However, it must be admitted that the condemnation of Verres was also partly due to the danger of the loss of their privileges which threatened the senatorial jurors.
The crimes of Verres. The evidence which had been brought out against Verres was afterwards used by Cicero in composing his Second Pleading against Verres (actio secunda in Verrem) which was of course never delivered, but was a political pamphlet in the form of a fictitious oration. From it we learn the devices of which the governor made use to amass a fortune at the expense of his province. By initiating false accusations, by rendering, or intimidating other judges to render unjust decisions, he secured the confiscation of property the value of which he diverted to his own pockets. He sold justice to the highest bidder. While saving himself expense by defrauding the collectors of port dues of the tax on his valuables shipped out of Sicily, he added to his profits by the sale of municipal offices and priesthoods. He entered into partnership with the decumani or collectors of the ten per cent produce tax, and ordered the cultivators to pay whatever the collectors demanded, and then, if dissatisfied, seek redress in his court, a redress which, needless to say, was never gained. He loaned public funds at usurious rates of interest, and either did not pay in full or paid nothing for corn purchased from the Sicilian communities for the Roman government, while charging the state the market price. At the same time he insisted upon the cities commuting into money payments at rates far above current prices the grain allotted for the upkeep of the governor’s establishment. At times the demands made upon cultivators exceeded the total of their annual crop, and in despair they fled from their holdings. To the money gained by such methods Verres added a costly treasure of works of art, which he collected from both individuals and cities by theft, seizure and intimidation. Even the sacred ornaments of temples were not spared. All who resisted or denounced him, even Roman citizens, [pg 159]were subjected to illegal imprisonment, torture or execution. These iniquities were carried out in defiance of the provincial charter, but there was no power in his province to restrain him, and the Senate, which should have done so, remained indifferent to the complaints which were carried to Rome. The sad truth was that after all Verres was only more shameless and unscrupulous than the average provincial governor, and consequently the sympathies of the Senate were with him rather than with his victims—the provincials.