Vercingetorix, 52 B. C. A more serious movement started in 52 B. C. among the peoples of central Gaul who found a national leader in Vercingetorix, a young noble of the Arverni. The revolt took Caesar by surprise when he was in Cisalpine Gaul and his troops still scattered in winter quarters. He recrossed the Alps with all haste, secured the Narbonese province and succeeded in uniting his forces. These he strengthened with German cavalry from across the Rhine. However, a temporary check in an attack upon the position of Vercingetorix at Gergovia caused the Aedui to desert the Roman cause, and the revolt spread to practically the whole of Gaul. Caesar was on the point of retiring to the province, but after repulsing an attack made upon him he was able to pen up Vercingetorix in the fortress of Alesia. A great effort made by the Gauls to relieve the siege failed to break Caesar’s lines, and the defenders were starved into submission. The crisis was over, although another year was required before the revolting tribes were all reduced to submission and the Roman authority re-established (51 B. C.). Caesar used all possible mildness in his treatment of the conquered and the Gauls were not only pacified but won over. In the days to come they were among his most loyal supporters. The conquest of Gaul was an event of supreme importance for the future history of the Roman empire, and for the development of European civilization as well. For the time Gallia comata was not formed into a province. Its peoples were made allies of Rome, under the supervision of the governor of Narbonese Gaul, under obligation to furnish troops and for the most part liable to a fixed tribute. Caesar’s campaign in Gaul had given him the opportunity to develop his unusual military talents and to create a veteran army devoted to himself. His power had become so great that both Pompey and the Optimates desired his destruction and he was in a position to refuse to be eliminated without a struggle. The plots laid in Rome to deprive him of his power had made him hasten to quell the revolt of the Gauls with all speed. [pg 172]When this was accomplished he was free to turn his attention to Roman affairs.
Crassus in Syria, 55–53 B. C. After the assignment of the provinces by the Trebonian Law in 55 B. C., Crassus set out for Syria intending to win military power and prestige by a war against the Parthians, an Asiatic people who, once the subjects of the Persians and Seleucids, had established a kingdom which included the provinces of the Seleucid empire as far west as the Euphrates. Crassus had no real excuse for opening hostilities, but the Parthians were a potentially dangerous neighbor and a campaign against them gave promise of profit and glory. Accordingly, in 54 B. C., Crassus made a short incursion into Mesopotamia and then withdrew to Syria. The next year he again crossed the Euphrates, intending to penetrate deeply into the enemy’s country. But he had underestimated the strength of the Parthians and the difficulties of desert warfare. In the Mesopotamian desert near Carrhae his troops were surrounded and cut to pieces by the Parthian horsemen; Crassus himself was enticed into a conference and treacherously slain, and only a small remnant of his force escaped (53 B. C.). But the Parthians were slow in following up their advantage and Crassus’ quaestor, Cassius Longinus, was able to hold Syria. Still Roman prestige in the East had received a severe blow and for the next three centuries the Romans found the Parthians dangerous neighbors. The death of Crassus tended to hasten a crisis in Rome for it brought into sharp conflict the incompatible ambitions of Pompey and Caesar, whose estrangement had already begun with the death of Pompey’s wife Julia in 54 B. C.
Affairs in Rome, 54–49 B. C. At the end of his consulship Pompey left Rome but remained in Italy, on the pretext of his curatorship of the grain supply, and governed his province through his legates. In Rome disorder reigned; no consuls were elected in 54 B. C. nor before July of the following year; the partizans of Clodius and Milo kept everything in confusion. Pompey could have restored order but preferred to create a situation which would force the Senate to grant him new powers, so he backed Clodius, while Milo championed the Optimates. Owing to broils between the supporters of the candidates, no consuls or praetors could be elected for 52 B. C. In January of that year Clodius was slain by Milo’s body-guard on the Appian Way, and the ensuing outburst of mob violence in the city [pg 173]forced the Senate to appeal to Pompey. He was made sole consul, until he should choose a colleague, and was entrusted with the task of restoring order. His troops brought quiet into the city; Milo was tried on a charge of public violence, convicted, and banished. Pompey had attained the height of his official career; he was sole consul, at the same time he had a province embracing the Spains, Libya, and the sphere assigned to him with the grain curatorship, he governed his provinces through legati, and his armies were maintained by the public treasury. In reality he was the chief power in the state, for without him the Senate was helpless, and he was justly regarded by contemporaries as the First Citizen or Princeps. In many ways his position foreshadowed the Principate of Augustus. However, Pompey did not wish to overthrow the republican régime; his ambition was to be regarded as the indispensable and permanent mainstay of the government and to enjoy corresponding power and honor. In such a scheme there was no room for a rival, and therefore he determined upon Caesar’s overthrow. This decision put him on the side of the extreme Optimates, who were alarmed by Caesar’s wealth, influence and fame and feared him as a dangerous radical. They had no hesitation in choosing between Pompey and Caesar.
Pompey’s attack upon Caesar: 52 B. C. The latter’s immediate aim was to secure the consulship for 48 B. C. and to retain his proconsular command until the end of December, 49. He knew that he had reached a position where his destruction was the desire of many, and that the moment he surrendered his imperium he would be open to prosecution by those seeking to procure his ruin. But he had no intention of placing himself in the power of his enemies. The consulship would not only save him from prosecution but would enable him to confirm his arrangements in Gaul, reward his army, and secure his own future by another proconsular appointment. However, to secure his election, he had to be exempted from presenting himself in person for his candidature in 49, and this permission was accorded him by a tribunician law early in 52 B. C. So far his position was strictly legal, but Pompey, whose own consulship was unconstitutional, now broke openly with Caesar by passing legislation which would undermine the latter’s position. One of Pompey’s laws prohibited candidacies for office in absentia, and when Caesar’s friends protested, he added to the text of the law after it had passed a clause exempting Caesar from its operation; a procedure of more than dubious [pg 174]legality. A second law provided that in future provincial governorships should not be filled by the city magistrates just completing their term of office but by those whose terms had expired five years previously. This latter law may have been intended to check the mad rivalry for provincial appointments, but its immediate significance lay in the fact that it permitted a successor to be appointed to take over Caesar’s provinces on 1 March, 49 B. C. He would thus have to stand as a private citizen for the consulship and would no longer enjoy immunity from legal attack. At the same time Pompey had his own command in Spain extended for another five years.
Negotiations between Caesar, Pompey and the Senate, 51–50 B. C. The question of appointing a successor to Caesar’s provinces filled the next two years and was the immediate cause of civil war. Caesar claimed that his position should not be affected by the Pompeian law, and pressed for permission to hold his command until the close of 49 B. C. The extreme conservatives sought to supersede him on March first of that year, but Caesar’s friends and agents thwarted their efforts. Pompey was not willing to have Caesar’s command to run beyond 13 November, 49. Cicero, who had distinguished himself by his uprightness as governor of Cilicia in 51, strove to effect a compromise, but in vain. Caesar offered to give up Transalpine Gaul and part of his army, if allowed to retain the Cisalpine province but the overture was rejected. Finally, in December, 50 B. C., he formally promised to resign his provinces and disband his troops, if Pompey would do the same, but the Senate insisted upon his absolute surrender. On 7 January, 49 B. C., the Senate passed the “last decree” calling upon the magistrates and proconsuls (i. e. Pompey) to protect the state, and declaring Caesar a public enemy. Caesar’s friends left the city and fled to meet him in Cisalpine Gaul, where he and his army were in readiness for this emergency.
III. The Civil War between Caesar and the Senate: 49–46 b. c.
Caesar’s conquest of Italy and Spain, 49 B. C. The senatorial conservatives had forced the issue and for Caesar there remained the alternative of victory or destruction. He possessed the advantages of a loyal army ready for immediate action and the undisputed control [pg 175]over his own troops. On the other hand, his opponents had no veteran troops in Italy, and although Pompey acted as commander-in-chief of the senatorial forces, he was greatly hampered by having at times to defer to the judgment of the consuls and senators who were in his camp. It was obviously to Caesar’s advantage to take the offensive and to force a decision before his enemies could concentrate against him the resources of the provinces. Hence he determined to act without delay, and, upon receiving news of the Senate’s action on 7 January, he crossed the Rubicon, which divided Cisalpine Gaul and Italy, with a small force, ordering the legions beyond the Alps to join him with all speed. The Italian municipalities opened their gates at his approach and the newly raised levies went over to his side. Everywhere his mildness to his opponents won him new adherents. Pompey decided to abandon Italy and withdraw to the East, intending later to concentrate upon the peninsula from all sides; a plan made feasible by his control of the sea. Caesar divined his intention and tried to cut off his retreat at Brundisium, but could not prevent his embarkation. With his army and the majority of the Senate Pompey crossed to Epirus. Owing to his lack of a fleet Caesar could not follow and returned to Rome. There some of the magistrates were still functioning, in conjunction with a remnant of the Senate. Being in dire need of money, he wished to obtain funds from the treasury, and when this was opposed by a tribune, Caesar ignored the latter’s veto and forcibly seized the reserve treasure which the Pompeians had left behind in their hasty flight. In the meantime Caesar’s lieutenants had seized Sardinia and Sicily, and crossed over into Africa. He himself determined to attack the well organized Pompeian forces in Spain and destroy them before Pompey was ready for an offensive from the East. On his way to Spain, Caesar began the siege of Massalia which closed its gates to him. Leaving the city under blockade he hastened to Spain, where after an initial defeat he forced the surrender of the Pompeian armies. Some of the prisoners joined his forces; the rest were dismissed to their homes. Caesar hastened back to Massalia. The city capitulated at his arrival, and was punished by requisitions, the loss of its territory and the temporary deprivation of its autonomy. From here Caesar pressed on to Rome, where he had been appointed dictator by virtue of a special law. After holding the elections in which he and an approved colleague were returned as consuls for 48, he resigned his dictatorship and set out [pg 176]for Brundisium. There he had assembled his army and transports for the passage to Epirus.
Pharsalus, 48 B. C. During Caesar’s Spanish campaign Pompey had gathered a large force in Macedonia, nine Roman legions reinforced by contingents from the Roman allies. His fleet, recruited largely from the maritime cities in the East, commanded the Adriatic. Nevertheless, at the opening of winter (Nov. 49 B. C.) Caesar effected a landing on the coast of Epirus with part of his army and seized Apollonia. However, Pompey arrived from Macedonia in time to save Dyrrhachium. Throughout the winter the two armies remained inactive, but Pompey’s fleet prevented Caesar from receiving reinforcements until the spring of 48 B. C., when Marcus Antonius effected a crossing with another detachment. As Caesar’s troops began to suffer from shortage of supplies he was forced to take the offensive and tried to blockade Pompey’s larger force in Dyrrhachium. However, the attempt failed, his lines of investment were broken, and he withdrew to Thessaly. Thither he was followed by Pompey, who suffered himself to be influenced by the overconfident senators to risk a battle. Near the town of Old Pharsalus he attacked Caesar but was defeated and his army dispersed. He himself sought refuge in Egypt and there he was put to death by order of the king whose father he had protected in the days of his power. Pompey’s great weakness was that his resolution did not match his ambition. His ambition led him to seek a position incompatible with the constitution; but his lack of resolution did not permit him to overthrow the constitution. The Optimates had sided with him only because they held him less dangerous than Caesar and had he been victorious they would have sought to compass his downfall.
Caesar in the East, 48–47 B. C. After Pharsalus Caesar had set out in pursuit of Pompey, but arrived in Egypt after the murder of his foe. His ever pressing need of money probably induced Caesar to intervene as arbiter in the name of Rome in the dynastic struggle then raging in Egypt between the twenty-year-old Cleopatra and her thirteen-year-old brother, Ptolemy XIV Dionysus, who was also, following the Egyptian custom, her husband. Caesar got the young king in his power and brought back Cleopatra, whom the people of Alexandria had driven out. Angered thereat, and resenting his exactions, the Alexandrians rose in arms and from October, 48, to March, 47 B. C., besieged Caesar in the royal quarter of the city. Having [pg 177]but few troops with him Caesar was in dire straits and was only able to maintain himself through his control of the sea which enabled him to eventually receive reinforcements. His relief was effected by a force raised by Mithradates of Pergamon who invaded Egypt from Syria. In co-operation with him Caesar defeated the Egyptians in battle; Ptolemy Dionysus perished in flight; and Alexandria submitted. Cleopatra was married to a still younger brother and put in possession of the kingdom of Egypt. Caesar had succumbed to the charms of the Egyptian queen and tarried in her company for the rest of the winter. He was called away to face a new danger in Pharnaces, son of Mithradates Eupator, who had taken advantage of the civil war to recover Pontus and overrun Lesser Armenia, Cappadocia and Bithynia. Hastening through Syria Caesar entered Pontus and defeated Pharnaces at Zela. After settling affairs in Asia Minor he proceeded with all speed to the West, where his presence was urgently needed.