However, the visit of the governor's agent, previously referred to, had already borne fruit when, on the morning of Sunday, July 10, Sheriff McCleary forwarded his final appeal for military aid. In this communication, the sheriff once more averred that his powers were exhausted, and that the civil authorities could not raise a force of deputies large enough to cope with the locked-out men, "Only a large military force," he added, "will enable me to control matters."
At 10 o'clock on Sunday night the governor issued the following order:
George R. Snowden, Major-General Commanding N. G. P.:
Put the division under arms and move at once, with ammunition, to the support of the sheriff of Allegheny County, at Homestead. Maintain the peace, protect all persons in their rights under the constitution and laws of the state. Communicate with me.
Robert E. Pattison, Governor.
Sheriff McCleary was informed of this order and directed to communicate with General Snowden.
Immediately on receipt of his instructions, General Snowden issued orders to the brigade commanders. General Robert P. Dechert, in command of the First Brigade, with headquarters at Philadelphia, was directed to concentrate his brigade in camp at Mt. Gretna, near Lebanon, in the eastern part of the state, by Monday afternoon, battery horsed, and taking three days' rations. General J. P. S. Gobin, of the Second Brigade, was ordered to concentrate his command at Lewiston, moving west. General John A. Wiley, of the Third Brigade, composed of regiments from Western Pennsylvania, was ordered to proceed with his command to a point on the Pennsylvania Railroad within easy reach of the Monongahela River.
Within twelve hours from the time when Major General Snowden received the Governor's order the entire National Guard of Pennsylvania was on the march, fully equipped and ready for any kind of service.
It was no makeshift army that thus took the field on a few hours' notice. General Sherman said at the Garfield inauguration that the Pennsylvania Militia were the best body of troops in the National Guard of the country and, if confirmation of the accuracy of his judgment were needed, the Homestead "campaign" furnished it in amplest measure. The Guard underwent a signal transformation after the Pittsburgh railroad riot of 1877. Prior to that time it was a loosely constituted, loosely governed organization, wholly unfitted for service in an emergency and serving principally as an agency for the distribution of military titles. The disastrous consequences of the movement against the Pittsburgh rioters, in which ignorance, incompetency and lack of concrete organization, in addition to causing the destruction of millions of dollars' worth of property came near bringing about the loss of many lives, opened the eyes of Major General Hartranft, then Governor of the state, and led him to formulate and carry into execution a plan of reorganization the success of which is seen to-day in the superiority of the Pennsylvania militia to any other body of troops in the United States outside the regular army. Under Governor Hartranft's direction the several divisions of the guard existing under the old order of things were merged in a single division of three brigades, composed of eighteen regiments of infantry, three troops of cavalry and three batteries of artillery. The maximum enrollment was limited to 8000 men. The regiments are recruited from all parts of the state and include all classes of citizens—farmers, mechanics, clerks, merchants and gentlemen of leisure.
The mobilization of this great body of men was accomplished with a degree of celerity and effectiveness unknown since the civil war. When the regiments advanced on the morning of July 11, all had nearly their full complement of officers and men. In a single night, preparations for service, the duration and hardship of which could not be estimated, were completed, and 8000 soldiers stood unreservedly at the disposal of the commonwealth.
The news that the soldiers were coming was received in Homestead without any perceptible feeling of alarm. It was understood by every one in the town that resistance to the power of the commonwealth was out of the question, and at the same time the idea went abroad that General Snowden and his men would confine themselves to the preservation of the peace and not aid Mr. Frick in the manning of the mill with non-unionists or the landing of another force of Pinkertons. There were, it is true, some hot-heads who disputed the justice of the Governor's action and canvassed the possibility of resisting the militia or of inducing the workingmen who bore arms for the state to make common cause with their brethren in the beleaguered town. The advisory committeemen, however, aided by other influential and intelligent citizens, were quick to suppress these disorderly symptoms and to emphasize the necessity of giving the soldiers a cordial and patriotic reception.
At two o'clock on Tuesday afternoon a mass meeting of workingmen was held in the rink, with Hugh O'Donnell in the chair. Burgess McLuckie made a fervent address, counseling a friendly demeanor towards the soldiers and eulogizing the Governor. "This man Pattison," said the sturdy Burgess, "Is acting quietly and rightly. He understands our position. He does not cater to monopolies.... Your friends are about to come; the safest, the best people that can come. We don't want Pinkertons here. We want the militia.... I stand here to say that any man who insults the militia shall be taken to the river and ducked." Cheers and laughter followed this sally and a motion in favor of ducking in the river any man who insulted the militia was carried unanimously.