A more valid objection might be urged, in the danger of entrusting to public officials so great a power as the control of money value would seem to be.
In reply to this it may be said, that an inefficient, or to some extent even dishonest, control would be far preferable to no control at all,—which is the present condition. The greater concentration of capital in our modern industrial system, and the increasing values handled, necessitates the entrusting of greater responsibilities to individuals, in both public and private business, and it has not been found that the men selected for the higher positions of trust in public life were often recreant to the trust reposed in them, or inadequate to its responsibilities, even where much was left to their discretion. In the plan proposed, however, almost nothing would be left to the discretion of the officials in charge.
The act of Congress putting the plan in force could provide for any contingencies likely to arise, and the duties of the officials would be mandatory, so far as the adjustment of the volume of money was concerned and the method of accomplishing it. Beyond that, errors of judgment, or even of intention, could do little harm. Surely it is not expecting too much of a public official, that he shall carry out his mandatory instructions, especially as any variation therefrom would be liable to immediate detection, and could be corrected before harm was done.
It might be objected that the government should not go into the banking business, that it is not one of its legitimate functions.
Avoiding the question of what the legitimate functions of government are,—about which there is room for a large difference of opinion,—it may be said that the plan does not contemplate the government entering the banking business as a competitor of existing banks, but rather as a regulator of them. This function it already exercises, and the popular demand is rather for an increase of such control. Furthermore, the Treasury, under the present system, is the largest holder of cash in the country, and its action is at any time of vital interest to the banks. It has more than once come to their aid in perilous times, to the extent of its ability, and had its ability been greater it could, and doubtless would, have done so more frequently. At times, moreover, the actual money held in the Treasury has been excessive, and by diminishing the volume of money in circulation this has badly affected business.
The proposed plan would prevent this, and while not materially enlarging the functions now exercised by the government, would make its control of the banking system more direct and effective, to the benefit alike of the banks and the public. Our present banking system, admittedly, shows much weakness in times of panic. Each bank expands its credits to the full limit in times of prosperity, for its own profit, and in time of distress contracts them for its own safety, thus increasing the distress at such times. Under this plan its safety, if solvent, would be assured without the need of contracting its credits.
As to controlling the volume of money, this either is, or is not, a proper governmental function. If it is, then justice demands that the control be efficient, and in the interests of an honest money. If it is not,—if the sole duty of government is to certify to the weight and fineness of pieces of metal by coining them,—then it has no right to refuse to coin any amount that may be presented of any metal the people or any section of them desire to use as money; no right to issue, or authorize others to issue, on government credit, any paper money; and no right to forbid, or prevent in any way, banks, firms, or individuals from issuing, on their own credit, any money they chose. All of these acts are a control of money volume. The mere statement of such an alternative is a sufficient refutation of the claim. It would simply be financial anarchy. The government must control money volume, and the control should be real, effective and honest.
Other objections might be raised to this plan, but none are foreseen of sufficient weight or gravity to offset in any considerable degree the merits it seems to present.