The source of the Blue Nile

by Arthur J. Hayes

It has already been said that the Abyssinian soldier wears no uniform, and is not easily distinguished by his appearance from the civilian. But there is a distinct military class, with characteristics of its own. “There is no harder worker,” said Mr. Wylde, “than the Abyssinian peasant, and no more harmless and hospitable person when left alone and properly treated[254]; and no more truculent, worthless, conceited, lazy, and useless individual than the Abyssinian soldier, who formerly did nothing but prey upon the defenceless cultivator. Circumstances are now altering this, but before the country settles down to modern civilization and makes any great strides forward, a civil revolution must take place, which may not be far distant.”[255] The same writer has pointed out that the soldiery “were called into existence by Abyssinia being surrounded by Mohammedan enemies, and little by little they increased and multiplied till they got out of all proportion to the wants of a peaceful country.” The king’s exchequer cannot provide pay for these men, so, to keep them quiet, they are allowed to live by exaction. Mr. Wylde’s strictures apply to the “lazy, loafing lot of mercenaries who have never done anything in their lives except fighting and looting, men without homes and without territory, ready to fight for those who give the highest pay, and who do not value the lives of their fellow-Christians at the price of a sheep or a jar of hydromel;” and he adds, “I am writing only of the mercenary soldier whose father and grandfather, perhaps, were the same, and not of the bulk of the fighting force of the country, who are yeomen farmers and their servants, or the peasants and their families.”[256]

The state of feeling between the peasantry and the soldiery might have serious consequences if the Abyssinian monarch undertook an important campaign outside his territory. “The great danger to an unpopular king attempting such an expedition would be, in the absence of the army, a rising of an oppressed peasantry, backed up by some European Power, to put down the military party. The arming of the peasantry and farmer class with modern weapons has not altogether been a blessing to the present ruler, and may end not only in his downfall, but in that of the barons as well.”[257]

The fighting value of the Abyssinian army is by no means a quantité négligeable in the politics of Eastern Africa, and it would be very easy to underrate it. Mr. Wylde, in his narrative of the battle of Adoua, has given a very complete account of the numbers, armament and temper of the Negus’s forces, and he does not agree with the estimate formed by Mansfield Parkyns of their personal valour.[258] He has also described the tactics which they customarily adopt in attacking, and has made some interesting observations on the employment of artillery, mounted infantry, and cavalry in the country.”[259]

The limitations to the activity of the forces are chiefly determined by commissariat difficulties. “The Abyssinian hordes are the same as the locust, they live on what they can get from the surrounding country; and when they have devoured everything, they have to move on to another place where supplies are procurable. At the outside an Abyssinian who is not one of the regular soldiers can keep the field for a couple of months, and then he has to take one transport animal with him, with a boy or girl, generally the latter, to look after his riding animal and to cook his food. The regular troops are the same; they have to bring supplies with them, which they get from their leaders before they set out on the campaign; after these are finished, unless fresh supplies come forward, they have to live on the country.”[260]

Probably the most recently published paper dealing with the Abyssinian army is the despatch, dated June 2, 1904, of Colonel Rochfort, C.B., R.A., included in the official account of the operations in Somaliland.[261] Colonel Rochfort accompanied the forces which his Majesty Menelek II., on the invitation of the British Government, sent in 1903, “to intercept the Mullah’s retreat, should he attempt to escape to the south or west.” As might be imagined from the nature of the document, it contains no descriptive account of the Abyssinian Expedition, and very little critical comment upon it. But the following particulars may serve to convey some idea of Abyssinian operations in the field at the present time. The strength of the force first employed was about five thousand men, nearly all of whom were mounted on mules. It left Harrar for its destination (the Webi Shebeli, near Hilowen) on February 18, 1903, under the command of Fituari Gabri.

Surprise parties were sent out to visit all wells within reach to the north, and “the Abyssinians carried out these raids with considerable dash and some success, showing their mobility by the ease with which they covered long distances, sometimes a hundred miles in forty-eight hours; but as at this time they had no special arrangements for carrying water, their scope was necessarily restricted.

“During these operations the main body was attacked by a considerable number of Dervishes. The attack was delivered in thick bush on the arrival of the force in bivouac, and before the zareba was formed; it was pushed home with resolution, but repulsed with loss. The pursuit was carried out with vigour, and the Dervish casualties were estimated at three hundred. The Abyssinians returned their loss at thirty-one killed and wounded. The Abyssinians were now living on the country, and exigencies of supply rendered it necessary to move down stream to Mekunna. . . .

“On the morning of May 28 the Abyssinians left Hahi, and after a series of forced marches surprised the Habr Suliman section of the Bagheri tribe on the morning of May 31 at Jeyd, which is thirty miles south of Bur. The Dervishes suffered heavy losses, and all their camels and stock were captured. . . . This terminated the first phase of the operations, and the force returned to Harrar.”

Later, the Negus consented to send another expedition, and “expressed the wish for an increase in the number of medical officers to accompany his force, and also suggested the issue of water-bottles to his men. At the conclusion of the first phase of the operations I had represented to the War Office that the absence of any special arrangements for carrying water had seriously affected the mobility of the Abyssinians; this want was now remedied by the issue of one thousand twelve-gallon tanks; pumps and waterproof sheets for improvising drinking-troughs were also supplied by his Majesty’s Government.

“There is no organized system of supply in the Abyssinian army, and hitherto arrangements made individually to carry one month’s supply on a mule or donkey had been found sufficient to enable expeditions to reach a district from which supplies could be drawn; such a course did not meet the conditions under which the present force was about to act, owing to the distance to be covered, the necessity for carrying water, and the total absence of any grain, either on the road or in the probable zone of operations. After some unavoidable delay, arrangements were improvised for carrying two months’ supply,[262] and his Highness Ras Makunnan,[263] who personally interested himself in the despatch of the force, subsequently supplemented this supply by sending three small convoys as transport became available. The force commenced concentration in the neighbourhood of Harrar on November 27, 1903. . . . The advanced party reached Wardair on January 12, 1904. . . . The resources of the country in the neighbourhood of the River Fafan and the arrival of two more small convoys enabled the force to keep the field until March 28, 1904, when the Abyssinian commander (Fituari Gabri) was advised that the retreat of the Mullah through the Sorl, pursued by the British columns, rendered the presence of the Abyssinian expedition no longer necessary, and the force marched for Harrar.”[264]