The realization of the plan would depend entirely upon the pace of the Grand Fleet in getting into action. Had all the divisions of the Grand Fleet kept their course at full speed until reaching the track of Sir David Beatty’s squadron, the starboard division would have cut that line in about ten minutes and the port division in about twelve and a half to thirteen. There would have been an interval of five miles between the leading ships. Even at twenty-seven knots the four battle-cruisers led by Lion could hardly have got clear of the port division and, to avoid collision, all would have had to ease their speed slightly. But undoubtedly at 6:15 or, at least, 6:20, a line might have been formed exactly in Sir David Beatty’s track. Had this line followed him as he closed down after Hood at 6:25 the enemy would have been completely outflanked at both ends of his line and even surrounded at its head. There would have been half an hour between the Grand Fleet getting into action and the failure of the light. It is difficult to suppose that, at ranges of from 11,000 yards to 8,000, the guns of the Grand Fleet could not have beaten the High Seas Fleet decisively. Scheer could not have turned. His choice would have been between annihilation and a flight pêle-mêle.
Not only does it seem that some such deployment as this was manifestly possible; it looks as if it was exactly this deployment that Admiral Beatty had expected. On any other supposition his manœuvre in throwing first his own and then Hood’s battle cruisers into a short-range fight with the Germans was to run the gravest risks of disaster, without any high probability of justifying it by a final defeat of the enemy. If he expected the Grand Fleet to deploy on to his course and so come into action with its entire strength, possibly within fifteen, certainly within twenty minutes of the enemy being sighted, then to have incurred the loss, not of one but of half of his and Hood’s ships would have been amply justified.
The manœuvre he executed—judged not as a self-contained evolution but as part of a large plan—was, of course, one of the most brilliant and original in the history of the naval war. For the first time for more than two thousand years two fleets met of which a section of one had nearly a 50 per cent. superiority in speed over the other. This fast squadron was sent at top speed to hold and envelop the enemy’s van. It was calculated to, and it did, arrest that van by sinking the leading ship and throwing the remainder into confusion. It was not a movement that interfered with the deployment of the Grand Fleet in the least degree. It was one, on the contrary, that would have covered it most effectively, and to a great extent must have concealed its character from the enemy. But, further, being carried through at a speed which probably exceeded that which any enemy flotilla could maintain in the open sea, the manœuvre must have made it impossible for Scheer to get his destroyers into the right position for a torpedo attack, either upon the deploying ships or upon the Grand Fleet once deployed. For to attack to advantage, the flotillas must have been brought up ahead of the British battle-cruisers, a manifest impossibility. Had the Grand Fleet as a whole, then, been in action in Sir David Beatty’s wake from 6:20 on, it is almost certain that, with all his fleet in action at short range, against guns almost twice as numerous as his own and more than three times as powerful Scheer could not have ventured upon changing the course of his fleet at all. He could not have done so, that is to say, while attempting to keep his ships in line. He might, as we have seen, have turned all his ships together in undisguised flight, he could not have kept them in fighting formation while withdrawing from a fight in these circumstances.
Sir John Jellicoe’s Tactics
Before speculating as to the plans or discussing the tactics of the British Commander-in-Chief, two factors which influenced the situation must be kept in mind. The first is, that the positions of the two fleets and of the enemy had been the subject of a forecast by dead reckoning in both flagships. It is to be supposed that Sir David Beatty kept Admiral Jellicoe informed from time to time of the position, speed, and course of his fleet and of the enemy, and that from these data the lines of approach had been calculated. Each flagship made its own calculations and, being made by dead reckoning, there was a discrepancy between the two, which the Commander-in-Chief describes as inevitable. It resulted from this that both were equally surprised when, at four minutes to six, Lion and Marlborough came within sight of each other. Whatever plan of action was adopted could not, if it was intended to meet the situation of the moment, have been the subject of long forethought or preparation.
The second factor was the difficulty of seeing anything at long range. This, in the first place, had prevented any rectification of the misunderstanding as to positions, such as might easily have been done had the scouting cruisers of the two fleets come into sight earlier. It followed, next, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet did not probably see a single ship in the enemy’s line until ten or twelve minutes after seeing the leading ship of the British Battle-Cruiser Fleet. His plan of deployment, then, orders for which must have been given some minutes before the deployment was complete, could not have been based upon his own judgment of the situation after seeing the enemy, but must have been dictated, either by some general principle of tactics applied to the information as to the enemy’s position, speed, and course, as given by the Vice-Admiral, or it must have been part of a plan suggested by the Vice-Admiral. There is nothing in the despatch to say whether Sir David Beatty communicated anything more to the Commander-in-Chief than the bearing and distance, first, of the enemy’s battle cruisers, then of his battleships. But it seems irrational to suppose that Sir David did not announce what he intended to do or failed to suggest how best he could be supported.
If the despatches are silent as to the nature of Sir David Beatty’s plan, they are equally silent about the Commander-in-Chief’s. We are told simply that he formed his six divisions into a line of battle and are left to infer the character and the direction of the deployment from internal evidence. The facts, so far as they can be gathered from the despatch seem to be as follows:
The Grand Fleet came upon the scene in six divisions on a S.E.-by-S. course. This means that the six divisions were parallel with the leading ships in line-abreast, with an interval of approximately a mile between each division. A line drawn through the leading ships and continued to the west would have cut the line of Sir David Beatty’s course after six o’clock, if that also had been similarly continued, making an angle of about 33 degrees. The division on the extreme right, led by Marlborough, flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, sighted Sir David Beatty’s squadron at six o’clock. At the same time Sir David reported the position of the enemy’s battle-cruisers, three of which were still at the head of the German line. The speed of the Grand Fleet was probably at least twenty knots, if not twenty-one. The six divisions seem to have continued their former course for ten or twelve minutes, when all the leading ships turned eight points—or a right angle—together to port, the second, third, and fourth ships in each division following their leaders in succession, so that, very few minutes after the leading ship had turned, the fleet would be on a line at right angles to its former course, and steering N.E. by E. If the leading ship continued on the new course, the fleet would then be heading at an angle of 56 degrees away from the enemy. A fleet so deployed would now be brought into action by the leading ship turning again, either to a course parallel with the enemy or converging towards it.
It seems probable that it was some such manœuvre as this that took place, from the fact that the starboard (or right hand) division, which became the rear division after deployment, got into action so early as 6:17, at a range of 11,000 yards, that is, a thousand yards nearer to the enemy than Sir David Beatty’s track, while the port division, now the leading, did not open fire till some time after 6:30, when, as we learn from the despatch, the British fleet was on the bow of the enemy. This means that the courses were parallel, but that the leading British divisions were well ahead of the enemy. Both fleets, in other words, were still steering to the east. The track of the Grand Fleet was, therefore, parallel, not only to that of the enemy, but to that of Sir David Beatty up to 6:25, but by some considerable amount, probably 2,000 yards farther from the High Seas Fleet. At 6:50 the leading battle squadron was 6,000 yards N.N.W. from Lion. The Grand Fleet had not formed up astern of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet. It had not come into action as a unit simultaneously. It had not deployed either on the enemy or on the British fast division.