Supposing the Austrians to be between Josephstadt and Königgrätz, two plans were open to Von Moltke’s choice. First: To attack the Austrian position in front with the First Army and the Army of the Elbe, and on its right with the Second Army. This would have necessitated forcing the passage of a river in the face of a formidable enemy; but this passage would have been facilitated by the flank attack of the Crown Prince, whose entire army (except the Ist Corps) was across the river. It would have been a repetition of Magenta on a gigantic scale, with the Crown Prince playing the part of McMahon, and Frederick Charles enacting the rôle of the French Emperor. Second: To maneuver the enemy out of his position by moving upon Pardubitz; the occupation of which place would be a serious menace to his communications. The latter movement would necessitate the transfer of the Second Army to the right bank of the Elbe, and then the execution of a flank march in dangerous proximity to the enemy; but its successful execution might have produced decisive results. This movement by the right would have been strikingly similar to Von Moltke’s movement by the left, across the Moselle, four years later. The resulting battle might have been an antedated Gravelotte, and Von Benedek might have found a Metz in Königgrätz or Josephstadt. At the very least, the Austrians would, probably, have been maneuvered out of their position behind the Elbe.
Before determining upon a plan of operations, it was decided to reconnoiter the Elbe and the Aupa. The Army of the Elbe was directed to watch the country towards Prague, and to seize the passages of the river at Pardubitz. The First Army was ordered to take up the line Neu Bidsow-Horzitz and to send a detachment from its left wing to Sadowa, to reconnoiter the line of the Elbe between Königgrätz and Josephstadt. The Ist Corps was to observe the latter fortress, and to cover the flank march of the Second Army, if the movement in question should be decided upon. The remaining corps of the Second Army were, for the present, to remain in their positions, merely reconnoitering towards the Aupa and the Metau.
These orders were destined to be speedily countermanded.
Colonel Von Zychlinsky, who commanded an outpost at the castle of Cerakwitz, reported an Austrian encampment near Lipa, and scouting parties, which were then sent out, returned, after a vigorous pursuit by the Austrian cavalry, and reported the presence of the Austrian army in force, behind the Bistritz, extending from Problus to the village of Benatek. These reports, received after 6 o’clock P. M., entirely changed the aspect of matters.
Under the influence of his war experience, Frederick Charles was rapidly developing the qualities of a great commander; his self-confidence was increasing; and his actions now displayed the vigor and military perspicacity of Mars-la-Tour, rather than the hesitation of Münchengrätz.[11] He believed that Von Benedek, with at least four corps, was about to attack him; but he unhesitatingly decided to preserve the advantages of the initiative, by himself attacking the Austrians in front, in the early morning, while the Army of the Elbe should attack their left. The co-operation of the Crown Prince was counted upon to turn the Austrian right, and thus secure victory.
With these objects in view, the following movements were promptly ordered:
The 8th Division to be in position at Milowitz at 2 A. M.;
The 7th Division to take post at Cerakwitz by 2 A. M.;
The 5th and 6th Divisions to start at 1:30 A. M., and take post as reserves south of Horzitz, the 5th west, and the 6th east, of the Königgrätz road;
The 3d Division to Psanek, and the 4th to Bristan; both to be in position by 2 A. M.;