“The position selected had, then, considerable defensive value; but it had the defect of having at its back the Elbe and the defiles formed by the bridges.”
On this subject, however, Hozier says: “The Austrian commander took the precaution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges, a river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the retreating army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges were broken, and the river became an obstacle to the pursuit. Special, as well as general, conditions also came into play.... The heavy guns of the fortress scoured the banks of the river, both up and down stream, and, with superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover the passage of the Austrians.”
In considering the Austrian retreat, we shall find that neither of these distinguished authorities is entirely right, or wholly wrong, in regard to the defects and advantages of the position described.
The following dispositions were ordered by Von Benedek:
The Saxons to occupy the heights of Popowitz, the left wing slightly refused, and covered by the Saxon Cavalry;
The 1st Light Cavalry Division, to the rear and left, at Problus and Prim;
The Xth Corps on the right of the Saxons;
The IIId Corps to occupy the heights of Lipa and Chlum, on the right of the Xth Corps;
The VIIIth Corps in reserve, in rear of the Saxons.