The “spectacle of wildest flight and utter rout” in the passage of the defeated army over the Elbe[15] would surely seem to support the views of Derrécagaix, rather than those of Hozier, in regard to a position with a river at its back, even though the river be spanned by many bridges. Yet Von Benedek undoubtedly derived considerable advantage from having the Elbe at his back; for the Prussian Staff History says: “The Elbe formed a considerable barrier to any further immediate pursuit. As soon as the bridges over the river were once reached by the enemy—to whom moreover the fortress of Königgrätz, which commands so large a tract of the surrounding country, afforded a perfectly secure place of crossing—the pursuers were obliged to make the detour by way of Pardubitz.” If Von Benedek had encountered only a front attack, and had been defeated, it is probable that the Elbe at his back would have been advantageous to him in the highest degree; for the superb behavior of his artillery and cavalry would have effectually covered the retreat of his infantry over the numerous bridges, and the Elbe would have played the same part in favor of the Austrians that the Mincio did after Solferino. But the direction of the Crown Prince’s attack destroyed the value of the bridges north of Königgrätz; and, but for the protection afforded by the fortress, the Elbe, instead of being of the slightest advantage, would have completely barred the retreat of a great part of the Austrian army.
Von Benedek’s selection of his individual station for watching the progress of the battle was unfortunate. From his station on the slope between Lipa and Chlum, his view of the field was limited by the Swiep Wald on the north, and Problus on the south; and his view of the entire northeastern portion of the field was cut off by the hill and village of Chlum. The hill of Chlum was his proper station, and the church tower in that hamlet should have been used as a lookout by some officer of his staff. From that point the Horica Berg, the heights of Horenowes, the Swiep Wald, the village and wood of Sadowa, the villages on the Bistritz (almost as far as Nechanitz), the villages of Langenhof and Problus—in brief, every important part of the field—can be plainly seen. Had this important lookout been utilized, Von Benedek could not have been taken by surprise by the advance of the Crown Prince. Even the rain, mist and low-hanging smoke could not have wholly obscured the advance of the Second Army from view; for the Crown Prince was able to trace the direction of the contending lines from the heights of Choteborek, a point much farther from the scene of action than Maslowed and Horenowes are from Chlum. Von Benedek’s neglect to make use of the church tower of Chlum probably had not a little to do with the extent of his defeat.[16]
Among the causes of Prussian success in this campaign, the needle gun has been given a high place by all writers; and Colonel Home, in his admirable “Précis of Modern Tactics,” says: “It is not a little remarkable that rapidity of fire has twice placed Prussia at the head of the military nations of Europe—in 1749 and 1866.” Nevertheless, the importance of the breech-loader in this campaign has probably been over-estimated. The moral and physical effects of the needle gun upon the Austrian soldiers were tremendous, and were felt from the very beginning of the campaign. All other things equal, the needle gun would have given the victory to the Prussians; but all other things were not equal. The strategy and tactics of the Prussians were as much superior to those of their opponents as the needle gun was to the Austrian muzzle-loader. In every case, the Prussian victory was due to greater numbers or better tactics, rather than to superior rapidity of fire; and when we consider the tactical features of each engagement, it is hard to see how the result could have been different, even if the Prussians had been no better armed than their adversaries. The needle gun, undoubtedly, enabled the Prussian Guards to repulse the attacks of the Austrian reserves at Chlum; but the battle had already gone irretrievably against the Austrians, and if they had driven back the Guards, the Ist and Vth Corps would have quickly recovered the lost ground, and the result would have been the same. Derrécagaix, too, overestimates the influence of the needle gun when he points, for proof of its value, to the great disparity of loss between the Prussians and Austrians at Königgrätz. The same enormous disproportion of loss existed in favor of the Germans at Sedan, though the needle gun was notoriously inferior to the Chassepot. This inequality of loss is to be attributed mainly to the superior strategical and tactical movements of the Prussians, by which, in both these battles, they crowded their opponents into a limited space, and crushed them with a concentric fire.
It is a remarkable fact, moreover, that the superiority of the needle gun over the muzzle-loader did not arise so much from the greater rapidity of fire, as from the greater rapidity and security of loading. Baron Stoffel says: “On the 29th of June, 1866, at Königinhof, the Prussians had a sharp action with the enemy. After the action, which took place in fields covered with high corn, Colonel Kessel went over the ground, and to his astonishment, found five or six Austrian bodies for every dead Prussian. The Austrians killed had been mostly hit in the head. His [Kessel’s] men, far from firing fast, had hardly fired as many rounds as the enemy. The Austrian officers who were made prisoners said to the Prussians: ‘Our men are demoralized, not by the rapidity of your fire, for we could find some means, perhaps, to counterbalance that, but because you are always ready to fire. This morning your men, like ours, were concealed in the corn; but, in this position, yours could, without being seen, load their rifles easily and rapidly: ours, on the other hand, were compelled to stand up and show themselves when they loaded, and you then took the opportunity of firing at them. Thus we had the greatest difficulty in getting our men to stand up at all; and such was their terror when they did stand up to load that their hands trembled, and they could hardly put the cartridge into the barrel. Our men fear the advantage the quick and easy loading of the needle gun gives you; it is this that demoralizes them. In action they feel themselves disarmed the greater part of the time, whereas you are always ready to fire.’”
As to rapidity of fire, it only remains to add that in the battle of Königgrätz the number of cartridges fired by the infantry averaged scarcely more than one round per man. This, however, is largely accounted for by the fact that during a great part of the battle the Austrian artillery kept most of Frederick Charles’ army beyond effective infantry fire, as well as by the circumstance that a large part of the Crown Prince’s army did not fire a shot—the Vth Corps not coming into action at all.
The needle gun was of inestimable value to the Prussians, but it was by no means the principal cause of their triumph. The great cause of the success of Prussia was, without doubt, the thorough military preparation which enabled her to take the field while her adversaries were yet unprepared, and to begin operations the minute war was declared. This, combined with the able strategy of Von Moltke, enabled the Prussians to seize the initiative; to throw the Austrians everywhere upon the defensive; and to strike them with superior numbers at every move, so that Von Benedek’s troops were demoralized before the decisive battle was fought.