[314] Apart from the policy set forth in it, this memoir contains some important critical suggestions:
(a) The minister's determination to maintain Frederick in
Silesia.
(b) His conception of peace as the primary object to which all
others must contribute.
(c) His perfect knowledge of the real conditions of his
negotiations with Augustus. It throws a new light upon the
desperate persistency with which he tried to win over the Court of
Dresden.
[315] Flassan, "Histoire de la Diplomatie Française," V. pp. 242-5.
[316] Zevort, Appendix, pp. 254-7.
[317] Ibid., p. 257.
[318] Ibid., Appendix, p. 361.
[319] At the end of April, when he had been pressing the negotiation for three months, d'Argenson had absolutely no faith in its success. See a very significant passage in Zevort, p. 280, which throws a light more than usually clear upon d'Argenson's view of his own position.
[320] Zevort, Appendix, p. 362.
[321] Cf. Zevort, p. 143, where d'Argenson is quoted as saying in March: "La sagesse et l'honneur veulent que nous soutenions le roi de Prusse avec toute l'ardeur la plus grande que nous ayons jamais embrassée aucune vue d'État."
[322] Ibid., p. 145.
[323] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 311.