[370] Vitzthum, p. 110.
[371] In certain letters of doubtful authority, the ill-feeling is accounted for by the suggestion that Maria Theresa was corresponding with Madame de Pompadour, and that d'Argenson had intercepted the letters ("Correspondance sur la cour de Louis XV." Gaçon-Dufour, Paris. 1808).
[372] See "Correspondance de Louis XV. et le Maréchal de Noailles," ed. Camille Rousset. The Madame de Chatelus mentioned by Noailles was the lady to whom d'Argenson had been attached for sixteen years. He has left a rather striking description of her (see Journal, under date 1728). They occupied adjoining houses in the Rue de Gros Chenet, some drawings of which are to be found among d'Argenson's sketches (Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS. 6164).
[373] M. Vitzthum d'Eckstaedt concludes his account as follows:
"It was not for general incapacity that the Marquis d'Argenson was dismissed, nor for having forgotten one day to open the despatches from Genoa. It was because he was obstinately attached to a false policy, to a policy disapproved by Maurice de Saxe, who at this moment was governing France" (p. 152).
[374] "Le système des ridicules poursuit de même le ministre des affaires étrangères, qui, estimant peu les courtisans, est très reservé avec eux. Ces messieurs, pour le distinguer de son frère, l'appellent 'd'Argenson le Bête.' Les gens honnêtes ont nommé le ministre de la guerre 'd'Argenson l'intrigant'" ("Correspondance," Gaçon-Dufour, p. 90).
These letters are far from reflecting the very poor opinion of d'Argenson which is said to have been prevalent at Court. Such may have been the opinion of his political rivals and of the circle of Madame de Pompadour, to which d'Argenson, in person and principle, was consistently opposed. It might well have acquired the substance of a tradition, and have affected later criticism unduly.
[375] It is necessary to grasp this point if we are to avoid a frequent prejudice against d'Argenson, a prejudice which arises from regarding him as a man of very large pretensions and of very inadequate performance. There is no good ground for believing in his utter failure, or consequently in the hollowness of his pretensions.
[376] Perhaps it is necessary to reinforce this point. It is to be remembered that in any acutely critical period, wisdom is a matter of months or weeks. Never even for seven days can opinion safely be divorced from circumstance. It is quite true that a general view of the relations of France with the German powers during the last century and a half suggests that at the time with which we are concerned her traditional anti-Austrian policy was tending to become an anachronism; but we must be careful about making that general view the basis of particular conclusions. The available documents prove conclusively that whenever that tendency began to approach perceptibility and power, it was never in the course of d'Argenson's ministry, still less during the critical year 1745.
In and throughout that year France had but one competitor on the continent—Austria. The position of Prussia—if in connection with France and Austria we may assign her the dignity of a position—was in the highest degree precarious. No one knew it better than the Prussian king himself. There was probably not a moment in the course of the year when he did not feel himself to be within an ace of destruction; not an episode but betrays his anxiety for escape with honour. His efforts for peace in January; his desperate overtures at London after the death of the Emperor; his earnest, eloquent entreaties to maintain the Elector of Bavaria and the Prince of Conti; his dull bitterness and despair at the Convention of Augsburg and the withdrawal of the French from Germany; his continued pressure upon England, ending in the Treaty of Hanover; finally, his studious moderation when he appeared as a conqueror in Dresden; all point to but one conclusion. His position was, and he knew it be, desperate; and it was only the headlong courage of desperation that enabled him to see the year out safely.