[274] "Mémoires du Ministère" (Rathery), IV. pp. 253, 254.
[275] Zevort, p. 133.
[276] "Mémoires du Ministère" (Rathery), IV. p. 257.
[277] Ibid., IV. pp. 248-56.
[278] Ibid., IV. p. 249.
[279] Ibid., IV. p. 250.
[280] Ibid., IV. p. 247.
[281] M. de Broglie represents ("Marie Thérèse," I. pp. 202-4) that d'Argenson's policy involved the abandonment of the allies of France. The grounds for the contention are not quite clear. It would be equally true of Frederick's own recent proposal for an immediate peace (Zevort, p. 131). France at this time actually held sufficient territory to satisfy her allies upon the terms proposed by Frederick ("Mémoires du Ministère," Rathery, IV. p. 258); and she had only to defend it, as d'Argenson said, with foresight and success, to weary her enemies and force upon Maria Theresa conditions of peace which would be acceptable to her allies as well as to herself.
The occurrence of such suggestions is easily explained. M. de Broglie makes no secret of his strong approval of the campaign in Flanders, and of his strong antipathy to Frederick II. In both respects, though in the case of the Flemish campaign he would appear to have no suspicion of it, he is at absolute variance with the French Foreign Minister; and he is consequently constrained to regard him in a spirit which does not conduce to critical appreciation. In the view of the writer, his account of d'Argenson's share in the events of 1745 cannot be taken as even approximately just.
Upon the merits of the rival policies it is not our business to decide. It is sufficient to show that d'Argenson's plans were sound and statesmanlike, and that successive disasters were entailed by the failure of the Government to support him.