"Il en arrivera ce qui pourra, bien, j'espère; mais pour la paix et un armistice dans le statu quo, il n'y faut plus penser" (De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse." I. p. 211).
It is admitted that d'Argenson was not the prime mover in the policy of the Council; he looked upon that policy as little short of desperate; but he accepted it as a choice between two evil alternatives; and, as we shall find, he did everything mortal man could do to make it a success.
[297] Zevort, Appendix, p. 351.
[298] Ibid., pp. 138, 139.
[299] Valori, "Mémoires," I. p. 207. "Il me semble que le parti que le roi de Pologne avait à prendre pour sa gloire, sa grandeur, son interêt et celui de sa maison, était en premier lieu de se prêter aux desseins que les rois de France et de Prusse avaient de l'élever à la dignité impériale," &c.
[300] Zevort, p. 140.
[301] That this was d'Argenson's real attitude is suggested by a multitude of minute hints to be found in nearly all the available documents. It is the only attitude consistent with his known opinions and with his subsequent conduct.
[302] Zevort, p. 139.
[303] Ibid, p. 140.
[304] Had Frederick imagined for a moment that Valori's mission had the slightest prospect of success, his action as regards both France and Saxony might have changed in a very startling fashion. Every principle of policy would have engaged him to withstand the elevation of Augustus to the Empire.