The councillors or experts—viri boni or periti—were usually chosen from the ranks of the clergy, priests, abbés, bishops—but they might also be laymen, and were often civil lawyers. Thus, at Pamiers in 1329 we find that out of fifty-one experts twenty are civil lawyers.[357] The number of experts varied. Fifty is an exceptionally large number; but twenty or twenty-five quite common.[358] To what extent the councillors had a practical influence in the inquisitorial process must remain doubtful. The idea was that they should act as a check on irresponsible inquisitors, as well as give professional legal opinion when such was needed; and from the frequent references to the system in papal bulls it certainly seems true that the popes showed anxiety to encourage the system of expert assistance as a restraint upon arbitrary action.
On the other hand, it is by no means clear that the system had much practical effect, since inquisitors were not bound to accept the advice tendered, and the number of the periti being so large, the volume of business transacted usually so great, it is doubtful whether any serious deliberation with the councillors took place in the majority of cases. Probably their presence was often purely formal, for the sake of giving additional solemnity to the condemnation of heretics.[359] Still, it remains true that a place was provided in the inquisitorial organization for the experts; that the means of competent legal advice was forthcoming; that if the inquisitor was a reasonable man he would no doubt pay due heed to such advice on the purely legal aspect at all events of his cases, and also that the experts, being often men of importance, probably did have the power of making their influence tell upon occasion. The system was at all events a potential safeguard.
Finally, there must be mentioned, among the members of the tribunal, one of the most important—the bishop. The relations between bishops and inquisitors, frankly antagonistic in the early days of the Inquisition, probably always tended to be unfriendly. If the bishop, for his part, resented the new jurisdiction, which was a rival to his own, the inquisitor in his own court aspired to be supreme and to arrogate to himself a superiority over the bishop, which the latter was not likely to allow. The bishop’s position was not altogether easy. Required to take cognizance of heresy in his own court, he yet had also to officiate in the special court where the inquisitor, whatever his ecclesiastical status and whatever his pretensions, was bound to be always prime mover in the proceedings. We know that the inquisitors often acted without the co-operation of the bishop. The relations between them remained none too clear until they were regulated by the Council of Vienne. They were to work together and to concur in the sentence.[360] As a matter of fact, the concurrence of the bishop was apt to be a mere formality and his position in practice was bound to be subordinate, the inquisitor being a delegate expressly charged by the Pope with the duty of trying heretics.
Such being the composition of the Inquisition, what was the extent of its province? What, technically speaking, was a heretic? According to Raymond of Peñaforte, he was simply one who denied the faith. St. Thomas Aquinas maintained that no one was a heretic, unless he obstinately maintained an error after its erroneousness had been pointed out to him by an ecclesiastical authority. One teaching, therefore, was that no one in ignorance could be a heretic.[361] Proof of previous instruction in the truth had to be forthcoming to show that a man was a heretic. But a broader interpretation tended to prevail, and the heretic to be considered as one who, on any grounds whatever, separated himself from the traditional faith of the Church.[362] The mere fact of separation did not in itself constitute heresy; but every schism must end in heresy, because separation argues an error in belief touching the nature of the Church. Lack of respect for ecclesiastical, and especially papal, authority suggests denial of the faith.[363] To assert anything against the Scriptures, to add to them or subtract from them would be heresy. Certain forms of blasphemy and profanity would make a man at least suspect of heresy.[364]
Obviously the matter of interpretation gave abundant scope for casuistry. Bernard Gui’s ‘Practica’ is an illustration of this. There was an obvious temptation for the inquisitor to discover heresy in all manner of disguises.[365] Heresy was conceived as a most insidious as well as a most pernicious enemy, to be ferreted out in all sorts of strange lurking-places. The indefiniteness of the term—the inquisitor’s definition is always a catalogue—was as a matter of fact unavoidable, seeing that the offence consisted, not in an overt act, but in an intention. It was a crime of the intellect, a matter of the state of a man’s mind and disposition. Sometimes the heresy might be revealed in an act, but very often there would be no formal act at all. The inquisitor must be a searcher of the heart and a prober into the obscure workings of the mind.[366] It is necessary to add one simpler but important point. No one could be a heretic unless he had been baptized, unless he was a member of the Christian Church.[367] The infidel, the Turk, the Jew, did not come within the Inquisition’s purview—unless he had at one time received the Christian religion. By birth or adoption the heretic must have been a Christian: for the heinousness of his crime consists in its being a repudiation, a rebellion.
The Inquisition formulated a number of classifications of heretics. In the first place, they used to distinguish between affirmative and negative heretics. The former was one who deliberately avowed some opinion contrary to the faith before the tribunal; the latter was one who either denied being guilty of the incriminating word or act or else, while acknowledging it, protested that he had no culpable intention.[368] In the second place, a distinction was drawn between the perfected heretic and the imperfect. The first not only held an error, but also practised the rites appertaining to it, modelled his life on its dogma; the latter merely believed the error without being guilty of the evil practices.
The inquisitors also recognized a class consisting of people who were not really heretics at all, perfect or imperfect, but merely people who gave evidence of heretical disposition or of tendencies which might lead them into heresy. In the fact of its taking cognisance of such a class lies one of the distinguishing features of the Inquisition.[369] The tribunal deliberately dealt with, and had a specific treatment for, those who were merely suspected of crime. Suspicion was classified as light, vehement or violent. There was no precise definition of what was meant by each of these; it was generally left to the inquisitor to decide in each particular case what degree of suspicion existed. It was most essential to avoid all contact with heretics.[370] A man proved to have saluted a heretic or listened to his preaching on a single occasion was regarded as lightly suspect; if he had done so more than once, he was vehemently suspect; if he had done so frequently, he was violently suspect.[371] But such an offence as this, even if often repeated, was not regarded as in itself sufficient evidence of actual heresy. It only made the offender a marked man. In such cases the Inquisition did not dismiss the accused as not guilty; it would not absolutely dismiss a case, unless satisfied that there was no proof whatever. This was due to the intangible nature of an offence which consisted in an intention.
The consequence was that the Inquisition, in order to be on the safe side, virtually created a minor offence of allowing oneself to be suspected of heresy. For every good Catholic must realize that any connection with heresy, however remote, is contamination and therefore take the most elaborate precautions to avoid all contact. To become an object of suspicion, therefore, meant either that the suspicion was after all well-founded (on the principle that there is no smoke without fire), or that the conduct which led to suspicion was inadvertent. Was it, then, unreasonable to require that the suspect should make a formal abjuration, to prove that in fact he had no sympathy whatever with heresy, that the suspicion was unfounded? Nor, surely, was it unjust to record such cases of suspicion in view of the possibility that the suspect might at some later date come up once more before the tribunal, when naturally his former offence would be legitimate evidence against him? Such is the line of argument in justification of the penalizing of the suspected, as well as the convicted. The suspect is indeed guilty, not of the major offence of actual heresy, but of a minor offence of misdemeanour, improper or at least imprudent behaviour, unbecoming to a good Catholic—an offence legitimately dealt with by the tribunal concerned with heresy.
Another class of offenders were fautors or defenders of heretics. To place any obstruction in the way of the inquisitors was an act of fautorship. A lord who neglected to pursue heretics out of his lands; anyone giving ecclesiastical burial to a heretic; one who in conversation excused a heretic or conferred any sort of favour, however slight, upon one—all these were fautors. For a doctor to attend a heretic patient, a lawyer to plead a heretic client’s case, was exceedingly dangerous, unless they could prove beyond all doubt that they did so in ignorance. The simplest deed of common humanity done to a heretic was in the view of the Church a sin.[372] Certain crimes were triable by the Inquisition, not for themselves, but because they were indicative of false doctrine. Thus a usurer might be tried and punished by the Inquisition, not because he was a sinner, but because he showed that he did not regard himself as such. Similarly, a bigamist might be tried by the Inquisition, not because bigamy was an immoral thing—if he could prove that he acted under the stress of simple unreflecting passion the Inquisition would dismiss the case as not coming under its purview—but because his act evinced erroneous belief regarding the sacrament of marriage.[373]