[212] It is curious that Kutusoff and Napoleon were actually retreating from Malo–Yarowslavitch, the scene of the battle, at the same moment; the one fearing another attack, the other despairing of success in forcing the position.
[213] Segur, ix. 11
[214] During the whole retreat only one corps grounded arms to the enemy, and that not until it was surrounded and cut off from the main army, and reduced to extremity. This occurred just before the passage of the Beresina.
[215] Segur, xi. 3
[216] Segur, xi. 5.
[217] To get at the exact truth is no easy matter, even where the means of ascertaining it seem most ample. General Gourgaud, who also served in 1812, has published an elaborate criticism of the Comte de Segur’s work, in which he maintains that the difficulties and losses of the passage of the Beresina have been excessively exaggerated,—that the French had 250 guns, which commanded the opposite bank, and 45,000 men under arms,—and that of women and children, whom Segur is always fond of introducing, there were next to none. Throughout the narrative we have followed Segur’s account, as generally considered most authoritative, though he seems fond of writing for effect, and his accounts, as far as disparity of numbers in this latter part of the retreat is concerned, are somewhat startling.
[218] Segur, xii. 2.