“John Douza, a famous Latin poet in those days, very nobly born, and of other high deserts, had the chief government of the affairs of the city. He failed not in acting his part well; he still encouraged the Leydenists, and fed them with hopes that the other cities would speedily join with them, and relieve them. In confirmation of this, sometimes letters, sometimes messages came from without, and some news was cunningly raised within the town itself: though it were very true, that Orange and the rest of the rebels in that province laboured nothing more than how to keep a place of such consequence still at their devotion. ‘Twas now the month of August; and the Leydenists began already to suffer want of victuals. Therefore the states of the country met to treat of so weighty a business, and to find out some way whereby the city might be relieved; and this affair began to be mightily earnest. The deputies differed in their opinions, some thought that the town might be the easiliest got into by making a gallant assault by land, others held it might better be relieved by some river or channel; but the greatest part concluded that there was small hopes of doing it either one way or other, the king’s men having so strongly fortified themselves everywhere. Lewis Boisot, admiral of Holland, chanced to be at this meeting; a man very expert in maritime affairs, of a manlike spirit and good at execution; and one who was very well esteemed of over all the province. He, whilst they were hottest in the variety of their opinions, stept forth to propound his, and began to speak thus:—
“’I wish that our own misfortunes did not too deplorably teach us how perverse the fury of the sea proves sometimes to our countries. Who sees not how we are daily inforced to oppose our industry to the threats thereof? Nor have our mountainous banks been sufficient so to curb the tempest of her waves, but that sometime she hath swallowed up whole islands on some sides, and caused miserable and unheard-of ruins in other parts. We are now to seek for remedy, in this our present necessity, from these evils which do so often afflict us. Let nature work the same effect to-day, for our good, which she useth upon so many other occasions to do for our hurt. And by those weapons wherewith she makes war against us, let us by her example make war upon our enemies. Every one knows that at the two equinoxials of the year the ocean swells extraordinary high upon our coasts; and, by the season of the year, we are shortly to expect the effects thereof. My counsel shall therefore be, that we may immediately, at the high tides, begin to let the waters loose into the neighbouring ground of Leyden: greater tides will hereafter follow. And thus, turning the siege upon the besiegers, we may hope to destroy our enemies within their own works, and at the same time to free the city from all danger. It may be thought impossible to relieve it by land, or by the ordinary way of channels or rivers; whereas, by the way which I have prescribed, we may believe that our enterprise will be smiled on by success. It will be in our power to let in the inundation where we please. We shall see the enemy strangely astonished and confused between the shame of abandoning the siege and the horror of continuing it. But being forced at last to fly, we shall see our own weapons and those of nature conspire together in slaughtering them on all sides; and shall see that punishment justly transferred on them which they with open violence prepared for the innocent. The country which shall be drowned will doubtlessly be somewhat indamaged thereby; but who would not bear with such an inconvenience, whereby their country shall receive so great a benefit? On the contrary, whose hair will not stand on end to think, that, after the loss of Harlem and of Leyden, all the whole province will shortly remain at the cruel will of the Spaniards? We must sometimes be wicked to be good. How oft do we cut off some one member for the welfare and safeguard of the rest of the body? Yet this evil will not prove finally so great, but that it will in time be paid with great usury. Some worldly actions prove so memorable, as they strike envy dumb and add new tongues to fame. This of ours will certainly be such, and will be everywhere highly celebrated. I, who so boldly give the advice, do as confidently pronounce the augury; and hope that the event will crown both of them with fortunate success.’
“At the hearing of so strange a proposition, the deputies were much confused, whether they should accept of it or reject it. But it is oft-times seen that need, passing into necessity, necessity passeth luckily into desperation. And thus it proved in what we shall now relate. For all of them, joining at last in opinion that Leyden was not to be freed by any other way than by what Boisot had propounded, it was resolved that at all adventures, they would follow his advice. The chief banks or ditches of the Meuse and Isell between Rotterdam and Tergowe, were presently cut in divers places; and at the high tide the waters began to break in everywhere, and overflow all the grounds which lie between Tergowe, Rotterdam, Delf, and Leyden. At the sight of this unlooked-for inundation, the Spaniards were at first much astonished; but they were soon aware of the enemies’ design. The king’s forts were very many, as we have said, and divers of them were seated in the lowest places. These the inundation did quickly reach, and therefore they were quickly forsaken, and those who kept them went to join with those that kept the chiefest forts, which were so placed as they might be the more easily maintained. This meanwhile, when once the enemy had pitched upon the aforesaid resolution, they applied themselves apace to get together great store of vessels which should be fitting to relieve Leyden. They were very careful to build them with shallow bottoms, to the end that they might pass over such grounds where the waters were shallowest: the greatest part of them were built in Rotterdam by reason of the nearness and opportunity of its situation. Whole Holland was in great expectation what the success would prove, and therefore people flocked from all parts to help to build boats; many of which were to be in the form of gallies with oars, to the end that they might the easier get by the passes, and assault the forts, which were yet in the royalists’ possession. These boats were therefore furnished with many pieces of artillery, and such people as were judged fit to fight. Whilst they were making this preparation, the admiral of Holland endeavoured, with some ships prepared for that purpose, to force certain passes, and to bring some succour into Leyden; for the besieged suffered very much for want of victuals, and did very earnestly solicit succour. But his design did not at that time take effect; for the waters were not yet so far increased, as that his vessels could come near Leyden. All Holland joined therefore in their prayers, that the sea might suddenly swell higher; and that the province, by raising the siege of Leyden, might receive so desired a misfortune.
“On the other side, the king’s men were not wanting in securing their forts, and repairing them with earth, hay, and whatsoever else they could come by of most commodious; and hoping that the waters would swell no higher, they persuaded themselves that they should, within a few days, finish their business. They very well knew the townsmen’s necessities; and that all their victuals being already spent, the affairs within were drawing to great extremity. While both sides were in these hopes and fears, the time came wherein nature, by way of her hidden causes, was likewise to work her effects. About the end of September the sea began to swell exceedingly, according as she useth to do in that season of the year; and pouring in at the high tides, no longer waves, but even mountains of waters, into the most inward channels and rivers, made so great an inundation, as all the country about Leyden seemed to be turned into a sea.[60] It cannot be said how much the rebels were hereby encouraged, and the king’s men discouraged. The former came presently forth with their fleet, which consisted of about one hundred and fifty bottoms, a great part whereof were made like gallies; and to these were added many other boats which served only to carry victuals. The whole fleet was thus assembled together about the beginning of October, and put to water in good order, to execute their designed relief: the gallies went on the outsides; the other greater vessels, which, if need should be, were to play upon the forts in the midst; and those which bore the victuals in the rear. But there was no occasion of any great contention: for the king’s men, having valiantly defended themselves in sundry places, considering that they were not now to fight with men, but with the elements, thought rather how to withdraw themselves into places of safety, than rashly to oppose the enemy. Yet they could not forego their fortifications, neither so soon nor in so good order, but that many of them remained a prey either to the sword or to the water. And truly it was a miserable spectacle to behold from all parts, one slain, another drowned; and many endeavour to save themselves in the highest places, where, when they were freed from the waters, they were inexorably slain by the enemy.[61] ‘Tis said that above fifteen hundred of the king’s men perisht thus, and most of them Spaniards; as those who were chiefly employed in ordering the siege, and who desirous to bear away the greatest glory, fell into the greatest misfortune. Thus was Leyden at last relieved, after five months’ siege, to the exceeding great joy of the rebels and all that favoured them. But howsoever, the memory of this siege remained a long time very sorrowful in the city; for about ten thousand died within the town of hunger and other sufferings; and all the most unclean and vilest nourishment was already so consumed when the relief was brought in, and the besieged resolving rather to die than to yield; nothing was expected but that the city should give up her last breath, and remaining a miserable carcass, should be buried within her own walls and houses.”[62]
In this siege the Spanish general committed a fatal error in not trying an assault, which might probably have succeeded, since there were no regular troops within the town; a body of English auxiliaries who were placed in advance near Gouda, and intended by the Prince of Orange to form the garrison of Leyden, when dislodged, having behaved so ill in the first skirmish, that the citizens refused them entrance within the walls. And this step, which might have been their ruin, became the cause of their safety, for the additional number of consumers must have brought their provisions to an earlier end, besides that no troops, comparatively uninterested in the event, would have endured the extremity of distress to which the men of Leyden were reduced. Of the amount of their suffering, which the Italian historian just quoted barely notices, the reader will be enabled to form a fuller idea by a few particulars derived from other authorities.
“With extreme impatience they now expected the approach of those tides which are commonly the object of their dread and terror. The situation of the besieged was become the most desperate and deplorable. During seven weeks there had not been a morsel of bread within the city; and the only food had been the roots of herbs and weeds, and the flesh of dogs and horses. Even all these were at length consumed, and the people reduced to live on soup made of the hides of animals which had been killed. A pestilence succeeded to the famine, and carried off in a few weeks some thousands of the inhabitants. Those who survived, overwhelmed with anguish at the dismal scenes which they daily beheld, were scarcely able to perform the mournful office of burying the dead. In this dreadful situation they saw from their walls the flags and sails of the vessels destined for their relief, but had the mortification to perceive that it was utterly impossible for them to approach. It is not surprising that some of the people, finding their misery greater than they were able to endure, should have entertained the thoughts of surrendering the town to the enemy. Some conspiracies were again formed for this purpose, but they were discovered and defeated by the vigilance of Douza, supported by a great majority of the people, to whom neither the pestilence, nor famine, nor death in its most hideous forms, appeared so dreadful as the tyranny of the Spaniards.
“A great number of people having come one day in a tumultuous manner to a magistrate whose name was Adrian, exclaiming that he ought either to give them food, or deliver the town into the hands of the enemy: ‘I have solemnly sworn,’ he replied, ‘that I will never surrender myself or my fellow-citizens to the cruel and perfidious Spaniard; and I will sooner die than violate my oath. I have no food, else I would give it you. But if my death can be of use to you, take, tear me in pieces, and devour me; I shall die with satisfaction, if I know that by my death I shall for one moment relieve you from your direful necessity.’ By this extraordinary answer, the people, struck with astonishment, were silenced, and their fury was for some time appeased.”[63]
In default of a better parallel to the battle of Salamis, we conclude this chapter with the overthrow of the Spanish Armada. The points of resemblance, such as they are, are sufficiently obvious and general, and consist in the magnitude of the interests at stake, in the alacrity shown by the English as well as by the Athenian people, and in the signal defeat of the greater by the less force. We may also direct attention to the circumstance, that in each case the defeated fleet was superior to its antagonist in the bulk no less than the number of its ships, and in each case owed its destruction mainly to that very superiority; the lighter and more manageable vessels proving an over-match for their formidable-looking opponents. The incident, however, is sufficiently striking to deserve notice, even if the resemblance were weaker, and if national vanity called less strongly for its insertion; independently of which we have some pleasure in giving the following high-sounding specimen of a contemporary historian, who has summoned all his powers to match the dignity of his subject by the elevation of his style.
“Although this present yeere 1587 were but as the vigil of the next ensuing yeere 1588, concerning which yeere many ancient and strange prophecies in divers languages, and many excellent astronomers of sundry nations, had in very plain termes foretold, that the yeere 1588 should be most fatall and ominous unto all estates, concluding in these words, or to the like effect, viz. ‘And if in that yeere the world doe not perish and utterly decay, yet empires all, and kingdomes after shall, and no man to raise himself shall know no way, and that for ever after it shall be called the yeere of wonder,’ &c., yet for divers yeeres past, by reason of the aforesaid generall predictions, all Europe stood at gaze, vehemently expecting more strange and terrible alterations, both in imperiall and regall estates, than ever happened since the world began. Which sayd universall terror was this present yeere half abated, and plainely discovered that England was the maine subject of that time’s operation: for albeit, the Spanish provision for three yeeres past were discerned to be wonderous great, for speciall service by sea and land, yet used they all possible secrecy concerning their intent, until they were fully furnished.