‘We have a sheep fair here, too, at Ratisbon, but of old horned rams, and not of young Suffolk lambs.
‘Yours cordially,
‘Bristol.’
From Thomas Law, Esq., who resided long in Bengal, on the application of the Corn Laws.
‘Weymouth Street: Jan. 5, 1793.
‘Sir,—I have fortunately obtained the perusal of your “Travels,” and the sentiments conveyed therein so totally coincide with my observations of eighteen years upon the extensive continent of Asia, that, upon your arrival in town, I shall be happy to convey to you any information in my power respecting the agriculture of Bengal, Behar, and Benares.
‘When a member of a grain committee during a drought, I pursued your system, which coincides with that of Adam Smith, viz.: All our object was to prevent impediments to the free transport of corn, being convinced that it would be removed from an abundant province to one which was less productive, and, like water, find its level, and that the interest of merchants would convey it from cheap places to dear ones, and thus promote the general good. I could impart to you many fatal instances of the intervention of powers by fixing the price and by forcing corn to market.
‘I can show you the thanks of a resident who presided in the capital of an extensive district threatened with a famine, and who wrote to me asking my opinion upon the following propositions: First, “Shall I raise subscriptions to supply the poor with rice at this crisis?” Answer, “You will thereby not only encourage a concourse to your city of persons whose expectations will be deceived, as their numbers will exceed the amount of your gratuities, and you will thereby destroy many; but you will enhance the price in the city.” Secondly, “Shall I compel the granaries to be opened, and fix a moderate price?” Answer, “By no means. You will thereby deter the merchants from bringing grain to market, and will thereby starve your inhabitants. Your power can only extend to a certain limit, and within that the merchant will not enter. If supplies are coming to you, those who have grain for sale will have advice of it, and hurry their grain to market; but if you compel them, you will stop all imports by such forcible interference. Have you calculated at what price the merchant buys at a distance, at what expense he brings it, &c.? In short, you have the choice of the alternative—whether for a day or two you will submit to want, and then be relieved by the exertions of those who always hasten to a good market; or whether you will gain popularity for a day or two by a compulsory expenditure of the quantity within your grasp, and then fall a martyr to an exasperated starving people.” He adopted the first, and thanked me in the strongest terms.
‘About that time, when Government intended to purchase grain to supply certain places, I protested against it, because those places would entirely rely upon Government management; for no merchant would convey to places where Government by a sudden import might overflow the market—if London were to be supplied with every want by a contract or monopoly, the effect is easily foreseen.
‘In respect to a fixed land tax, I can show you some very satisfactory papers upon the subject; as I had to contend against some very able advocates for periodical equalisation, and at length have obtained a fixed land tax for ever. In Asia we have metayers, as in France; we have surveyors of the crop. In short, to a gentleman of your philosophic and agricultural turn I may prove a welcome referee. To the many pertinent questions you will put, you will, no doubt, find many deficient replies, for I am conscious of having omitted much. Unluckily I had never seen your able productions, and had too often to find the truth by the experience of error.