1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from Servitude, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man is free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints hinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing to do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity.
2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the language of a very distinguished philosopher, “if you cut off a man’s little finger, you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency;” because, in that case, you abridge so much his power to do as he chooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may be destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? Is this Liberty as distinguished from Necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of moral obligation?
3. If this is the only sense in which man is free, then dire Necessity reigns throughout the entire domain of human agency. If all acts of Will are the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at the time subjected, much more must a like necessity exist between all acts of Will and their consequents, external and internal. This has been already shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and states, exists in a chain of antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, linked together in every part and department by a dire necessity. This is all the Liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us; a Liberty to choose as influences necessitate us to choose, and to have such acts of Will followed by certain necessary consequents, external and internal. In this scheme, the idea of Liberty, which all admit must have a location somewhere, or obligation, is a chimera; this idea, I say, after “wandering through dry places, seeking rest and finding none,” at length is driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not a living habitation.
4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, as the foundation of moral obligation, should be located here. Because that acts of Will are followed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and internal, therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of Will, whatever the influences acting upon us may be, and however impossible it may be to put forth those acts under those influences! Did ever a greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian?
5. The public are entirely deceived by this definition, and because they are deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true? Suppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means, when he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this express your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for example, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must put forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot but walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No, he would say. That is not my idea at all. If that is true, man is not a free agent at all. What men in general really mean when they say, they can do as they please, and are therefore free, is, that when they put forth a given act of Will, and for this reason conduct in a given manner, they may in the same circumstances put forth different and opposite determinations, and consequently act in a different and opposite manner from what they do.
VI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to the practical tendencies of their doctrine demands a passing notice. All acts of the Will, they say, are indeed necessary under the circumstances in which they occur; but then we should learn the practical lesson not to place ourselves in the circumstances where we shall be liable to act wrong. To this I reply:
1. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in the circumstances which originate a given choice, is as necessary as the choice itself. For I am in those circumstances either by an overruling Providence over which I have no control, or by previous acts of the Will rendered necessary by such Providence. Hence the difficulty remains in all its force.
2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, that is, that our being in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not necessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such circumstances, and not to place himself there again?
[GROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ABILITY.]
VII. We are now fully prepared to state the ground which Necessitarians of every school are bound to take in respect to the doctrine of Ability. It is to deny that doctrine wholly, to take the open and broad ground, that, according to any appropriate signification of the words, it is absolutely impossible for men to will, and consequently to act, differently from what they do; that when they do wrong, they always do it, with the absolute impossibility of doing right; and that when they do right, there is always an equal impossibility of their doing wrong. If men have not power to will differently from what they do, it is undeniably evident that they have no power whatever to act differently: because there is an absolutely necessary connection between volitions and their consequents, external actions. The doctrine of Necessity takes away wholly all ability from the creature to will differently from what he does. It therefore totally annihilates his ability to act differently. What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, becomes of the doctrine of Ability? It is annihilated. It is impossible for us to find for it a “local habitation or a name.” As honest men, Necessitarians are bound to proclaim the fact. They are bound to proclaim the doctrine, that, in requiring men to be holy, under influences under which they do sin, and cannot but sin (as it is true of all sinful acts according to their theory), God requires of them absolute impossibilities, and then dooms them to perdition for not performing such impossibilities.