There are, among others, two senses of the term Liberty, which ought to be carefully distinguished from each other. In the first sense, it stands opposed to Necessity; in the second, to what is called Moral Servitude. It is in the last sense that I propose to consider the subject in the present Chapter. What, then, is Liberty as opposed to Moral Servitude? It is that state in which the action of Will is in harmony with the Moral Law, with the idea of the right, the just, the true, and the good, while all the propensities are held in perfect subordination—a state in which the mind may purpose obedience to the law of right with the rational hope of carrying that determination into accomplishment. This state all mankind agree in calling a state of moral freedom. The individual who has attained to it, is not in servitude to any propensity whatever. He “rules his own spirit.” He is the master of himself. He purposes the good, and performs it. He resolves against the evil, and avoids it. “Greater,” says the maxim of ancient wisdom, “is such a man than he that taketh a city.”
Moral Servitude, on the other hand, is a state in which the Will is so ensnared by the Sensibility, so habituated to subjection to the propensities, that it has so lost the prerogative of self-control, that it cannot resolve upon action in the direction of the law of right, with any rational expectation of keeping that resolution. The individual in this condition “knows the good, and approves of it, yet follows the bad.” “The good that he would (purposes to do), he does not, but the evil that he would not (purposes not to do), that he does.” All men agree in denominating this a state of Moral Servitude. Whenever an individual is manifestly governed by appetite, or any other propensity, by common consent, he is said to be a slave in respect to his propensities.
The reason why the former state is denominated Liberty, and the latter Servitude, is obvious. Liberty, as opposed to Servitude, is universally regarded as a good in itself. As such, it is desired and chosen. Servitude, on the other hand, may be submitted to, as the least of two evils. Yet it can never be desired and chosen, as a good in itself. Every man who is in a state of servitude, is there, in an important sense, against his Will. The state in which he is, is regarded as in itself the greatest of evils, excepting those which would arise from a vain attempt at a vindication of personal freedom.
The same principle holds true in respect to Moral Liberty and Servitude. When any individual contemplates the idea of the voluntary power rising to full dominion over impulse of every kind, and acting in sublime harmony with the pure and perfect law of rectitude, as revealed in the Intelligence, every one regards this as a state, of all others, the most to be desired and chosen as a good in itself. To enter upon this state, and to continue in it, is therefore regarded as a realization of the idea of Liberty in the highest and best sense of the term. Subjection to impulse, in opposition to the pure dictates of the Intelligence, to the loss of the high prerogative of “ruling our own spirits,” on the other hand, is regarded by all men as in itself a state the most abject, and least to be desired conceivable. The individual that is there, cannot but despise his own image. He, of necessity, loathes and abhors himself. Yet he submits to self-degradation rather than endure the pain and effort of self-emancipation. No term but Servitude, together with others of a kindred import, expresses the true conception of this state. No man is in a state of Moral Servitude from choice—that is, from choice of the state as a good in itself. The state he regards as an evil in itself. Yet, in the exercise of free choice, he is there, because he submits to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to freedom.
REMARKS.
[MISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS.]
1. We notice a prominent and important mistake common to metaphysicians, especially of the German school, in their Treatises on the Will. Liberty of Will with them is Liberty as distinguished from Moral Servitude, and not as distinguished from Necessity. Hence, in all their works, very little light is thrown upon the great idea of Liberty, which lies at the foundation of moral obligation, to wit: Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. “A free Will,” says Kant, “and a Will subjected to the Moral Law, are one and identical.” A more capital error in philosophy is not often met with than this.
[MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE.]
2. In the state of Moral Servitude above described, the Bible affirms all men to be, until they are emancipated by the influence of the Remedial System therein revealed—a truth affirmed by what every man experiences in himself, and by the entire mass of facts which the history of the race presents. Where is the individual that, unaided by an influence out of himself, has ever attained to a dominion over his own spirit? Where is the individual that, without such an influence, can resolve upon acting in harmony with the law of pure benevolence, with any rational hope of success? To meet this great want of human nature; to provide an influence adequate to its redemption, from what the Scriptures, with great propriety, call the “bondage of corruption,” is a fundamental design of the Remedial System.