The fact of individual variability can in this way be well understood; the living organism contains in itself no principle of variability—it is the statical element in the developmental processes of the organic world, and would always reproduce exact copies of itself if the inequality of the external influences did not affect the developmental course of each new individual; these influences are therefore the dynamical elements of the process.

From this conception of variability two important empirically established facts can be theoretically deduced, viz. the limitability of variation with respect to quality, which has already been previously mentioned, and the origination of transformations by the direct action of external conditions of life.

If the differences in individuals of the same origin depend upon the action of unequal influences, variation itself is nothing else than the reaction of the organism to a definite external inciting cause, the quality of the variation being determined by the quality of the inciting cause and by that of the organism. In the cases of individual variation hitherto considered, the quality of the organism is equal but that of the inciting cause is unequal, and in this way there arise minute differences in organisms of an equal physical constitution—variations of a different quality.

The same result, viz., different qualities of variation, may also arise in a reverse manner by organisms of a different physical nature being affected by equal external influences. The response of the organism to the cause inciting change would be different according to its nature, or, in other words, organisms of different natures react differently when affected by equal modifying influences. The physical nature of the organism plays the chief part with respect to the quality of the variations; each specific organism can thus give rise to extremely numerous, but not to all conceivable, variations; that is, only to such variations as are made possible by its physical composition. From this it follows further that the possibilities of variation in two species are more widely different, the wider they diverge in physical constitution (including bodily morphology)—that a cycle of variation is peculiar to every species. In this manner we are led to the knowledge that there must certainly exist a “fixed direction of variation,” but not in the sense of Askenasy and Von Hartmann, as the result of an unknown internal principle of development, but as the necessary, i.e. mechanical, consequence of the unequal physical nature of the species, which must respond even to the same inciting cause by unequal variations.

The facts, as far as we know them, agree very well with this conclusion. Allied species vary in a similar manner, whilst species which are more distantly related vary in a different manner, even when acted upon by the same external influences. Thus, in the first part of these “Studies” I have remarked that many butterflies under the influence of a warm climate acquire an almost black coloration (Polyommatus Phlæas), whilst on the other hand others become lighter (Papilio Podalirius).

We can thus understand why always certain courses of development are followed, a fact which cannot be completely explained by the nature of the conditions of life which induce the variations. But as soon as we clearly perceive that the quality of the changes essentially depends upon the physical nature of the organism itself, we arrive at the conclusion that species of widely diverging constitutions must give rise to different variations, whilst those of allied constitutions would produce similar variations. But definite courses of development are thus traced out, and we perceive that from any point of the organic developmental series, it is impossible that any other point can be attained at pleasure. Variation in a definite direction thus by no means necessitates the acknowledgment of a metaphysical developmental principle, but can be well conceived as the mechanical result of the physical constitution of the organism.

The manner in which the dissimilar physical constitution of organisms must arise can also be easily shown, although the first commencement of the whole developmental series, i.e. the oldest living forms must be assumed to have been almost homogeneous in their physical constitution. The quality of the variation is, as said before, not merely the product of the physical constitution, but the resultant of this and of the quality of the changing external conditions. Thus from the first “species” there proceeded, through the dissimilar influence of external conditions of life, several new “species,” and as this took place the former physical nature of the organism at the same time became changed, necessitating also a new mode of reacting upon external influences, i.e. another direction of variation. The difference from the primary “species” must certainly be conceived as having been very minute, but it must have increased with each new transformation, and must have proceeded exactly parallel with the degree of physical change connected with each transformation. Thus, hand in hand with the modifications, the power of modification, or mode of reaction of the organism to changing influences, must have continually become re-modified, and we finally obtain an endless number of differently constituted living forms, of which the variational tendencies are different in exact proportion to their physical divergence, so that nearly allied forms respond similarly, and widely divergent forms very differently, to the same inciting causes.

Individual variation arises, as I have attempted to show, by each individual having been continually affected by different, and indeed by constantly changing, influences. Let us, however, imagine on the contrary, that a large group of individuals is affected by the same influences—in fact by such influences as the remaining individuals of the species are not exposed to: this group of individuals would then vary in a nearly similar manner, since both factors of variation, viz. the external influence and the physical constitution, are equal or nearly so. Such local variations would first become prominent when the same external influence had acted upon a series of generations, and the minima of variation produced in the individual by the once-exerted action of the cause inciting change had become augmented by heredity. Transformations of some importance (up to the form-value of species) can thus arise simply by the direct action of the environment, in the same way as that in which individual differences are produced—only the latter fluctuate from generation to generation, since the inciting influences continually change; whilst, in the former, the constant external cause inciting modification always reproduces the same variation, so that an accumulation of the latter can take place. Climatic varieties can be thus explained.

A more efficacious augmentation of the variations arising in the single individual is certainly brought about by the indirect action of the environment upon the organism. It is not here my intention to explain once more the processes of natural selection; I mention this only in order to point out that in these cases transformation depends upon a double action of the environment, since the latter first induces small deviations in the organism by direct action, and then accumulates by selection the variations thus produced.

By regarding variability in this manner—by considering each variation as the reaction of the organism to an external action, as a diversion of the inherited developmental direction, it follows that without a change in the environment no advance in the development of organic forms can take place. If we imagine that from any period in the earth’s history the conditions of life remain completely unchanged, the species present on the earth at this period would not, according to our view, undergo any further modification. Herein is clearly expressed the difference of this view from that other one according to which the inciting principle of modification is not in the environment, but lies in the organism itself in the form of a phyletic vital force.