In any case the philosophers of that period cannot be blamed for filling up the gaps in the existing knowledge by unknown powers, and in this manner seeking to establish a finished system. The task of philosophy is different to that of natural science; the former strives at every period to set up a completely finished representation of the universe in accordance with the existing state of knowledge. Natural science on the other hand is only concerned in collecting this knowledge; she need not therefore always finish off, and indeed can never close her account, since she will never be in a position to solve all problems.[284] But science must not for this reason pronounce any question to be insoluble simply because it has not yet been completely solved; this she does, however, as soon as she renounces the possibility of a mechanical explanation by invoking the aid of a metaphysical principle.
That this is the correct mode of scientific investigation is seen by the abandoning of the (ontogenetic) vital force. The latter is no longer admitted by anybody, now that we have turned from mere speculation to the investigation of Nature’s processes; nevertheless its non-existence has not been demonstrated, nor are we yet in a position to prove that all the phenomena of life must be traced to purely physico-chemical processes, to say nothing of our being actually able to thus trace them. Von Baer also states “that the abolishment of the vital force is an important advance; it is the reduction of the phenomena of life to physico-chemical processes, although these indeed still contain many gaps.” He points out how very far we are still removed from being able to reduce to physical causes, the processes through which the fertilized yelk of an egg becomes developed into a chicken.
How comes it therefore that we all have a conviction that such a complete reduction will in time become possible, or if not this, that the development of the individual depends entirely upon the same forces which are in operation without the organism? For what reason have we rejected the “vital force”?
Simply because we see no reason for assuming that known forces are insufficient for explaining the phenomena, and because we are not justified in admitting directive forces as long as we have any hope of one day furnishing a mechanical explanation.
But if it is not only permissible, but even necessary, to explain the ontogenetic vital power by known forces, and to commence to indicate the mechanism which produces the individual life, why should it not be equally necessary to abandon that assumption of a phyletic vital force which stifles any deeper inquiry, and to attempt to point out that here also the co-operation of mechanical forces has brought about the multitudinous and wonderful phenomena of the organic world?
The renunciation of the old vital force was certainly an immediate consequence of the acquisition of new facts—of the knowledge that the same compounds which compose organic bodies can be produced without the latter. This discovery, due to Wöhler and his followers, showed that organic products could be prepared artificially.[285] In brief, the decline of the vital force followed from the knowledge that at least one portion of the processes of life was governed by known forces.
But in the domain of the development of the organic world have we not quite analogous proofs of the efficacy of known forces? Is not the variability of all types of forms a fact? and must not this under the action of natural selection and heredity lead to permanent changes? Has not the problem of explaining the subserviency of all organic form to law as a result without invoking its aid as a principle been thus successfully solved? It is true that we have not directly observed the process of natural selection from beginning to end; neither has anybody directly observed the mode in which the heat of the animal body is generated by the processes of combustion going on in the blood and in the tissues; nevertheless, this is believed as a certainty, and a “vital force” is not invoked.
Now the above-mentioned Darwinian principles of transmutation are certainly not simple forces of nature like those underlying the development of the individual, i.e. chemico-physical forces, and it cannot be said à priori whether in one of these principles—perhaps in variability or in correlation—there may not lie concealed a metaphysical principle in addition to the physical forces. In fact it has lately been asserted by Edward von Hartmann[286] that the theory of selection is not a mechanical explanation, since it combines forces which are only partly mechanical and in part directive.
It must therefore be next investigated whether this assertion is tenable.